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ABSTRACT 
This thesis presents a case study of a briefing paper coauthored by a technical writer 
employed at an agricultural research center at a land-grant university. The intent of the 
briefing paper is to create new knowledge about the European Union's ban on imports of 
beef from cattle produced with growth-promoting hormones and intended for human 
consumption. Given the complexity and length of the U.S.-EU dispute over the use of 
growth-promoting hormones in beef production, the case study discusses the need for the 
writer to hold extensive topical expertise, which includes knowledge about current research 
and about the historical political, economic, and social context of the hormone issue. On the 
other hand, the technical writer does not hold the educational and publishing credentials 
normally required for creating knowledge within the discipline of economics, where the 
research center resides. The case study explains how the technical writer's rhetorical 
decisions about content for the briefing paper address the institutionalization of power and 
authority inside and outside the university and how this power and authority both benefit and 
constrain the technical writer's efforts to create knowledge in an academic workplace. 
1 
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Technical writers bring theory and expertise from their own discipline to writing projects 
within other disciplines. However, technical writers often are perceived as lacking the 
appropriate qualifications to create knowledge from within another discipline and their 
expertise and work are often discounted relative to that of experts within other disciplines . 
. This thesis discusses the institutionalization of university research as a dominant source of 
knowledge and several factors that determine whether a technical writer can achieve the 
power and authority required to create knowledge from within a second discipline in an 
academic workplace. 
To address these issues, this thesis presents a case study of an academic research paper 
prepared by a technical writer. The case study illustrates how the academic workplace both 
creates and limits opportunities for technical writers with topical expertise to add to the 
institutional body of knowledge held within a second discipline. Specifically, this thesis uses 
the case study to answer the following questions. 
1. How and why do institutional practices within universities control who is allowed to 
create knowledge within an academic discipline? 
2. To what extent does a writer's understanding of the academic institution as both a source 
of new knowledge and a workplace; external political, economic, anc~ social factors and 
relationships; and the parameters that define an academic research paper affect rhetorical 
decisions about the content of a research paper? 
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3. Can a technical writer create new knowledge from within another academic discipline? 
If so, how does one determine whether new knowledge has been created? 
The case study examines how a technical writer made rhetorical decisions based on the 
institutional environment of the university, the role of the university relative to external 
entities such as the U.S. government, and the technical writer's power and authority within 
the university as a workplace and within an academic discipline of which the technical writer 
is not a full member. 
The discussion focuses on the technical writer's attempt to participate in the process of 
creating knowledge based on knowledge about (1) the topic of the research paper; (2) 
government- and industry-based political, economic, and social issues; (3) the political 
environment of the university as workplace; (4) the relationship of the university relative to 
data sources and potential readers; (5) institutionalized rules and conventions for creating 
publishable academic text; and (6) communication theory. As will be discussed, some of the 
institutional authority that protects academic disciplines from contributions by nonexpert 
interlopers can also contribute to the technical writer's ability to create knowledge. 
Throughout this thesis, a nonexpert is defined as an individual who has not achieved the level 
of education (Ph.D.) and has not published the appropriate texts (i.e., peer review articles) 
that allow acceptance as a full member of an academic discipline or professional field and 
who does not enjoy the full benefits of power that accompany identification as an expert. 
This thesis also employs a less conventional definition of data than is often the case. 
Here, data are defined as any type of information provided by external sources, held or 
developed within the research center, and considered as possible content for the briefing 
paper. Thus, the data used for the briefing paper covered a wide range of information, from 
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statistical data provided on U.S. government Internet sites to data expressed as individual 
beliefs or hearsay by other external sources. 
The case study analyzes the development of a briefing paper prepared for an agricultural 
research center within the Department of Economics at a midwestern land-grant university. 
The purpose of the research center is to provide information to small and mid-sized 
agribusiness firms to help them enter or expand international markets for U.S. agricultural 
products and technologies. As one form of output of the research center, briefing papers 
address current issues that will help U.S. exporters evaluate the potential for selling their 
products in foreign markets. 
The briefing paper genre was created by the research center as a way to discuss current 
and sometimes highly political issues. The genre offers an opportunity for authors to present 
a subjective U.S. perspective on international issues as opposed to attempting to enforce the 
strict objectivity generally associated with "pure" academic research. As such, briefing 
papers provide an outlet for presenting information to both expert and nonexpert readers, but 
the level of writing and approach to the topic assume some prior knowledge about the topic 
on the part of the reader. The audience for briefing papers includes agricultural producers 
and processors, exporters, government researchers, legislators, individuals who participate in 
government policymaking, and academic faculty and staff. Briefing papers are published on 
a public Internet site, so the audience includes both U.S. and international readers. 
An example of a briefing paper that presents information targeting both expert and 
nonexpert readers is a paper about livestock identification, meat traceability, and quality 
assurance programs in Australia and New Zealand (Lawrence 2002). This paper describes 
the different programs and contrasts their development with the less developed programs in 
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the United States. The target audience for this paper would include cattle producers, beef 
processors, beef exporters, beef importers, beef industry groups, policymakers, and 
researchers who might, for example, study the relative costs and benefits of the programs. 
Most, if not all, members of the target audience would have some knowledge about these 
systems and why they are being developed. 
The target audience might also be aware of political and economic issues involved in 
developing the systems. Political issues would include U.s. cattle producers' concern about 
liability for food safety problems that might be attached to them through animal 
identification, and economic issues would include the additional costs of implementing the 
systems, who would pay these additional costs, and whether beef production is more 
profitable or less profitable to members of the supply chain when the programs are 
implemented. An important element of this and other briefing papers is that the discourse 
used can be understood by all levels of expertise, not just experts in a specific discipline. It is 
worth noting that this briefing paper was prepared by an economics professor with full 
membership in the discipline. The linkages between academic credentials, expertise, 
authorship, power, and authority will be developed in this thesis for both full members of 
academic disciplines and for technical writers. 
As with most papers published by a university, briefing papers are expected to advance 
the missions of the research center, the academic department, and the university in which 
they are prepared. To achieve this goal, the research center is responsible for protecting the 
credibility of all three entities by ensuring the papers are based on accurate information 
presented in a manner acceptable to the university community as a whole. 
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The briefing paper used as a case study for this thesis was coauthored by a technical 
writer and a professor of economics. The paper discusses economic and trade implications of 
the European Union (EU) ban on importing beef for human consumption from cattle treated 
with growth-promoting hormones (Clemens and Babcock 2002b). The decision to prepare 
the briefing paper was made after a short article prepared by the same authors uncovered 
questions about the costs of the EU hormone ban to the U.S. beef industry that were not 
answered in the current literature (Clemens and Babcock 2002a). 
Prior to implementation ofthe hormone ban in 1989, many studies were conducted to 
determine an aggregate value of the economic losses to the U.S. beef industry as a result of 
the ban. However, little analysis was published once the hormone ban and U.S. retaliatory 
tariffs were implemented in 1989. More recent trade data indicated that very little trade has 
taken place since the ban, and the lack of supply and/or the high cost of producing non-
hormone treated beef were the most likely causes for the decline in trade. No public sources 
of supply potential or production costs were found, so research was initiated to discover the 
factors causing reduced U.S. beef exports to the European Union. 
In addition to the decline in trade, far-reaching political, economic, and social changes 
had occurred since the ban on hormone-treated beef was imposed. For example, the 
European Union was planning to allow ten more countries to join the union, and the volume 
and value of U.S. beef exports to the countries slated for accession were expected to decline 
because these countries would be required to adopt the hormone ban. The U.S. beef industry 
had proposed that the United States receive compensation from the European Union for trade 
that would be lost when the ten countries joined the European Union. Because EU expansion 
had not been an issue when the hormone ban was implemented, these issues were not 
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included in the pre-ban studies. The scope of the briefing paper was expanded beyond 
production costs, supply, and trade volumes to address these accession issues. 
In addition, the European Union was preparing to comment on research the member-
states believed would support the hormone ban based on human safety factors. The comment 
and the briefing paper were being prepared simultaneously. Although the comment was not 
known to be forthcoming when the briefing paper was prepared, the timeliness of publishing 
the briefing paper relative to the comment helped increase the potential value ofthe briefing 
paper's content to some members of the intended audience. 
In presenting the case study, this thesis is organized as follows. The next chapter 
provides a review of relevant literature about the institutionalization of knowledge and who 
is allowed to create knowledge. Chapter 3 provides a historical context for the domestic and 
international political environment surrounding the EU ban on hormone-treated beef. This 
historical context helps situate the briefing paper within the changing political, economic, 
and social environments within which trade negotiations over the hormone dispute have 
occurred. The historical background also contextualizes the level of expertise necessary for a 
writer to prepare a research paper about the hormone ban. The discussion focuses on the 
non-university (external) environment, which in tum affects the university (internal) 
environment within which the briefing paper was prepared. 
Chapter 4 presents the case study and demonstrates how rhetorical decisions made by the 
technical writer for the briefing paper respond to the demands of the university as a source of 
knowledge; to the relationships among the university and external entities such as the Office 
of the U.S. Trade Representative, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and the U.S. beef 
industry; and to the internal relationships within and demands ofthe academy as a 
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workplace. Finally, Chapter 5 presents some conclusions that can be drawn from the case 
study. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
This thesis presents a case study of a briefing paper published by a university research 
center and coauthored by a technical writer and a professor in an academic discipline in 
which the technical writer is not a full member as measured by academic credentials. To 
provide a theoretical context for the thesis, this literature review presents recent research 
about creating knowledge within an academic environment. Specifically, the review presents 
research that addresses factors that govern whether a technical writer can create knowledge 
from within another discipline as opposed to acting as a discursive functionary who simply 
presents existing information. The unifying element of the research presented in this 
literature review is the focus on power and authority in the creation of knowledge in a 
university. 
To address the issues that emerged in developing the case study for this thesis, this 
literature review presents research on the power of the university as a social institution in 
creating and disseminating knowledge. The review includes literature from several 
disciplines (i.e., composition theory, rhetoric, philosophy, sociology, and education) to 
examine how writers who participate in the process of creating knowledge understand and 
respond to institutionalized power relationships; political, economic, and social 
environments; and the parameters that define disciplinary discourses. 
All writers attempting to "write new knowledge" within an academic institution face 
some common issues. Power relationships, workplace roles, and a writer's education level 
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are evaluated within the hierarchies and systems that select what research will be considered 
new knowledge (i.e., published) and what work will be excluded. The literature chosen for 
this review addresses the institutionalization of the university as a primary source of new 
knowledge, issues faced by all writers, issues faced by full members of an academic 
discipline, and issues faced by authors who are not full members of a discipline. The case 
study presented in Chapter 4 uses some of the specific issues addressed during preparation of 
the briefing paper to compare the technical writer's experience with some of the theoretical 
concepts reported in this literature review. 
The first section of this review presents research about the institutionalization of 
knowledge and the relationship between power and knowledge, starting with the work of 
Foucault. This body of literature examines theory on opportunities and limitations with 
regard to who is allowed to create knowledge and what new knowledge is allowed to be 
created, with an emphasis on the university as workplace. The second section focuses on 
how institutionalized power and authority guide the writing of new knowledge, both for full 
members of an academic discipline and for technical writers. This section includes a 
discussion of the peer review process as a method of negotiating the value of new 
knowledge. The final section discusses the effects of political, economic, and social factors 
on university research. Some of this literature addresses the role scientific discourse plays in 
informing policy makers and the public about food safety issues. The literature in this 
section is relevant to the case study presented in this thesis because food safety is at the heart 
of the dispute over the use of growth-promoting hormones in beef production. 
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The University as an Institution for Creating Knowledge 
According to Smith (1996), "Institutions manage public life .... They are social 
macro structures for stabilizing and legitimating relationships within and between groups as 
those relationships evolve" (205-06). Tudiver (1999) notes that, "Universities are crucial 
repositories for independent inquiry and the capacity to see beyond the horizons of 
conformity," and that "[t]he loss of such institutions threatens us with social stagnation" 
(171). 
In Western society, science has become the accepted basis on which new knowledge is 
created and the university has become the social institution charged with creating knowledge. 
Unlike research conducted by private companies that have profit as the primary incentive, 
university research generally has been perceived as sound, objective, science-based 
investigation conducted to benefit society. Keith (1997) asserts that researchers for private 
companies have different incentives than do university researchers because, "The business 
community's interests in science ... tend to be exclusively pragmatic: What can this 
(knowledge/device/technique) do for me?" (310). 
Anderson (2001) writes that, in contrast, "The purpose of academic research is often 
described in ideal terms as the pursuit of truth or the advancement of human knowledge" 
(242). In a more realistic concept of academic research, researchers advance knowledge 
because an "implicit social contract ... accords [faculty members] public support in return 
for service to the public good" (241). As will be discussed, the briefing paper analyzed in 
this thesis provides an example of how university research can perform both functions. For 
example, the briefing paper provides information about the costs of producing non-hormone 
treated beef that is available to industry participants before resources have been spent 
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developing a business plan. Thus, the paper provides information of benefit to individual 
companies and for the public good because it is equally available to all companies and saves 
government employees the task of responding to individual inquiries about the same 
questions. 
Using these concepts as a starting point, this section of the literature review discusses 
how universities have institutionalized the process of creating, controlling, and disseminating 
knowledge. Because Foucault is one of the more well-known modem philosophers to 
examine the institutionalization of knowledge, his work provides a basis from which to begin 
a discussion on the emergence of the university as a dominant source of knowledge. 
In "The Will to Knowledge," Foucault (1994) asserts that discursive practices allow us to 
analyze systems of thought on which knowledge is based. He identifies three elements of 
discursive practices that make such analysis possible. First, discursive practices are 
"characterized by the demarcation of a field of objects, by the definition of a legitimate 
perspective for a subject of knowledge, by the setting of norms for elaborating concepts and 
theories" (11). Second, discursive practices "take shape in technical ensembles, in 
institutions, in behavioral schemes, in types of transmission and dissemination, in 
pedagogical forms that both impose and maintain them" (12). Finally, transformation of a 
discursive practice is "tied to a whole, often quite complex set of modifications," which may 
occur outside it (e.g., political institutions), within it (e.g., the accumulation of data), or 
alongside it (in other discursive practices) (12). Thus, discursive practices govern selection 
and exclusion of knowledge within a system of thought. 
The importance of this approach to analyzing systems of thought is embedded in the way 
Foucault establishes the complex network of relationships among discursive practices and the 
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changing nature of the practices and the networks, both inside and outside a subject of 
knowledge (discipline). Further, these practices become controlled by norms, which become 
institutionalized and are then imposed and maintained through teaching. In the case study for 
this thesis, the institution of interest is the academy, which selects, excludes, and teaches 
knowledge and must interact with other institutions in the process. Foucault's description of 
discursive practices sets the stage for the remainder of this literature review and the case 
study for the briefing paper by giving us a theoretical perspective for understanding how 
systems of thought helped create the academy as an institution within which individuals work 
to create knowledge. 
Foucault also developed theories about the roles of genealogy, power, and social control 
in the development of the academy as a source of knowledge. An important element of these 
theories is the situating of texts as artifacts within the historically based process of creating 
and presenting knowledge. According to Foucault (1980), society has come to accept 
science as truth. He asserts that, "Science, the constraint to truth, the obligation of truth, and 
ritualized procedures for its production have traversed absolutely the whole of West em 
society for millennia and are now so universalized as to become the general law for all 
civilizations" (66). As discussed in the case study and conclusions of this thesis, these 
ritualized procedures are central to the ability of technical writers to create knowledge in 
their own and other disciplines. 
Given this societal perception about the role of science, Foucault (1980) attempts to 
answer the question of how the process of creating knowledge is "interwoven with the 
relations of power" (66). Although Foucault wrote extensively about the role of institutions 
in the surveillance, control, and discipline of society, he views the function of power as 
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potentially more productive than repressive. Foucault (1980) states that, "Far from 
preventing knowledge, power produces it" (59). He further asserts that 
What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it 
doesn't only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces 
things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be 
considered as a productive network which runs through the whole social body, 
much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression. (119) 
It is this productive function of power that has allowed the academy to emerge as a dominant 
source of knowledge. 
In his short history of rhetorical theory, Herzberg (1993) writes that, in the social view of 
communication, " ... logic, demonstration, science, and truth are ... to be regarded properly 
as the titles given at any moment by a particular group to the arguments that it finds most 
convincing, the assumptions that it questions least, and the paradigms that it follows in 
defining what counts as knowledge" (47-48). Under this theory, "knowledge is inseparable 
from rhetoric ... and must be inseparable from the group or community, its material 
circumstances, its historical conditions, its forms of discourse, and its agenda of self-
preservation, replication, and extension" (48). 
Under the social perspective described by Herzberg, truth is constantly changing and "is 
not found but made; it is never unassailable; its genesis is to be investigated in the arguments 
that have established it, in the purposes it serves, in the power it confers .... The rhetorical 
view of knowledge that underlies the social perspective in communication is, finally, a 
critique of the ways that knowledge is created and the purposes for which it is used" (48). 
Carpenter and Krest (2001) agree with Herzberg about the rhetorical nature of science, 
stating that "what defines scientific writing is that rhetorical situations, audiences, and goals 
are directly related to scientific practices" (48). 
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In another recent study, Cameron et al. (1999) compare different approaches to the study 
of social reality and the creation of knowledge. These authors agree with Foucault's 
assertions that power is a mUltiple relation connected both to knowledge and to '''regimes of 
truth'-sets of understanding which legitimate particular social attitudes and practices" 
(142). In their discussion on the relative power positions of researcher and subject, Cameron 
et al. "treat power metaphorically as a property which some people in some contexts can 
have more of than others" (152) and examine the implications for power relationships of 
including ethics (minimizing the potential for exploitation of or damage to subjects), 
advocacy (conducting research on and for subjects), and empowerment (conducting research 
on, for, and with subjects) in the research process. 
Within this framework, two relevant concepts emerge. First, the boundary between 
what "'we' [researchers] know and what 'they' [research subjects] know" contributes to the 
process "whereby knowledge acquires its authority and prestige" (Cameron et al. 1999, 155). 
A subject's belief that researchers hold expert information that is unavailable to the subjects 
confers power to the researchers and enhances the researchers' authority and prestige. 
Second, subjects "may have agendas of their own, things they would like the researchers to 
address" (Cameron et al. 1999, 155). The perception that researchers hold the power and 
authority to effect change in favor of a subject's personal agenda may encourage subjects to 
provide information intended to encourage such change. Although appropriate research 
design will mitigate the effects of attempts to influence results, the fact remains that 
perceptions of researcher power and authority may provide an incentive for subjects to 
participate in the research for this purpose. This concept of perceptions of researcher power 
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as an incentive for subjects to provide data for the briefing paper is developed in greater 
detail in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
The notion that researchers possess greater knowledge or expertise than do 
nonexperts appears frequently in the literature about creating knowledge. For example, Keith 
(1997) writes that, "A traditional distinction is between audiences 'inside' science and 
'outside' science proper .... Audiences outside science are typically characterized by a lack 
of knowledge: They don't know what a specific scientist knows" (308-09). Geisler (1994) 
also addresses the boundary between experts and nonexperts and the power issues associated 
with creating and controlling knowledge. She contends that only individuals who achieve 
enough education to understand the reasoning processes of experts, the metadiscourse of 
texts by experts, and the "myth of the autonomous text" and who are able to explore the 
"extensive chains of reasoning aimed at being informative and persuasive" are allowed entry 
into the world of expertise (92-93). 
As noted in Chapter 1, the definition of a nonexpert used in this thesis is an individual 
who has not achieved the level of education (Ph.D.) and has not published the appropriate 
texts (i.e., peer review articles) that allow acceptance as a full member of an academic 
discipline or professional field and who does not enjoy the benefits of power and authority 
that accompany identification as an expert. This distinction between experts and nonexperts 
is central to the case study in that the technical writer has topical expertise but does not have 
1 To maintain consistency with the literature about the EU hormone ban, the trade bloc is 
referred to as the European Community for events that occurred prior to 1993 and as the 
European Union for events that occurred thereafter. As adjectives, EC and EU refer to the 
European Community and European Union, respectively. 
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the education the academy deems necessary to understand Geisler's extensive chains of 
reasoning needed to be informative and persuasive within a second discipline. 
More recently, Davis and Shadle (2000) contend that, "In the modern academy, the 
possessive gaze is expressed as the desire for expertise, which hides the passionate need to 
control the world" (421). Further, in an article about quality assurance in higher education, 
Salter and Tapper (2000) argue that, "As part of the continuing power struggle for control 
over the regulation of high-status knowledge, quality assurance combines technical, 
bureaucratic, and value elements in ways which give power to some and remove it from 
others" (66). 
Many other theorists have addressed ways power is bestowed to individuals with 
expertise, especially with regard to science and education. In 1916, Max Weber pioneered 
credentialing theory, which examines the role of universities in providing educational 
certification (i.e., diplomas) that "serve the formation of a privileged stratum in bureaus and 
in offices [that serves to] limit the supply of candidates for these positions and to monopolize 
them for the holders of educational patents" (Brown 2001, 20). In expanding Weber's 
theory, Brown asserts that, "Powerful professions control the production of 'expertise' (the 
content of professional schooling)" and that "[t]he standardization of knowledge bases in 
schools ... builds public and organization faith in the veracity of professional claims of 
expertise" (28). Norgaard (1999) writes that, "In a culture both obsessed with and skeptical 
toward experts, we seem to agree on this much: the 'real' experts are scientists, doctors, and 
engineers" (44). This cultural agreement suggests that definitions of expertise for 
professionals in these three fields are more widely accepted within society than notions of 
expertise for individuals in most other disciplines (e.g., communications theory). This 
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agreement would also suggest that individuals in these professions be accorded greater power 
as a result of the perception of greater expertise they are accorded by society. 
According to Schwartzman (1994), differences in the power associated with expertise 
may arise from differences in credentialing/certifying experts. The status of a claim as truth 
depends on the criteria accepted as a legitimate means for testing it, and a community's idea 
of reality may be understood by examining how that community establishes and tests what it 
considers true amid shifting audiences, varying uses and interpretations of discourse, and 
changing conditions for establishing truth. Multiple criteria for expertise require movement 
along many discursive communities that recognize and certify experts differently, "with 
shifts and possible conflict among different standards for testing and certifying truth claims" 
(8). Using the case study presented in this thesis as an example, the criteria for certifying a 
technical writer include the writer's ability to use communication theory and words to 
establish and test truth, whereas criteria for certifying an economist include the ability to use 
economic theory and numerical equations to establish and test truth. As discussed in the case 
study and conclusions, a technical writer's inability to fulfill the criteria required by the 
discourse of economics limits hislher ability to develop, test, and certify truth claims within 
that discourse. 
Further, other discourses may not acknowledge the legitimacy of the criteria for 
credentialing the technical writer. Many communications theorists believe that the process of 
credentialing in some disciplines can cause members of those disciplines to "deny the 
rhetorical nature of their work," so the act of writing is not valued as an element of 
negotiating new knowledge (Norgaard 1999,47). Using engineers as an example, Norgaard 
claims that because engineers "receive their professional certification as undergraduates, 
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teachers working to improve their rhetorical skills thus face a double challenge in helping 
students become aware of the 'hard argumentative labor by which knowledge is constructed 
and maintained'" (47) (italics in original). The perception among engineering students that 
their knowledge comes "directly from physical reality" causes them to discount the expertise 
of individuals credentialed in other disciplines that do not produce or use physical objects. 
Part of the credentialing process includes admission to discourse communities by the 
groups authorized to create, control, and disseminate new knowledge within and outside their 
own professional groups. Bartholomae (1985) asserts that the purpose, projects, agendas, 
and limits of communication are not set until a writer is located within the discourse. Part of 
the process of locating oneself within a discourse involves learning to write according to the 
conventions of that discourse. Pare (1993) states that, "The relationship between discourse 
and knowledge is reciprocal: Each shapes the other" (122). Pare further states that writers 
must know the discourse rules within a community because membership within that 
community "is based, in large part, on adherence to such regulations" (122). Kuriloff (1996) 
examines the theory that "discourse practices are rooted in discrete discourse communities" 
(485). To become a full member ofa discipline and to communicate effectively within that 
discipline, one must learn how other members of that discipline communicate knowledge. 
The case study presented in this thesis examines the technical writer's understanding of 
discourse rules and practices within the second discourse community. An important concept 
in this discussion is that many aspects of this process are learned through experience rather 
than training. These rules and practices are as varied as conducting research that satisfies the 
goals of funding agencies, university administration, and the discipline; using statistical data 
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to illustrate and support arguments; presenting information in an appropriate academic 
format; and appropriate acknowledgement of the authority and power of data sources. 
As universities have become institutions for the creation of knowledge, the language of 
academic communities has become embedded in the literature of knowledge. Several 
theorists view this process as part of an ongoing conversation among disciplinary experts. 
Collier and Toomey (1997), for example, writes that as you participate "in an academic 
discipline or profession and become familiar with the literature ... you enter an ongoing 
conversation consisting of certain topics, accepted beliefs, and common questions" (69). 
Cayton (1991) writes that professional standing in academics requires training that 
"renders the nature and character of what we do beyond the reach of those without similar 
professional credentials" (650). Further, she writes that, "If professional academics claim to 
exist in order to provide public service to meet the needs of clients, we do so in such a way 
that the professional language we speak is all but inaccessible to outsiders" (650). Cayton 
includes marginalized faculty as a group of readers who are considered outsiders. 
Several other researchers have explored how professional language operates to increase 
the power, authority, and prestige of researchers while sacrificing access and understanding 
on the part of readers outside a specific discipline. Kuriloff (1996) contends that, "By 
endorsing the premise that each discipline's discourse is unique, we encourage fragmentation 
and separation in the academy," and this "highly specialized view of knowledge ... keeps 
professionals and scholars in different disciplines apart from one another" (486). In other 
words, professional language limits access to knowledge in one discipline to researchers in 
other disciplines. 
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Three other functions of professional language and the problems with each are worth 
examining here. First, according to Cayton (1991), one purpose of professional language is 
to convey a sense of researcher objectivity toward the research project. Checkoway (2001) 
describes the "prevailing positivist paradigm" whereby "researchers are 'detached' experts 
who define problems in 'dispassionate' ways on conceptual or methodological grounds 
according to their discipline and gather data ... [using] 'value-free' methods that assure 
reliability of findings" (134). According to Golden-Biddle and Locke (1997), "Following 
writing conventions in the 'sciences,' the writing in these reports generally is taken to be 
minimally expressive so that discovered phenomena can be reflected as clearly as possible in 
the text" (3). Further, researchers use specialized terminology that allows researchers to 
transfer information "from the field to the library" in a voice meant to convey dispassionate 
objectivity (3). 
This attempt to convey objectivity also serves to put research beyond the grasp of most 
nonexperts. Golden-Biddle and Locke (1997) assert that generations of academics have 
passed on a tradition of "language and writing practices that symbolize the culture of 
science" but that "obfuscate our points" for readers outside that discipline's boundaries (4). 
In other words, the desire to eliminate any suggestion of researcher subjectivity from a text 
has encouraged writing conventions that are intended to convey objectivity that makes the 
text less accessible to nonexperts outside a discipline. As will be discussed, the briefing 
paper analyzed in Chapter 4 adopts a similarly objective stance using a professional tone and 
style that distance the authors as experts from the readers. However, the information in the 
paper remains available to a wide range of non-experts. 
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A second function of professional language is to confer academic credibility to a 
scientific work. For example, Tebeaux (1996) writes that, " ... technical communication 
researchers, to give academic credibility to their work, have developed their own 
exclusionary language. This increasingly allusive, political, ideological, and abstract 
language gives intellectual stature and a sense of erudition to our work, but also alienates 
nonacademic users of our research" (50). In other words, specialized terminology makes the 
research less accessible to nonexperts. Returning to the briefing paper, the authors anticipate 
an audience with a broad range of topical expertise and education but assume some 
knowledge of the topic. Under this assumption, they use basic terms that would be well-
known within the industry, such as variety meats, feed efficiencies, growth-promoting 
hormones, but intentionally avoid the use of exclusive language and define terms that may 
not be understood by all readers. 
A third function of professional language is to elevate the status of data in scientific 
research. Because expert conversations place a high value on data to support research 
results, the use of data has become embedded in the literature of knowledge as a way to lend 
credibility to new knowledge. Winsor (l996a), among others, addresses this seeming 
intrinsic power of scientific data. She cites Latour in asserting that, " ... data and other 
written records produced by various kinds of instruments tend to be interpreted as reality 
'writing itself down' ... an origin that gives them great authority. The ability to produce and 
use data is one of the factors giving engineers their status as experts and, thus, a share of 
power in their employing organizations" (75). This narrow perception of data in scientific 
texts contributes to the power bestowed upon experts who create/gather and interpret data. 
The case study of the briefing paper presented in Chapter 4 discusses how the lack of 
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professional/specialized language can be perceived to "violate" the purposes of the three 
functions just described and reduce acceptance of research within an expert discourse 
community. 
In addition to linkages with power and authority, some uses of data to disseminate 
scientific knowledge may contribute to the inaccessibility of the information in another way. 
In their article about alternative pedagogical strategies for teaching research writing, Davis 
and Shadle (2000) note that, " ... the research paper is solely academic. In a culture overrun 
with data, the public often remains uninterested in the detached perspective of the modernist 
research paper" (420). In other words, potential readers may choose not to read a text simply 
because the inclusion of too much data make the text too difficult for all but the most 
interested reader to attempt to penetrate. 
It should be noted that other researchers, such as Clark (1998), perceive the functions of 
discipline-specific discourse communities as being much more complex and their boundaries 
as being much wider than those envisioned by theorists who view professional discourse as 
primarily exclusionary. Clark presents the view that discourse communities can be perceived 
less as territories to be protected by inclusion or exclusion, and more as travel, whereby 
successful communication "takes the form of a transient set of agreements" (17). Further, 
"communicating people [are] travelers who encounter and assist each other as they journey 
across a common space" (17). 
Others, such as Cayton (1991), contextualize disciplinary conversations within "the social 
substratum of academic discourse" (650), implying a hierarchy of power and authority in 
determining who is allowed to speak for a discipline. Within institutional hierarchies, an 
individual's eligibility to create knowledge is much more complex than inclusion or 
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exclusion from a disciplinary discourse based on the professional language of that 
community. In the land-grant university discussed in this thesis, for example, nonacademic 
staff members must achieve a minimum job classification before they are allowed to 
participate as a principle investigator on proposals for funding. However, it often happens 
that technical writers and other staff members with job classifications below that minimum 
level write all or most of the text in many proposals. Some of these employees have the 
academic credentials to be full members of the discourse community. This point illustrates 
that reasons for institutionalizing hierarchies of power and authority go beyond the ability to 
participate in some or all of a discipline's discourse solely on the basis of the ability to 
employ the discipline's professional language 
These hierarchies are not always perceived as positive. In what might seem to be a 
refutation of Foucault's assertion that power encourages the production of new knowledge, 
many researchers claim that the inefficiencies of the university as an institution limit the 
potential of researchers, stifle creativity, and marginalize qualified and creative individuals. 
In his text about knowledge management, for example, Halal (2003) asserts that, "Academic 
disciplines remain narrowly isolated from one another in 'silos' or 'stovepipes'" and that 
"apart from a few leading intellectual centers," most universities "lag the cutting edge of 
real-world innovation by about ten years" (4-5). He attributes these problems to academic 
bureaucracies that operate like the planned economy of the former Soviet Union. Halal 
envisions a more efficient, knowledge-based organizational structure that is driven from the 
bottom up rather than the current top-down hierarchies. 
In addition, several theorists contend that the very nature of power, authority, and 
prestige creates the danger that certain groups will be marginalized from participating in the 
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process of creating knowledge. Geisler (1994), for example, asserts that the structure of the 
U.S. academy, which rewards achievement based on individual motivation and cognitive 
resources, mutes ethnic and class conflicts within the system because expert knowledge 
appears to be universally accessible to American students, when in fact expert knowledge has 
historically been less accessible to individuals from some ethnic groups and economic levels 
(79). 
Harding (1991) makes a similar argument from a feminist perspective, arguing that the 
academic institution is exclusionary to many groups. She asserts that the current process of 
creating, protecting, and publishing knowledge marginalizes participants by ignoring "the 
historical location of their own analyses and the consequences of these analyses for the lives 
of others" (312). As described by Harding, a more inclusive theory would consider strong 
objectivity and strong reflexivity "in contrast to the weak objectivity of objectivism and its 
mirror-linked twin, judgmental relativism" (142). 
Many theorists believe that individuals from communications disciplines have less stature 
within both academic and corporate workplaces compared with individuals from other 
disciplines such as mathematics or the natural sciences. North (1987) argues that academic 
institutions undervalue practitioners as researchers. He asserts that methodological 
communities are "more or less united by ... an agreed-upon set of rules for gathering, 
testing, validating, accumulating, and distributing what they regard as knowledge" and that 
acceptable modes of inquiry in one discipline may not be as useful in another discipline (1). 
In composition, for example, lore (the body of knowledge developed by practitioners) is 
"driven by a pragmatic logic ... organized within an experience-based framework" (23). As 
such, practitioner inquiry is not accepted as scientifically rigorous. Practitioners are regarded 
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as technicians who use knowledge rather than make knowledge and are accorded lower status 
than are other researchers, who are conventionally perceived as makers of knowledge (21). 
Winsor's (1996b) assertion that "[ d]ifferent knowledge communities sort reality 
differently" supports North's claim (p. 169). The scientific conventions for studying corn 
yield, for example, are not useful in composition theory, so why would research for the two 
topics be evaluated using the same criteria? However, disciplines tend to cling to relatively 
universal academic conventions that equate knowledge with power and perpetuate the 
tendency to view writers as technicians and to classify their work as unscientific (North 360). 
Communication theory has not escaped this attempt to differentiate workplace settings as 
being either academic (the writer creates knowledge) or nonacademic (the writer works as a 
technician). As Ackerman and Oates (1996) assert, the problem with such a division is that 
the "nonacademic label further mythologizes the boundaries between literacy in the real 
world and academic settings .... and has produced categories of difference ... that are useful 
as entry points [to studying workplace writing] but that may otherwise obscure and limit 
participation and inquiry" (81-82). The case study used for this thesis was coauthored within 
the academy by a technical writer who is not a disciplinary expert in the conventional sense. 
Further, the briefing paper is written in a style that makes the text accessible to nonexperts, 
making these perceptions about differences between academic versus nonacademic writing 
especially pertinent to this discussion. 
As the university has become empowered as a dominant source of new knowledge, 
conventions for reporting knowledge have become embedded within its institutional systems. 
Collier and Toomey (1997) write that forms of writing (e.g., scientific writing) are 
conventions "adopted by academic and professional communities ... [that] structure thinking 
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and how one expresses ideas" (71). Further, "Like individuals, institutions have 'memories' 
of past experiences, methods, and procedures. As a member of the institution, you develop 
memories that alter, and are altered by, your writing process" (75). The forms of scientific 
and technical communication (e.g., proposals, instructions, and journal articles) represent "an 
acknowledged set of guidelines that bring precedent and order to bear on an exchange of 
ideas" (69). As mentioned in Chapter 1, the briefing paper used for this case study provides 
a genre that gives researchers more latitude in the type of information being presented to the 
target audience than do other, more conventional genres of academic writing. The 
implications of this alternative genre in providing opportunities for a technical writer to 
create knowledge are explored in the following chapters. 
The theoretical background just presented establishes the importance of factors including 
credentialing, expertise, and professional language in establishing an individual's power to 
create knowledge. The following section addresses the processes by which expertise is 
determined and written information is accepted or rejected as new knowledge within the 
academic communities. 
Writing New Knowledge 
To understand the theories just presented, it is helpful to examine how academia controls 
the creation of knowledge, especially in terms of writing new knowledge. The literature in 
this section is loosely organized around two issues relevant to the case study presented in 
Chapter 4 of this thesis. The first issue concerns the ways power and authority affect the 
preparation of text. The second issue concerns the use of academic journals as outlets for 
new knowledge and the peer review system of selecting or rejecting new knowledge. This 
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discussion provides insight into a specific genre used to create power and authority within 
academic disciplines and to control the creation and distribution of knowledge. 
Discourse, Power, and Authority 
This section discusses similarities and differences in the ways power and authority affect 
the preparation of text by experts and technical writers. The discussion also addresses ways 
power and authority affect the technical writer's role and status within a professional 
workplace. 
In his discussion about scientific writing (i.e., experimental papers), Bazerman (1988) 
notes that writing is historically situated and that scientists in all disciplines write "as part of 
an evolving discussion, with its own goals, issues, terms, arguments, and dialect. The history 
frames both the rhetorical moment and the rhetorical universe" (5). Within this context, 
Bazerman refers to a writing praxis "so integrated with social, epistemological, psychological 
praxis and events-in-the making that the problem of choosing which words to put on a page 
looks outward to the whole world rather than inward to a contained technology" (10). 
Because the "power of language can only be understood in the context of social action in 
specific situations," scientific writing is not simply a matter of recording natural facts in an 
unreflective manner (21). Instead, a scientist "behaves normatively, creatively, and self-
interestedly within a complex system," and "texts are embedded in situated practices, through 
which meanings are created and embodied in the symbols" (191). In other words, language 
takes on power and conveys meaning when it is used according to the norms and systems that 
experts have agreed can be used to create meaning. 
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In a more recent paper, Longo (2000) argues that technical writing not only mediates the 
transfer of technical information from scientist to end user, it "controls how technical 
knowledge is made" and "allows for control of technical knowledge and its power within a 
society" (x). Longo calls technical writing a "mundane discourse practice" that enables some 
types of knowledge and practice while disabling others (x). As such, technical writing 
"participates in an economy of scientific knowledge and power within our culture" (17). 
Longo notes, for example, that in 20th -century society, we use technical writing to legitimate 
scientific research approaches and knowledge, whereas we marginalize liberal arts research 
approaches and knowledge that address issues such as ethics, conflict, and gender (163-164). 
Further, Longo posits that technical communication is a scientific mechanism for establishing 
and controlling the value of and credit for the scientific product of knowledge. Because only 
the first scientist to communicate new knowledge is rewarded, new knowledge has become a 
form of "scientific capital" and technical writing is the tool used to coin that capital. 
Within this process, technical writing helps maintain social stability by serving as a tool 
for separating technically competent people (as measured by specialized knowledge and 
language) from people without technical competence (Longo 2000, 3). Longo cautions, 
however, that the process of coining scientific knowledge is not always a collaborative one. 
Some forms of knowledge will conquer other forms of knowledge in "contests of 
legitimation" that then "shape subsequent discourse and knowledge" (17). She illustrates the 
contests among some forms of knowledge over others by noting historical changes in the way 
society has valued classical knowledge, religion, and science in forming new knowledge. 
Flower (1994) also examines these contests oflegitimation. In her theoretical sketch, 
Flower presents two necessary conditions for constructing negotiated meaning. Meaning is 
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negotiated "when the process of meaning making is subject to pressure, to converging 
constraints and options, or to conflict among goals; and when writers tum their attention at 
some level of awareness to managing or negotiating this problematic cognitive and rhetorical 
situation" (66). Under these conditions, outside forces such as social and cultural 
expectations and discourse conventions are internalized as "inner voices, speaking in 
conjunction with the writer's own goals and available knowledge" but can promote 
conflicting choices, options, and actions (66). Attending to this conflict requires the writer to 
"enter into the construction of negotiated meaning" (67). According to Flower's theory, 
conflict and multiple voices are the main forces shaping negotiation. Multiple goals and 
demands create conflict and multiple voices clamor for the writer's attention. In attempting 
to address each, writers "negotiate/arbitrate the power relations inherent in the social forces 
and inner voices that would shape writing" (70). According to Flower, the process of 
negotiating meaning results in the construction of "a web of meaning" and "hidden logics 
that shape the writer's text" (67). 
Under this theory, a writer's internalized store of information (voices) about such factors 
as power relationships within and outside the workplace, institutional expectations and goals, 
sources of research funding, the desire of research subjects to effect change, ethical issues, 
past experience, and professional goals may compete to affect the rhetorical choices that 
shape a text. Once the choices have been made, the text becomes an artifact representing the 
web of meaning through which some resolution of the conflicts between competing voices 
was achieved. Part of this conflict arises from the writer's attempt to appropriately address 
each voice based on its relative power to accept or reject meaning in the text. The case study 
presented in this thesis provides several examples of the conflicting and multiple voices and 
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power relations mentioned by Flower and explains ways the technical writer makes rhetorical 
decisions to negotiate meaning from among them. 
In a discussion about differences in the literacy practices of experts (persons in scientific 
professions) and novices (students), Geisler (1994) notes that, "The literacy practices of 
experts in the academy are organized around the creation and transformation of academic 
knowledge .... " (81). By using one language for writing and another language for reading 
the work of other practitioners, experts are able to be "productive in the face of the discord 
between the highly rhetorical nature of their literacy practices and their avowed ideal of 
producing autonomous texts" (81). Geisler contends that expertise is separated into two 
"distinct problem spaces" of domain content and rhetorical process and that this separation is 
a mechanism whereby society "delivers expertise to some and withholds it from others" (89). 
The withholding of expertise from nonexperts and the institutionalized distinctions 
between experts and nonexperts contribute to an institutionalized environment wherein 
writers who are not full members of a discipline have limited power and, as a result, have 
limited ability to create new knowledge. In her case studies of student interns writing 
technical documents in a professional engineering environment, Winsor (1996a) found that 
"writing is not simply determined by reality, nor can writing impose a view of reality. 
Rather, writing is a process by which a common reality is negotiated .... [but] some 
employees are allowed far more play in negotiations than others" (71). According to Winsor, 
In a rhetorical view of knowledge, knowledge is created both in an interplay between 
physical reality and knowers and in persuasive interaction among knowers 
themselves .... in multidisciplinary, hierarchical organizations, this persuasive action 
takes place within power relationships that affect the way people interact. People 
gain power in these organizations in a least two ways: from their position or from 
their status as expert in an area. (69) 
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Winsor found that writers without power within an organization are likely to be more 
responsive to the attitudes and politics of persons in power than to the attitudes and politics 
oflower-Ievel employees. For a document to be accepted within the organization, the writer 
must respond most strongly to the vision of reality held by the individuals who have the most 
power. One result of this response is that the reality negotiated within an unempowered 
writer's documents is likely to be heavily weighted toward the attitudes and politics of the 
organization. However, Winsor's (1996a) research also revealed that unempowered writers 
often must address the power relationships, interactions, and competing purposes of both 
empowered and unempowered members of the organization and negotiate a vision of reality 
that all groups can accept to some degree (74). 
On the other hand, Slack, Miller, and Doak (1993) present an articulation theory of 
communication based on the premise that "the place of the technical communicator-and of 
technical discourse itself-shifts in different relations of power" (14). Under this theory, 
"Whether they desire it or not, technical communicators are seen as variously adding, 
deleting, changing, and selecting meaning .... they are always implicated in relations of 
power" (31). However, the consequences of extending authorship to technical 
communicators are significant. "With the articulation and rearticulation of meaning come 
the responsibility for that rearticulation," including acknowledging that texts are neither 
ethically transparent nor linguistically neutral (31). The technical writer must thoroughly 
understand the relationship between technology and discourse, the relationship between 
science and rhetoric, and how organizations operate (33). 
Communications disciplines have attempted to put their researchers and practitioners on a 
more even footing with the more socially accepted definition of the researcher or practitioner 
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wearing a white lab coat or manipulating databases on a computer. Tebeaux notes that 
"technical and business communication needed to move away from its skills image; articulate 
a theory, a research methodology, and an alliance with well-established respected liberal arts 
and social science fields; and show that our intellectual goals were commensurate to and as 
academically worthy as theirs" (35). 
Returning to Brown's (2001) theory on credentialing, "the strength and character of 
formal credentialing processes have much to do with the location of positions on a 
bureaucracy-profession continuum, that is, as individual workers who are objects of 
hierarchical control or as organized professionals who have autonomy" (28). In professional 
workplace hierarchies, technical writers are often classified at lower levels. Henry (2000) 
asserts that professional writers " ... often deny themselves their titles as a result of several 
forces in English disciplining, making them a professional class marked by remarkable self-
effacement-particularly with respect to the other professional classes with which they daily 
interact. This self-denial is compounded by strictly formalist understandings of writing that 
circulate widely among those other professionals .... " (31). One of these formalist 
understandings-the use of the peer review system-is discussed in the next section. 
The Peer Review System 
Within the university environment, the most important form of scientific communication 
is publishing journal articles. This section builds on the discussion in the previous section by 
examining how peer review journals are part of the process of credentialing experts, settling 
contests of legitimation, and establishing expertise within a discipline. The section is also 
important in part because the briefing paper analyzed in this case study initially was going to 
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be submitted to an economics peer-reviewed journal and was chosen for analysis on this 
basis. The original intent was to determine how much information a technical writer could 
contribute to a peer-reviewed article in another discipline and whether the article would be 
accepted for pUblication. As time passed, however, the professor-coauthor of the paper 
decided to pursue other research projects. If the briefing paper had been submitted and 
accepted for publication in a peer review journal, there would be virtually no question in the 
minds of most experts that the authors had created new knowledge. Given this emphasis on 
publication in peer review journals as a measure of the value of research, this section 
examines the use of the peer review process as the primary system through which 
disciplinary expertise is acknowledged and the creation of new knowledge is controlled. The 
case study will compare this system of acknowledging new knowledge with a discussion of 
the alternative measures that were used to evaluate acceptance of the briefing paper. 
In his discussion about forms of communication in science, Keith (1997) writes that, 
"journal articles ... [are] supposed to represent a forum for presentation of research and 
(once the research is accepted) a body of common knowledge for scientists" (311-12). He 
further notes that, "the writing must take into account the beliefs and doubts of the audience 
as well as the standards and types of proof accepted within the scientific community" (313). 
In a paper on the changing social environment in which scientific writing has developed, 
Bazerman (1988) notes the historical emergence of different genres to address different 
audiences. Professional journals became a way to allow "an inner circle of specialized 
readers" to publicly criticize and challenge scientific work and for the scientist-writer to 
defend the work (135). Editorial boards and the peer review process served to create and 
maintain the power and "the authority of the journal as an institution through the appearance 
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of fairness and generalized competence" (137). Popular journals, on the other hand, emerged 
as a tool to inform a popular audience that has gradually lost the power to participate in the 
scientific communication process. 
Under the peer review system, writing research results is a rhetorical process designed 
not only to present new knowledge, but to persuade an expert audience that the writer is an 
authority presenting credible findings that can then be accepted as new knowledge. 
Berkenkotter (1995) writes that, "Peer review ... has become over time a system for 
certifying new knowledge" (245). As such, "it remains the primary means through which 
authority and authenticity are conferred upon scientific and scholarly papers ... and can 
therefore be seen as a social mechanism through which a discipline's 'experts' maintain 
quality control over new knowledge entering the field" (563). 
This process of establishing competence and authority empowers the scientific 
community to determine whether a writer is allowed to "join, not just eavesdrop on" the 
conversation of experts (Golden-Biddle and Locke 1997, 11). Because a researcher must get 
work published to participate as an expert in the discipline, research results are directed 
toward other experts within the discipline, a system that privileges the academic audience 
over all other audiences in deciding what constitutes new knowledge. According to 
Zuckerman and Merton (1971), "[t]he referee system in science involves systematic use of 
judges to access the acceptability of manuscripts ... for publication. The referee is ... 
charged with evaluating the quality of role-performance in a social system .... They 
influence the motivation to maintain or to raise standards of performance" (68). 
Henry (2000) contends that the university structure holds academics to a traditional 
epistemology that excludes unpublished writers and provides economic and professional 
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rewards based on articles accepted in peer-review publications. Under this system, 
"authorship" is often appropriated by the upper levels of hierarchies with the power to 
"decide about writing's effects in local cultures and our larger culture" (Henry 2000, 45). 
Henry further argues that writers "need to develop organizational acuity as well as rhetorical 
and technological acuity" and "must employ the organizational culture" to participate in the 
peer process (56, 74). 
These concepts of consensus within hierarchies of experts has been explored by several 
theorists. According to Berkenkotter (1993), for example, Chubin and Hackett contend that 
the peer review process creates "a unique formal consultation ... about the merits, scope, 
style, methods, substance, and knowledge claims of a potential article. This method of 
selection ... transforms a scientific manuscript into consensual 'knowledge' and enduring 
testimony to the skills (or shortcomings) of its author" (247). 
In their book about preparing academic journal articles that present qualitative research, 
Golden-Biddle and Locke (1997) contend that the articles are "proposals of knowledge" that 
"require adjudication and some accrediting action on the part of their disciplinary audience 
before they are accorded the status of knowledge" (13). To be accorded the status of 
knowledge, research "must be seen as true and significant" by the researcher's peers (12). 
Further, "the professional community exerts its influence over writing" by setting topical 
boundaries and configuring a manuscript's structure and progression (9). Would-be authors 
must demonstrate the significance of their work within the context ofa discipline's existing 
conversation. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, the technical writer emulates this 
requirement to demonstrate significance by contextualizing the briefing paper within the 
existing conversation about the European Union (EU) hormone ban. 
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But according to Golden-Biddle and Locke (1997), acceptance for publication does not 
fully represent acceptance of the work. Instead, the research contributes to knowledge, 
"Only when it is cited and its findings are used in future published articles .... " (12-13). If 
scientific work is ignored, "its claim to knowledge will have been denied" (13). Golden-
Biddle and Locke call this process "accrediting action." 
Also, Berkenkotter and Huckin (1993) address the need for new scientific work to fit into 
a discipline's existing body of accepted, published, and accumulated knowledge. They 
discuss the role of citation as a narrative mechanism in establishing "intertextuallinkages 
that diachronically connect scientists' laboratory activity to significant activity in the field," 
thereby serving "to establish a narrative context for the study to be reported" (111). As such, 
citations contextualize "local (laboratory) knowledge within an ongoing history of 
disciplinary knowledge making" (111). Publishable research must have novelty, but the 
researchers must also justify its relevance and importance within the context of existing 
work. Bazerman agrees with Berkenkotter and Huckin about the role of citation in creating 
intertextuality and calls citation a visible product of the "development of implicit and explicit 
intertextuality" (Bazerman 1988, 154). 
According to Berkenkotter and Huckin (1993), the importance of positioning new work 
by "deploying the relevant line of research through citation, cannot be underestimated" 
(1993, 115). The "narrative scaffolding" required by the peer review process creates an 
intertextuality that provides narrative coherence to the story of how the new research fits into 
the larger body of accepted knowledge (123, 125). The convention of contextualizing 
research works to "instantiate ideological assumptions ... that are regularly reinforced by 
scientists' routine, unreflexive use of the genre" (126). Citation remains "central to the 
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generic function of the experimental article," partly in response to a continually changing 
research context (111). 
The changing research context mentioned by Berkenkotter and Huckin suggests that the 
timing of a research article can affect acceptance or rejection as new knowledge according to 
the standards and types of proof accepted by experts within a discipline. Sullivan (1997) 
defines kairos as "a rhetorical situation that is ripe, an opportunity or window during which 
otherwise difficult or impossible tasks become possible" (335). He notes that ajoumal paper 
is kairotic when the time is ripe for other disciplinary experts to grasp the significance ofthe 
research. In his study on interdisciplinary writing, for example, Sullivan found that, "What 
was unspeakable seven years earlier has now found its way into the introductory paragraph of 
a major paper ... " (340). The role of citation in contextualizing the briefing paper in the 
hormone discussion and in measuring the acceptance of the published paper is discussed later 
in this thesis. Chapter 1 mentions the role of timing in aiding acceptance of the briefing 
paper outside the academic community, and Chapter 4 discusses this issue in greater detail. 
The peer review process is not without its flaws and detractors. Research by Runeson 
and Loosemore (1999) notes that peer review is used "on the assumption that it encourages 
high standards of scholarly writing by providing an informed, fair, reasonable, and 
professional opinion about the merits of research work" (I). They contend, however, that 
"the outcome of the peer review process is not significantly different from random, and that 
there is little consistency in the reasons advanced for rejection or revision" (1). This finding 
counters the general perceptions of the peer review process as a system whereby one's peers 
are able to effectively negotiate and recognize what constitutes new knowledge based on a 
research paper's own merits within the research community. 
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Given such flaws, some theorists are calling for a revision of the peer review process. 
Davis and Shadle (2000), for example, call for alternative approaches to the scientific 
research paper, with its "modernist ideals of expertise, detachment, and certainty" and its 
dependence on the accepted body of knowledge (418). They envision "a new valuation of 
uncertainty, passionate exploration, and mystery .... [and] an increased rhetorical 
sophistication" (418). However, reviewers and editors of academic journals will likely 
continue to decide whether researchers become accepted as full members of an academic 
discipline on the basis of published research. 
Science, Politics, and the Market Economy 
The third body of literature relevant to this thesis addresses the interaction of science with 
political, economic, and social forces and ways institutionalized power and authority affect 
this interaction. The following text reviews some of the current literature on how politics, 
economics, and a changing social environment affect what knowledge is allowed to be 
created and the power of government and market forces in setting an agenda for science and 
the creation of new knowledge. 
In a democratic society, the link between science and politics is strong but differences in 
how these systems operate can result in reciprocal benefits and constraints. Jarvie (2001) 
writes that 
Science as an institution requires no reference group other than itself, and its 
membership over time and space is diverse along all social and economic parameters. 
Here lies the extraterritoriality of science. The aspiration to transcend the local, the 
fallibilism, the commitment to the search for truth no matter where it leads, and the 
universalism make science an exceptional social institution. (563) 
39 
But, Jarvie also contends that even an exceptional social institution "is too important to 
society to be permitted a splendid isolation, still less one based on self-defined boundaries." 
He asserts that "critical and democratic oversight" of science requires linkages with other 
social institutions, and "[ m loney, education, and issues of security create stakeholdings in the 
wider society (563). 
In her comparison of the science-as-explanation model with the emancipationist model 
whereby progressive political and social values would set research agendas, Koertge (2000) 
argues that "science known to be constrained by political considerations would lose its 
special epistemic authority" and that "[w]e should make every attempt to keep politics and 
religion out of the laboratory" (S45, S53). Koertge further argues that if this effort is not 
successful, science will "become perceived as ideologically driven and as a result lose not 
only its epistemic authority but also its rhetorical and political usefulness" (S54). This 
position does not assume that science is completely apolitical; rather, it argues against the 
further politicization of science that would occur under social agendas attempting to 
constrain scientists and limit the questions that could be asked. 
Schwartzman (1994) writes that, "Political and scientific discourse may be distinguished 
by the roles they assume on the rhetorical stage" (l). Whereas science seeks consensual 
agreement from all rational parties that an interpretation or explanation is correct, "political 
decisions must be rendered even while recognizing that consensus is unachievable" (3). 
However, different audiences often appropriate information when a scientific debate extends 
beyond the context of academic journals or lab experiments. Divergence in beliefs may arise 
due to antithesis between political and intellectual endeavors, epistemological divisions 
between pure and applied knowledge, or separation of power from knowledge. 
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Brint (1994) asserts that society is not directed by the "trained intelligence" of our 
professional classes. The perceived increase in the power of experts to guide government 
policy arises in part from the belief that the public is unable to make informed decisions 
about complex policy issues. Brint disputes this perception, arguing that although experts 
participate in the policy development process "by virtue of an assertion of 'knowledge-based' 
authority," they are not involved in the decision making process and their importance 
actually declines "whenever issues become politicized" (18, 131). In other words, the more 
political the issue, the less policymakers tum to science as a basis for their decisions. 
Albaek (1995) addresses the discipline of economics as a social science in providing 
research results to be used in the politico-administrative decision-making process. In 
discussing the perceived gap between the research community and the highly political 
policymaking community, Albaek contends that 
Science and politics are not as fundamentally different entities as suggested by the 
traditional notion of the interest-free quest for truth in contrast to the pure promotion of 
self-interest. What counts as knowledge in a given research community is based on a 
negotiated reality in exactly the same way as the objects of politics. There is no science 
without interests, and no politics without analytical reflection. (96) 
In his examination of the linkages between political and economic power and scientific 
knowledge, Brown (1993) explores how the creation and transmission of knowledge 
"recreates and transmits forms of power, and how power shapes and deploys forms of 
knowledge" (154). Among Brown's assertions is that research universities have become the 
"major self-policing recipients of funds for scientific investigation," based in part on 
reputation, which provides a crude indicator of assessment of research investment (166). 
Within this socially constructed environment, academic research links science to politics 
through funding, information networks among political and academic staff, and mechanisms 
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for coordinating and monitoring science and science policy. Brown concludes that the 
"insti tutionalization of science and the rationalization of power were mutually authorizing, 
but only because institutional power had become rationalized and because science already 
constituted power" (166). 
The impact of economics on science through government and private funding sources and 
market forces has also been addressed by several researchers. Rather bluntly, Keith (1997) 
asserts that, "Scientists interact with government for two main reasons: The government 
sponsors scientific research, and the government regulates scientific research" (310). This 
seemingly simple statement must be contextualized among some important economic and 
social shifts that are affecting academic research and the university as a source of new 
knowledge. 
Geisler (1994), for example, writes that the general educational system in the United 
States gradually laid the groundwork for public respect and acceptance of expert knowledge 
by educating the public about the superiority of expertise. She contends, however, that it was 
market forces that "created expert power ... not by direct oppression of the general public, 
but by denying legitimacy to their everyday knowledge and putting forth formal knowledge 
in its place" (80). 
Henry (2000) explores the emerging economic orientation from high volume to high 
value with learning as the new labor. In this environment, information "often functions as 
capital in an organization's value" and the discursive work of the workplace is "constitutive 
of realities rather than reflective of them" (135, 145). Henry notes, however, that, "Writers 
enter the workforce with precious little preparation for such arenas and few tactics for 
42 
defending and enhancing their professional status in manners similar to the other 
professions" (65). 
Halal (1993) contends that, unlike capital, which consists of limited tangible assets, 
"knowledge is an intangible asset that "can grow indefinitely" and that "increases when 
applied to different needs" (3). Halal further states that "we all agree on the need to share 
knowledge, yet attempts to do so usually fail because most people have an understandable 
reluctance to give away this valuable resource" (3). One result of the power of both capital 
and knowledge in American society is the exchange of knowledge for capital through 
professional consulting services. For university researchers, this exchange of knowledge for 
capital can raise questions about conflicts of interest and the sale of knowledge for purposes 
that may not benefit the public as a whole. 
Three recent books on academic-industry relations call this exchange "academic 
capitalism" or "capitalization of knowledge" (Anderson 200 1, 228). As public funding for 
research has declined, legislation regulating the ownership of knowledge has changed, and 
globalization of national economies has occurred, universities and researchers increasingly 
are entering into contractual relationships with corporations. On the one hand, these 
relationships allow "the bidirectional flow of knowledge and research ... the sharing of 
organizational cultures, language, and approaches to work; and the mutual influence of the 
academic and corporate worlds on individuals' career plans and prospects" (228). On the 
other hand, some theorists are concerned that "[ s ]hifts to a market orientation can lead to 
changes in the most fundamental assumptions about the mission and purpose of higher 
education institution" (234). 
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Among the problems with the shift to a market orientation in university research is the 
clash between the corporate desire to protect new knowledge and the university's emphasis 
on publications for promotion and subsequent funding opportunities. A second problem 
arises from the short-term, problem-based orientation of corporate research versus the longer-
term theoretical research conducted within the university. 
Brint (1994) asserts that markets, consumerism, and business organizations and the 
accompanying political environment have moved the role of the professions (legitimated 
through expertise) toward strong consumer markets for information and analysis. Brint 
includes professors at research universities, writers and editors for intellectual and specialist 
periodicals and some trade publications, and journalists and editors for the national new 
media within the "culture and communications sphere" who help create and maintain the 
"universe of scholarship ... and other spheres of formal knowledge" that respond to this 
demand (50). 
One way to better understand the linkages between politics, economics, the social 
environment, and science is to examine a real-world example. Thus, the final two articles 
covered in this literature review examine the role of science communication in policy making 
and show how policy makers (mis)handled communicating science to the public after the 
discovery of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) as a food safety issue in the United 
Kingdom. These articles are germane to the case study presented in this thesis because the 
BSE crisis in Britain had a major impact on the' debate over the use of growth-promoting 
hormones in beef production. This discussion is also relevant because of the insight it 
provides into how science, politics, and economics interacted to determine how information 
was communicated in a real-world situation. 
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In the first article, Dickson (2003) discusses the responsibility of science communicators 
to recognize that "science communication has become a significant participant in the 
formation of policy on science-related issues" and not merely a provider of "commentary on 
the way such issues are addressed" (1). Given this role in informing the creators and 
implementers of public policy, science communication has the basic responsibility to "be 
concerned with accurate transmission of information," but must also be a proxy for the public 
by interpreting and articulating the "relationship between science and society, or ... 
knowledge and power" (1-2). Dickson contends that the failure of science communicators to 
provide such information will result in the gradual dissipation of "trust in political decisions 
on science-related issues" (2). Taking Dickson's concept a step further, the dissipation of 
trust in political decisions may, in turn, reduce public trust in the ability of researchers to 
provide appropriate answers to policy questions. 
The second article, which examines changing public perceptions of truth as a result of 
risk communication failure, illustrates the dissipation of trust to which Dickson refers. 
Powell and Leiss (1997) note the tension between two ways of analyzing and speaking about 
the experience of risk: the scientific and statistical language of experts and the intuitively 
grounded language of the public. They contend that, " ... this gap will exist in most cases of 
publicly debated risks ... [and that] the gap cannot be closed appreciably because the 
scientific and public apprehension of a given risk are framed by fundamentally different 
assumptions or values. But in all risk situations where some public policy response is called 
for ... what occurs in that gap can have huge consequences for institutions and the public 
alike" (31). 
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Powell and Leiss use the example of the British government's failure to appropriately 
communicate the risks related to BSE, even after the emergence of new scientific knowledge 
concerning BSE and a new form of Cruetzfeld-lakob disease in humans. According to 
Powell and Leiss, the British government was unprepared for the extremely negative public 
response when the government finally admitted that beef from BSE-infected cattle may not 
be safe for human consumption. One consequence was that the government lost credibility 
among British citizens, leaving a wide informational gap that allowed other entities (e.g., the 
media, supermarket chains, and nongovernment organizations) to increase their role in 
communicating food-related risk and assurances about the safety of the food supply. One 
problem with this change is that information provided by these entities often was an attempt 
to advance their own ideologies or to respond to consumer fear rather than to communicate 
sCIence. 
By comparison, the U.S. government responded to the BSE crisis with "concrete actions, 
issued in a timely manner and subsequently widely reported" and was able to maintain public 
trust (Powell and Leiss 1997, 17). The different social contexts-stakeholder interaction, 
consensus-building, and acceptance of reasonable government regulatory frameworks-
contributed to the differences in response by the two governments and to the responses by the 
two public audiences. 
With the theoretical framework from this literature review in mind, the following chapter 
provides a brief historical context for the internal and external political, economic, and social 
environments in which the academic briefing paper was prepared. This context illustrates 
many of the theories about the creation and control of knowledge presented here. 
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CHAPTER 3. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT FOR THE CASE STUDY 
The process of building on an existing body of knowledge within an academic discipline 
means that the writer must determine (1) what knowledge already exists, (2) who holds this 
existing knowledge, (3) what information will constitute new knowledge, (4) the relative 
value of the new knowledge (i.e., is it important enough to publish), and (5) the audience for 
the new knowledge. The university briefing paper on which the case study for this thesis is 
based represents one point in a I5-year timeline of scientific research and public policy 
decisions about the use of growth-promoting hormones in beef production. Thus, the 
briefing paper was contextualized within a large body of accepted knowledge held within 
several academic disciplines, within several government agencies, by many industry 
participants, and by other nonuniversity sources. The audience for existing information is 
broad and diverse. Also, given that the issue has been so political, this body of knowledge 
includes information about the political, economic, and social issues surrounding the EU ban 
on the use of growth-promoting hormones ban. 
In the case of the EU hormone ban, there are actually two accepted bodies of knowledge: 
one accepted by the United States and one accepted by the European Union. Differences 
over what is accepted as knowledge are embedded in the historical dispute between the two 
international economic powers. To demonstrate the importance of the historical context of 
the hormone ban and its role in decisions about content for the briefing paper, this chapter 
provides a brief history of some of the major events in the history of the U.S.-EU trade 
dispute over the use of growth-promoting hormones in beef produced for human 
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consumption. The relevance of these events is further developed in the case study presented 
in Chapter 4. 
On January 1, 1989, the European Community2 implemented a ban on imported beef 
produced with growth-promoting hormones and intended for human consumption. In the 
United States, growth-promoting hormones are used in cattle to improve feed efficiencies, 
speed weight gain, and produce the type of lean beef that many health-conscious consumers 
prefer in their diets (Hanrahan 2000). The incentives for using these hormones are to reduce 
production costs and increase profits to U.S. producers. Because the economic loss to the 
U.S. beef industry resulting from loss of access to EC beef markets was sizeable and because 
political and scientific credibility were at stake, an international trade dispute emerged that 
remains unresolved more than 15 years after the ban was implemented. 
At issue in the dispute is the European Union's contention that beef from cattle 
administered anyone of six specific growth-promoting hormones contains trace amounts of 
the hormones and poses a risk to human health. On the opposite side, the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration has approved the use of the six hormones at approved doses in beef 
production and has determined that trace levels are safe for human consumption based on 
scientific evidence from studies conducted in the United States and the European Union. 
A brief history of the events preceding and following enactment of the hormone ban 
helps explain why, despite ongoing attempts at resolution, this trade dispute persists. 
Although several other major beef-exporting countries use growth-promoting hormones and 
are affected by the hormone ban, this history presents a U.S. perspective and focuses on the 
trade relationship between the European Union and the United States. This perspective is 
consistent with the perspective used in the briefing paper. 
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Science or Politics and Economics? 
During the 1970s, EC consumers became aware of human health problems associated 
with eating meat from livestock produced with growth-promoting hormones. Media reports 
attributed serious health problems to misuse of hormones by some EC livestock producers. 
For example, illegal use of dethylstilboestrol (DES) in veal production was linked to 
hormonal irregularities in adolescents. DES was found in baby food made with veal in 
France, and cases of children born with birth defects attributed to exposure to DES were 
reported elsewhere in Europe. Consumer organizations called for a boycott of veal, resulting 
in a large decline in veal sales and creating major problems for administrators ofthe 
European Community's agricultural market policy (Weir undated). 
The European Community banned the use of growth-promoting hormones in domestic 
beef production in 1981 but postponed implementation pending further scientific study. The 
ban was reinstated in 1985 and remains in effect. Shortly after the ban was implemented, a 
black market for growth-promoting hormones emerged and some EC producers created 
"hormone cocktails" in an effort to avoid detection by the regulatory authorities testing for 
specific substances. Often, these cocktails were smuggled into the European Community by 
the so-called "hormone mafia" that had developed around the black market trade. 
Then, in 1995, a Belgian veterinarian who had been working to uncover the use of illegal 
hormones was murdered. The murder was attributed to the hormone mafia, and four people 
were eventually tried and convicted of the murder on June 4, 2002. These events illustrate 
the difficulty of controlling the use of illegal growth-promoting hormones within the 
European Union and suggest that concerns over food safety and enforcement of the ban were 
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more applicable to the domestic herd than to imported U.S. beef.3 However, because beef 
from treated and untreated animals normally was not segregated, the ban resulted in the loss 
of a valuable international market for the United States (Hayes 1998). 
In the 1980s and early 1990s, many non-EC stakeholders in the dispute contended that 
the ban was based more on political considerations than on food safety concerns. One 
perspective was that the European Community had implemented the ban on imported beef to 
mollify domestic producers who formed a very strong agricultural lobby. These producers 
did not want to compete against hormone-treated beef from other countries, which was less 
expensive to produce. The World Trade Organization's (WTO's) Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
trade agreement requires scientific justification if a country bans imports of another country's 
products. However, once EC consumers had been told by their government that the use of 
growth-promoting hormones in cattle was unsafe, it was almost impossible for the EU 
government to reverse its position. 
According to Hanrahan (2000), "political and economic considerations reinforced 
consumer concerns about the use of hormones and may have contributed to the Commission's 
decision to ban their use" (2). This belief was based in part on the European Community's 
history of implementing barriers and providing subsidies to protect agricultural products 
from outside competition. At the time, the European Community was holding a so-called 
"beef mountain" of frozen stocks purchased by the government to remove excess beef from 
the market when prices were low. 
3 Beef from animals that have not received growth-promoting hormone is often referred to as 
hormone-free beef. However, because some of the hormones in question occur naturally in 
beef, beef from animals that do not receive growth-promoting hormones is more accurately 
referred to as untreated beef. Beef produced using growth promotants in cattle is referred to 
as treated beef. 
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As the ban remained in place and negotiations continued, other events began to occur that 
changed the political, economic, and social dynamics of the debate. Table 3.l presents a 
chronology of the trade dispute that includes the timing of these events based on data from 
the USDA (2001). At the time the briefing paper was prepared, the USDA's chronology was 
incomplete in two respects. First, most chronologies published by the U.S. and EU 
governments end on May 13, 1999-the deadline for the European Union to comply with a 
WTO ruling that the European Union must bring policy in line with its trade agreements. 
Because the USDA chronology ended at 1999, other sources are used to include events that 
occurred after that time. 
Second, the USDA chronology does not include events that occurred outside the 
negotiations about the EU hormone ban. These events are included in Table 3.1 because of 
their direct or indirect effects on the political, economic, and social issues surrounding the 
use of growth-promoting hormones. These events became part of the existing body of 
knowledge surrounding the hormone dispute. 
The text following Table 3.1 provides a brief discussion about how the events affected 
the hormone dispute. The major focus of this discussion involves events that occurred 
outside the dispute negotiations but that had important impacts on the political, economic, 
and social environments in the European Union and the United States. In many cases, 
politics and public reaction had a greater impact on shaping policy responses than did 
science, and scientific integrity appeared to be sacrificed to political agendas, creating a 
credibility gap in research and undermining its value in setting public policy. 
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Table 3.1. History of the EU ban on the use of growth-promoting hormones in the 






Media reports link serious human health problems to the use of illegal growth-
promoting hormones in beef and veal production in the European Community. 
The European Community prohibits the use of five growth-promoting hormones3 but 
postpones action pending the results of a study by the European Commission. 
An EC interim report concludes that the three natural hormones in question present 
no harmful effects to human health when administered appropriate to farm animals. 
Further research is necessary on the two synthetic hormones. 
1984 The European Community proposes allowing the use of the three natural hormones. 
1985 October-The European Parliament bans the use of all the hormones.3 
December-The European Commission bans the use of natural3 and synthetic 
hormones and prohibits imports of animals and meat from animals treated with these 
hormones, effective January 1, 1988. 
1986 Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) is discovered in Britain's beef herd. 
September-The United States objects to the hormone ban through the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
1987 The European Union blocks a U.S. request to invoke the GATT dispute settlement 
process. 
June-The World Health Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization 
establish acceptable daily intake levels and residue limits for synthetic hormones and 
determine that levels are not needed for the natural hormones. 
November-The European Commission delays applying the hormone ban to imports 
until January 1,1989. 
December-The U.S. government announces, and then suspends, retaliatory duties 
(100 percent ad valoremb) on about $100 million worth of imported EC products. 
1988 BSE becomes a reportable livestock disease in the European Community. EC 
officials continue assure consumers that beef is safe to eat. 
November-The European Commission bans all U.S. meat and asks the United States 
to develop a residue testing programs for all meats, even though growth-promoting 
hormones are approved only for beef. 
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Table 3.1. Continued. 
Date Event 
1989 1 anuary-The EC ban on imports of treated beef takes effect. U. S. retaliation in the 
form of 100 percent ad valorem duties equivalent to about $93 million also takes 
effect. A one-month grace period covers beef products "in the pipeline." 
May-The United States and European Community agree to interim measures 
allowing EC imports of U.S. beef from cattle not treated with hormones. 
The United States bans imports of British beef and live cattle to avoid the spread of 
BSE to the United States. 
1993 The United States and the European Union participate in developing four principles 
that reinforce the preeminent role of science in policy decisions. 
1995 January-The Uruguay Round of the GATT, which includes a Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Agreement, enters into force. 
-The World Trade Organization (WTO) is formed to administer the agreement and 
resolve trade disputes. 
July-The four principles of science agreed to in 1993 are adopted. The Codex 
Alimentarius concludes that maximum residue limits are not necessary for the three 
natural hormones but adopts limits for the synthetic hormones. 
November-The EU Scientific Conference on Growth Promotion in Meat Production 
finds no evidence of health risk from the five hormones. 
1996 January-The European Parliament votes to maintain the ban, and the EU Agriculture 
Council re-affirms its commitment to maintain the ban. 
January-The United States requests WTO consultations to decide whether the ban is 
permitted under WTO rules. 
March-The EU government announces the possible link between a new variant of 
Creutzfeldt-lakob disease and human consumption of beef from cattle with BSE. 
March-Australia, Canada, and New Zealand join the United States in the hormone 
ban complaint against the European Union. 
May-A U.S. request for a WTO panel is blocked by the European Union. After a 
second U.S. request, a panel is formed. 
1997 The WTO panel finds the EU ban inconsistent with its obligations under the WTO 
agreement because the ban is not based on science. The European Union appeals the 
decision. 
1998 lanuary-The WTO upholds findings that there is no credible scientific evidence of 
human health risks from the use of growth-promoting hormones. 
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Table 3.1. Continued. 
Date Event 
1998 March-The European Union conducts additional risk assessments. The United 
States agrees to binding arbitration for a deadline, and the arbitrator rules that the 
European Union must comply with WTO rules by May 13, 1999. 
1999 May-The EU misses the deadline for compliance and chooses to accept economic 
retaliation rather than abide by scientific standards agreed to under the WTO. 
July-The European Union discovers traces of growth-promoting hormones in 
imports of U.S. beef, and the U.S. government suspends beef exports. 
August-The United States applies retaliatory duties on $116.8 million in EU 
agricultural products. 
September-U.S. beef exports to the European Union resume under stricter 
government controls, with the European Union testing 100 percent of U.S. shipments. 
2000 February-The European Commission endorses the Precautionary Principle. 
September-The European Union reduces testing of U.S. beef to a 20 percent test-
and-release system. 
2001 Outbreaks offoot-and-mouth disease (FMD) occur in the European Union. 
2002 The United States loses a WTO dispute concerning use of Foreign Sales 
Corporations, entitling the European Union to millions of dollars in damages. 
April-The European Commission continues to uphold opinions which find that 
growth-promoting hormones pose a risk to human health. 
The European Union negotiates EU accession with 14 Eastern European countries. 
The European Union prepares to comment on the U.S. position that duties should be 
imposed to compensate for the loss of additional beef exports. 
aUse of the natural hormones is allowed for therapeutic purposes. 
bAn ad valorem duty is expressed as a fixed percentage of the value of an imported product 
(USDA 1988). A 100 percent ad valorem duty means the government would collect 100 
percent of an imported item's value as a duty, effectively doubling the cost of the item in the 
importing country (USDA 1988). 
The World Trade Organization Is Formed 
The hormone dispute started under an international trade agreement that did not provide 
an appropriate dispute resolution process to resolve trade disputes. This trade agreement had 
been negotiated under the Tokyo Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
54 
(GATT), and both sides in the dispute were signatories. In 1987, the United States tried to 
invoke dispute settlement under the Tokyo Round, but the European Community blocked 
formation of a technical expert group. 
In 1995, the Uruguay Round of the GATT was implemented and remains in force today. 
The Uruguay Round is different from the Tokyo Round in that it includes a Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Agreement with regulations that countries can implement to protect food 
safety and human and animal health and a more effective process to settle disputes over how 
trade rules should be implemented. With implementation of the Uruguay Round, the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) was formed to administer the agreement and the dispute 
settlement process. Although the WTO cannot force any country to comply with the 
agreement, signatory countries agree to abide by WTO rulings. 
Under the WTO, the European Union could no longer block discussion about the ban. 
The U.S.-EU hormone dispute was especially important because the WTO case "was the first 
case that was decided under the WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement and, 
consequently, it clarified for the first time an important number of issues, including in 
particular the concepts of risk assessment, appropriate level of protection, the role of 
international standards laid down by Codex Alimentarius Commission, and the precautionary 
principle" (European Commission 2001). Politically and economically, both sides had much 
to gain or lose. 
As will be discussed, the hormone dispute placed science squarely at issue by pitting 
opposing interpretations of scientific studies against each other. Tangermann (1998) writes 
that "progress that was hoped to be made in the Uruguay Round through a new arrangement 
for sanitary and phytosanitary measures is in danger of being lost again, due to the reluctance 
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of European consumers and policy makers to accept scientific judgments" (22). The 
perception that the policy choices were made for political and economic reasons raised 
questions about the value of the WTO in administering international trade agreements and 
the use of science as a tool for developing food safety policies. 
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy: The First Crisis 
Arguably, the single most important event that affected the hormone dispute was the 
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) crisis in the United Kingdom. In 1986, BSE was 
discovered in the British cattle herd. Because symptoms of this fatal disease are 
uncontrollable movement and foaming around the mouth, BSE became widely known as 
"mad cow disease." In 1988, the UK government made BSE a reportable livestock disease 
and took steps to prevent its spread, including slaughtering and incinerating suspect cattle, 
banning the use of cattle bypro ducts in cattle feeds, and destroying milk from suspect cows. 
The United States banned imports of British cattle and beef in 1989, but BSE received 
little press coverage in North America until 1990, when feline spongiform encephalopathy 
(FSE) was diagnosed in cats in England. Prions (infectious proteins that lack nucleic acids) 
appeared to have crossed the species barrier when cats ate foods containing rendered 
products from cattle. Beef consumption exhibited a temporary decline and then recovered. 
However, consumers, scientists, and other stakeholders were focusing more attention on BSE 
and the safety of British beef. The EU government announced there was no scientific 
evidence that eating beef created a threat to human health, but the British public had begun to 
question whether this was true. Wiener and Rogers (2002) note that, "The public's 
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subsequent realization that the facts are disputed and the protections imperfect can give rise 
to public cynicism about government" (p. 347). 
In 1996, the British government announced that researchers had found a potential link 
between BSE and new-variant Cruetzfeld-lakob disease (nv-C1D). Cruetzfeld-lakob disease 
(C1D) is a rare but fatal neurological disorder that causes severe deterioration ofthe brain 
and the loss of physical and mental functions, and cases have been diagnosed throughout the 
world. Because C1D usually affects the elderly, the case of an English teenager who died 
from the disease in 1995 received a great deal of attention. As other young people were 
diagnosed and the cases were reported in the media, families of some of the victims began to 
attribute the disease to beef consumption. 
Besides occurring in younger victims, other differences were identified in some C1D 
cases. The illness lasted longer than was considered usual, and neurological damage in brain 
tissue was unique, with large aggregates ofprions (Powell and Leiss). These cases were 
eventually diagnosed as nv-C1D. This new disease was being diagnosed only in people 
living in the United Kingdom or people who had made extended visits to the United 
Kingdom. 
As noted, the EU hormone ban was considered by many industry experts to be more 
politically motivated than based on food safety concerns, and the degree to which EU 
consumers were concerned about consuming U.S. hormone-treated beef was debatable. 
After the BSE crisis erupted, however, a wide divergence developed in attitudes toward 
consuming hormone-treated beef. Most U.S. consumers believed that their government had 
made appropriate use of science and policy to provide a safe beef supply. On the other side 
of the Atlantic, however, many EU consumers lost confidence in the ability of their 
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government to apply science to ensure a safe food supply, and an enormous decline in 
consumption of British beef caused devastating financial losses to the British beef industry. 
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy: The Second Crisis 
A second BSE crisis occurred when the European Union began testing for BSE in cattle 
outside the United Kingdom. EU countries that had previously declared themselves free of 
BSE began to find cases in their cattle herds. Further, every country that found BSE reported 
multiple cases. Whereas most consumers tend to be nationalistic in thinking that products 
from their own country are safer than are products from other countries, especially when it 
comes to meat, the discovery of BSE in cattle herds in their own herds eliminated the sense 
of safety that the disease was confined to the United Kingdom. The European Union 
implemented a massive and costly program to destroy cattle with the disease and prevent the 
disease from spreading. Again, EU beef consumption declined dramatically. 
Foot-and-Mouth Disease 
In February 2001, foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) was diagnosed in livestock in England, 
and the disease quickly spread to Ireland, France, and the Netherlands. FMD does not affect 
humans, and meat from animals with FMD is safe to eat. However, the disease spreads 
rapidly and causes great economic loss to producers. Most countries prefer to slaughter 
susceptible animals (cattle, hogs, sheep, deer, etc.) in an attempt to curb the disease as 
quickly as possible, rather than vaccinating animals. Countries that slaughter animals 
become eligible to export meat more quickly after the disease has been eradicated than do 
countries that vaccinate. 
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Within 11 weeks, almost 2.4 million farm animals were slaughtered, and media reports 
showed graphic pictures of livestock being burned on fiery pyres on farms. Once again, ED 
consumers were concerned about eating beef and the safety oftheir food supply, and the ED 
beef industry suffered even further economic damage. 
Genetically Modified Organisms 
As the hormone dispute continued, genetically modified organisms (GMOs) emerged as a 
food safety issue, galvanized ED consumers against the use of biotechnology in foods, and 
reinforced attitudes about other food safety issues such as the use of growth-promoting 
hormones. The timing of the GMO debate coincided with widespread adoption of the 
Internet, which provided a worldwide outlet through which organizations and individuals 
could publish information. Research data were no longer held only by experts, and 
publishing interpretations of scientific data became the domain of anyone who wished to do 
so. This change created difficulty for readers in determining whether individuals were 
credentialed to interpret and publish scientific information and whether their interpretations 
were based on political or economic agendas rather than the desire to present knowledge for 
the public good. This problem did not occur in academic genres such as peer review 
journals, where experts safeguard the definition of expertise and control what constitutes 
knowledge. However, the effects on the general public were to create consumer confusion 
and fear as consumers were less able to sort out truth from half-truths and misinformation. 
The debate over production of GMO foods for animal and human consumption created 
even further divergence in the attitudes ofD.S. and ED consumers toward food safety. 
Whereas the majority ofD.S. consumers continued to trust their government agencies to 
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ensure the safety of the food supply, EU consumers became even less accepting of science-
based safety assurances. The controversy over GMOs reinforced EU consumer attitudes 
against the use of growth-promoting hormones in beef production. 
Detection of Growth-Promoting Hormones in U.S. Beef 
In May 1999, traces of growth-promoting hormones were found in shipments of U.S. 
beef that had been imported into European Union. The treated beef was discovered just one 
month before the United States was scheduled to implement retaliatory tariffs against the EU 
hormone ban. In July, the USDA voluntarily halted beef exports to the European Union 
because government officials were unable to certify that all the beef was untreated. The 
USDA quickly revised the certification system, increased government oversight, and allowed 
exports to resume in September 1999. 
The Precautionary Principle 
At the heart of the hormone debate is the ongoing battle over whether the ban is 
scientifically justifiable. In May 1999, the European Commission stated that, 
The Commission cannot understand that the [United States] has not reacted in a more 
responsible way to the conclusive findings of the scientific committee: 17 beta oestradiol 
exerts both tumor-initiating and tumor-promoting effects .... The scientific evidence is 
of enormous importance to European consumers as it demonstrates that the Commission 
was right to strenuously defend the ban on hormones. We now have a scientific basis to 
defend our position. (European Commission 1999b) 
The European Commission further stated that, 
For all six hormones endocrine, developmental, immunological, neurobiological, 
immunotoxic, genotoxic, and carcinogenic effects could be envisaged, but the available 
data do not enable a quantitative estimate of the risk. Even exposure to small levels of 
residues in meat and meat products carries risks ... [and] prepubertal children are the 
group of greatest concern. (European Commission 1999a) 
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The United States disagreed with this interpretation ofthe scientific data based on 
scientific research conducted both in the United States and the European Union. Secretary of 
Agriculture Dan Glickman announced that, "The evidence is overwhelming that proper use 
of these hormones poses no danger to human or animal health. Even scientific groups 
composed by the EU have found that hormones are safe when used properly" (U.S. 
Department of Agriculture 1996). Amidst the ongoing debates over scientific justification 
for developing policy about food safety issues, the European Union adopted the 
Precautionary Principle in 2000. The Principle defines relevant use as, 
In specific circumstances where, following an assessment of available information, the 
possibility of harmful effects on health is identified but scientific uncertainty persists, 
provisional risk management measures necessary to ensure the high level of health 
protection chosen in the Community may be adopted, pending further scientific 
information for a more comprehensive risk assessment. (Coleman 2002, 5). 
Further, the principle defines its own scope and limitations to measures that "shall be 
proportionate and no more restrictive of trade than is required to achieve the high level of 
health protection chosen in the Community, regard being had to technical and economic 
feasibility and other factors regarded as legitimate in the matter under consideration" 
(Coleman 2002,5). 
Because of the precautionary principle's potential to deny access of any product for 
which harm to human health is possible but not yet proven, it was perceived by the United 
States as a tool for creating trade barriers against almost any product. The European Union 
claimed the moral high ground by arguing that the principle is intended to protect consumers. 
According to Wiener and Rogers (2002), "Today, the conventional wisdom is that the 
European Union endorses the Precautionary Principle and seeks proactively to regulate risks, 
while the [United States] opposes the Precautionary Principle and waits more circumspectly 
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for evidence of actual harm before regulating" (2). Wiener and Rogers assert that the 
perception that the United States has become less precautionary, the European Union has 
become more precautionary is simplistic and inaccurate. However, such perceptions figure 
strongly in policy decisions, and the European Union has promoted the perception that it is 
more responsive to food safety issues, whereas the United States has stood firmly on the side 
of science. The European Union positions over what constitutes sound science and 
acceptable risk has, to some extent, increased anxiety over food safety. 
EU Enlargement 
Negotiations over EU enlargement have also figured in the hormone debate, both 
politically and economically. At the time the briefing paper was published, several southern 
and eastern European countries were negotiating to join the European Union. Countries 
joining the European Union would bring additional large agricultural sectors to the EU bloc. 
As these countries moved toward EU accession, many of them began adopting EU 
regulations regarding agricultural imports. The hormone ban is only one of many EU 
policies that would be adopted by any new EU member-state, and the United States stood to 
lose current and future markets for beef in these countries. 
Animal Welfare and Environmental Issues 
The European Union has legislated the strongest animal welfare regulations in the world. 
Abiding by these regulations usually increases production costs, which means producers 
must receive a higher price for their livestock and poultry, receive government compensation, 
or go out of business. At the time the briefing paper was published, nongovernment 
organizations (NGOs) were very active in promoting animal welfare and environmental 
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issues in the European Union. EU supermarkets attempted to increase sales by promoting 
products based on better animal welfare and environmentally responsible production 
practices, and fast-food restaurant chains were highly responsive to pressure from NGOs. 
Why Hasn't the Hormone Dispute Been Resolved? 
In a recent paper, Hufbauer and Neumann (2002) note that most U.S.-EU trade and 
investment disputes are small relative to overall trade. At about $117 million, U.S. beef 
exports represented a very small percentage of the value of U.S. agricultural exports to the 
European Union. From this perspective, the hormone dispute seems of minor consequence 
relative to the resources that have been invested by both sides through the years, but two 
different views have emerged over the relative importance of the dispute. 
Hufbauer and Neumann classify all U.S.-EU trade disputes into one of three categories: 
market access, industrial policy, and ideological. Linkages between disputes in the three 
categories reveal the complex relationship of the hormone dispute to other trade disputes. 
Market access disputes often have "low public profile and are not severely disruptive to the 
overall transatlantic economic relationship" (Hufbauer and Neumann 2002,5). Many U.S.-
EU industrial policy disputes involve agricultural support systems. Although these cases 
have great economic impact, they are not often brought before the WTO for resolution 
because attempts at litigation or punitive retaliation against core elements of agricultural 
support policy would elicit in-kind responses. 
The hormone ban falls into the third category, ideological disputes, which are the most 
difficult to resolve because factors outside the commercial realm affect the outcome. 
Hufbauer and Neumann contend that "a sure sign that a commercial dispute has evolved into 
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an ideological dispute is protracted attention" by the media and from NGOs, making these 
disputes more difficult to resolve (9). At the time, the beef hormone dispute was the most 
prominent ideological case to be brought before the WTO. With public opinion "dead set 
against lifting the ban," the European Union invoked the Precautionary Principle and created 
an ideological gulf between "a rule that provides scientific evidence to impose a ban and a 
rule that requires proof of innocence to lift a ban" (10). 
Josling (1999) presents a different perspective that suggests the three most important 
reasons for ongoing U.S.-EU food safety conflicts are differences between U.S. and EU legal 
systems, differences in political culture, and the power of commercial interests. Regarding 
legal differences, U.S. and EU regulations reflect differences in attitudes toward food safety. 
However, "many of the differences in food safety laws are arbitrary," reflecting "different 
legislatures writing regulations in different ways to the same end" (Josling 1999, 8). 
With regard to political culture, Josling cautions against placing too much emphasis on 
perceptions that U.S. consumers are more willing to accept science, to trust their government 
to protect the food supply, and to accept change than that ofEU consumers whereas EU 
consumers are cautious, distrusting of science and government, more likely to be swayed by 
NGOs, and more likely to react irrationally to food scares (9). He notes, for example, that 
U.S. consumers have been highly responsive to specific food safety scares and the U.S. 
government has shown itself to be responsive to consumer and environmental groups at the 
expense of international trade rules. Examples include the U.S. government's response to 
conflicts over imports of unpasteurized milk products and the harvest of dolphin-safe tuna. 
Positions are not necessarily fixed on either side in U.S.-EU food safety disputes. 
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Finally, losling discusses commercial interests. In the early years of the dispute, the 
hormone ban often was attributed to EO producer groups who influenced the government 
into making protectionist policies. The original target of the hormone legislation was the 
domestic industry, and national treatment required that imports receive equal treatment. 
More recently, experts have argued that "the system is biased in favor of ultra-cautious 
consumers" (Josling 1999, 11). losling contends that regulations protecting consumers are 
not necessarily trade-distorting. Consumers make their own choices and will pay more for 
the products they want. Thus, well-designed food laws will reward producers who supply 
these products. 
Another argument often forwarded with regard to commercial interests holds that 
agribusiness firms in the exporting country can affect policy because " ... exporters drive 
trade talks, and tend to set the agenda for such negotiations, ... [and] can afford to be much 
more adamant in the advocacy of strict scientific principles" (losling 1999, 12). losling 
contends that firms will differentiate products for a higher price, regardless of whether 
differentiation is supported by science. Further, because governments are responsive to 
domestic political pressure, they will "set food safety rules for consumption at home which 
may incorporate irrational (or unscientific) motivations" (12). According to Josling, the 
result is 
... a new form of consumer protection, whereby public authorities vie with each 
other to guarantee higher levels of safety than strictly necessary in order to maintain 
consumer confidence in the food system. What we see is a clash over the costs and 
rewards of market differentiation, and much of the objective is to capture the rents 
from consumers who demand qualities and characteristics over and above those 
deemed basic by the health authorities. Much of the battle is therefore likely to be 
fought over issues of consumer access to information, in particular through labeling. 
(12) 
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Josling clearly believes that communicating information to consumers will be an important 
element in resolving food safety disputes. 
Summary 
The previous discussion explains some of the political, economic, and social complexities 
surrounding the hormone trade dispute. The discussion shows that although the ban on u.s. 
hormone-treated beef may have been politically motivated to block trade, subsequent 
government actions and communications about food safety issues have created an 
increasingly consumer-driven policy environment. This is not to say that the negotiations are 
no longer highly political, but rather that EU consumers have come to demand stronger food 
safety measures than were in place when the hormone ban was first implemented. This 
transition of the hormone ban from a political issue to a consumer-driven food safety issue 
has had a major impact on the rhetoric of the hormone dispute and the content of the briefing 
paper. Chapter 4 presents the case study of the briefing paper within the historical context 
just presented in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4. DEVELOPING THE TEXT 
This chapter presents a case study of the briefing paper prepared for publication by a 
research center in the economics department of a midwestern land-grant university. The 
briefing paper was coauthored by a technical writer and a professor of economics. After 
consultations between the authors and data collection, a draft of the briefing paper was 
prepared by the technical writer. The following information reflects the process by which the 
technical writer, based on expertise about the topic as outlined by the historical context 
presented in Chapter 3, made content decisions for the briefing paper. 
The process of developing content began with a determination of the reliability of 
external sources, the accuracy of the data provided by these sources, and the value of the data 
as potential new information about the EU ban on the use of growth-promoting hormones in 
the production of beef for human consumption. These determinations were made, in part, by 
comparing existing knowledge held within the research center with new data available from 
external sources. An overview of that process follows. 
• Data held within the research center or readily available to the public from external 
sources (nonuniversity sources such as the U.S. government and other universities) were 
classified as existing knowledge. 
• The subset of data determined by the technical writer as knowledge accepted by the 
university and the U.S. government as part of the body of knowledge about the hormone 
issue was considered accepted knowledge. 
• To be included in the briefing paper, existing knowledge and new knowledge were 
required to be accurate and obtained from reliable sources. 
• Data were considered to be accurate if they were found to be consistent between at least 
two independent sources or were determined to be the best available data if only one 
external source of data existed. 
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• The amount of data found to be accurate from each data source determined how reliable 
the data source was judged to be. In cases where some of the data provided by an 
external source were found to be inaccurate, all data used in the briefing paper were 
verified with at least one other source and the original source was determined to be only 
partially reliable or unreliable. 
• New data obtained from public or private external sources, not available to the general 
public, and interpreted within the research center were assigned value as potential new 
knowledge. 
• Data were considered new knowledge if they were determined not to be held by any other 
individual or organization or were held by a very small subset of experts and would 
inform the majority of readers, including other experts. Only the new knowledge of 
direct relevance to the paper's argument was published in the briefing paper. 
Given the number and variety of external data sources and the conflicting and 
overlapping nature of the data, determining existing knowledge, data accuracy, source 
reliability, and value as potential new knowledge was a more complex task than this 
description of the process suggests. For example, the value of data as potential new 
knowledge included a judgment about the authority the source would lend to the briefing 
paper as a citation. The authority of a source affected the amount of data used and whether 
data were allowed to stand alone (i.e., attributed to an individual source) or were aggregated 
(i.e., presented without direct attribution). In other cases, the amount of accurate data 
obtained from a single reliable source affected the amount of data used and whether the data 
stood alone or were aggregated with data from other sources. For example, as will be 
discussed, the U.S. government was deemed a reliable source by providing a great deal of 
accurate and usable data for the paper. As a result, a great deal of government data was used 
and citations provided appropriate source attributions. On the other hand, although the 
industry participants group was determined to be reliable and the data this group provided 
was determined to be accurate, the amount of usable data from the group was relatively 
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small. As a result, a small amount of industry participant data was included and individual 
industry participants were not cited. As will be discussed, confidentiality also played a role 
in decisions about citation. 
Understanding decisions about the importance assigned to external sources requires an 
understanding of the sources, the data, and the political,_ economic, and social relationships 
among stakeholders in U.S.-EU hormone dispute as well as within the university as a 
workplace. The process of categorizing the sources and data is described in the following 
sections. This is followed by an explanation of how decisions were made about data 
accuracy, source reliability, and the importance of sources, using the historical context 
presented in Chapter 3 as part of the existing body of knowledge, or what Collier and 
Toomey term the ongoing conversation, about the hormone issue. The final sect~ons of this 
chapter discuss how the briefing paper fits within the academic system of creating 
knowledge. 
The External Sources 
Before any content was developed for the briefing paper, the organizations with a vested 
interest in the briefing paper were the university research center where the paper was being 
written and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), which provided funding for the 
center. The USDA funded the research under a proposal that defined research areas but did 
not specify precise topics for individual research papers. A proposal was submitted each 
year, and the USDA held the power to increase, decrease, or terminate funding for the center. 
This process reflects the combination of self-policing within universities described by Brown 
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and the oversight of research through linkages between universities and other institutions 
discussed by Jarvie. 
As decisions about source reliability, data accuracy, and which data would be included or 
excluded from the paper, the number of stakeholders with a potential interest in the 
information presented in briefing paper increased in that each data source became a 
stakeholder in the information. The following sections categorize these data sources. 
Because of the confidential nature of some of the data used for the briefing paper, the data 
sources were combined into relatively broad categories. 
The U.S. Government 
The greatest proportion of data used in the briefing paper was obtained from U.S. 
government sources. Data were obtained from the USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, the 
USDA Agricultural Marketing Service, the USDA Food Safety and Inspection Service, the 
U.S. International Trade Commission, the U.S. Customs Service, the U.S. Bureau of the 
Census, and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. Given the large volume of data and 
the number of government agencies and staff providing data, the U.S. government was 
categorized into three separate data sources. 
Statistics 
U.S. government statistics were comprised of numerical data downloaded from U.S. 
government Internet sites. The data from several of the sites were redundant, but different 
formats allowed users to obtain different levels of detail or make different types of 
comparisons. Decisions about which government data sources to use were based on the ease 
of extracting appropriate data for the briefing paper. 
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Documents 
Non-statistical government information included all other data from U.S. government 
agencies retrieved from Internet sites, printed publications, and emails. Sources for non-
statistical data were the USDA Agricultural Marketing Service, the USDA Food Safety and 
Inspection Service, the U.S. International Trade Commission, the U.S. Customs Service, the 
U.S. Bureau of the Census, and the Office ofthe U.S. Trade Representative. 
Experts 
Data from U.S. government experts were obtained from emails and telephone 
conversations about the Non-Hormone Treated Cattle program, the official government 
system for producing certified untreated beef for the European Union. These data also 
included trade information concerning implementation of the retaliatory duties under the 
World Trade Organization, which administers a multi-country agreement for international 
trade. These data were obtained through direct contact with government employees. 
Although the U.S. government freely provides much information to the public, 
government staff serve as gatekeepers of data considered to be politically or economically 
sensitive. An example would be data that might compromise the government's position in 
activities such as international trade negotiations. The power of government experts to make 
these decisions on a case-by-case basis can constrain the research process. In cases where 
research is publicly funded, researchers publish their results, and U.S. government experts 
are careful not to share sensitive information. 
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Trade Associations 
Trade associations conduct generic promotions of agricultural commodities and represent 
the commercial interests of member companies and organizations. Promotional activities are 
funded by federal funding, membership fees, and funding from national check-off programs. 
Federal funding is most common for trade associations with international programs. 
Members of the associations include private companies and organizations representing sub-
sectors of that association's industry. For example, members of the U.S. Meat Export 
Federation, an organization discussed later in this thesis, include commodity organizations 
attempting to promote the use and sale of com and soybeans. 
Trade associations tend to use U.S. government data as their primary source of published 
statistical data. However, many of these organizations have offices in foreign countries that 
provide market information disseminated only to their members. In addition, their ties to 
industry make some of the information held by the trade associations proprietary. 
Experience has shown that these organizations are often cautious about releasing 
information, serve as gatekeepers of knowledge in a similar fashion to government staff, and 
treat common knowledge as closely held information by publishing it on restricted Internet 
sites. This control of information helps increase their status as sources of knowledge, 
enhances their value to their membership, and helps justify their status as independent 
organizations. Examples of proprietary or closely held information include details of specific 
business relationships, details about trade negotiations and policy issues they to not want 
reported in the media until the negotiations have been completed, or information that might 
reflect negatively on the industries they represent. 
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Industry Participants 
Industry participants were defined as individuals involved in some phase of producing, 
slaughtering, processing, testing, marketing, and/or exporting untreated beef, whether or not 
trade occurred. The distinction that it did not matter whether trade occurred is important 
because, as was discussed in the briefing paper, most of the untreated beef being produced in 
the United States was not being sold into the European Union. This lack of trade did not 
lessen the credibility of industry participants as data sources because they had been involved 
in some aspect of this trade in the past and/or continued to be involved by attempting to 
produce and sell their beef to the EU market. Discovering the level of trade compared to 
production and the reasons why beef was not being exported were goals of the briefing paper. 
Nongovernment Documents 
Nongovernment documents were defined as all texts authored by nongovernment sources 
and obtained from public Internet sites or via private email in either printed or electronic 
formats. The volume of data in this category was small relative to that from other sources. 
This smaller dataset can be attributed, in part, to the government's greater resources to obtain 
and publish public information and its role in the hormone issue as the institution charged 
with policy-making, regulation, and negotiating trade agreements. 
Conversely, the confidentiality of much nongovernment data and the relatively small 
number of sources holding the data meant most nongovernment documents used in the 
research were not released publicly and most of their content was considered proprietary. In 
some cases, nongovernment documents were provided by one source but authored by 
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another. Examples of nongovernment documents that provided data for the research include 
an unpublished research paper, a legal document, and a Powerpoint presentation. 
Other Experts 
This category includes a small group of individuals that did not fit into any of the other 
categories. Within the small segment of the beef industry that produces and exports certified 
untreated beef, a more specific description of these individuals would reveal individual 
identities and might compromise confidential information. Thus, direct attribution was not 
made to these sources in the briefing paper and more detailed descriptions of their roles in the 
hormone dispute are not provided here. Individuals who would fit this category but were not 
specific to this study would be professional service providers such as accountants. These 
individuals would not be direct industry participants or fit into any other source category, but 
they would have access to confidential data relevant to the industry. 
EU Government 
Data from government agencies within the European Union were obtained via the 
Internet. Given that the EU government accepts a different body of knowledge than does the 
U.S. government, the EU government was used as a source in cases where data were not 
available from the U.S. government or to determine the differences in the bodies of data 
accepted by the two governments. 
The Data Categories 
Although a great deal of the knowledge held by the research center was based on the 
historical context presented in Chapter 3, a literature search ensured the research center held 
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the most recent published research about the ban. The literature search revealed existing and 
accepted knowledge, which ensured the topic for the briefing paper had not already been 
addressed by other researchers and provided a standard for measuring the value of new data 
as potential new knowledge. As such, the literature search helped the technical writer find an 
appropriate place to enter the ongoing conversation among experts about the topic, as 
described by Collier and Toomey. 
As noted in Chapter 1, this thesis employs a less conventional definition of data than is 
often the case in academic texts. Here, data are defined as any piece of information provided 
by external sources and already held within the research center. As such, all data were 
considered to be possible content for the briefing paper prior to analysis. The following 
sections define the seven data categories used in this case study: common knowledge, 
institutional knowledge, experience, belief, hearsay, misinformation, and speCUlation. 
Although there was some overlap among categories, most of the data fit relatively well into 
only one of the categories. 
Common Knowledge 
Common knowledge is defined as information that was publicly available to stakeholders 
in the hormone dispute at the time work on the briefing paper began. Although topic experts 
and data sources may not have specific recall of common knowledge, they would be 
expected to have specific recall of the basic issues concerning how the hormone dispute has 
evolved. For example, an individual data source may not know the exact export value of 
untreated beef to the European Union during January-June 2002, but he/she would know that 
the level was low compared to the volumes exported before the ban was implemented. Data 
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provided by an external source who did not have a firm grasp of the common knowledge 
surrounding the hormone ban would require careful verification against data from other 
sources before decisions were made about data accuracy and source reliability. 
Note that common knowledge is not the same thing as either existing or accepted 
knowledge or existing knowledge. Whereas existing knowledge may be held by an 
individual or only a few stakeholders, common knowledge is held by most of the 
stakeholders in the hormone issue. As such, common knowledge covers a broad set of public 
information held by these stakeholders, whereas accepted knowledge includes only the 
portion of this knowledge that has been consensually accepted by academic and u.s. 
government experts. As noted in Chapter 3, there are two bodies of accepted knowledge 
concerning the hormone ban-an American one and an EU one. For reasons that will be 
discussed later in this chapter, the content of the briefing paper is sensitive to the definition 
of accepted knowledge used by the U.S. government. 
In the briefing paper, common knowledge was used to introduce the topic, situate the 
briefing paper within the historical context presented in Chapter 3, and inform readers of the 
starting point for the paper. Unlike an academic paper that employs a high level of 
theoretical or technical knowledge that can be read and understood by a relatively small 
group of experts, a briefing paper is expected to provide enough common knowledge to make 
the topic immediately accessible to both expert and nonexpert audiences. Using common 
knowledge to introduce the paper is useful in helping guide readers and creating a bridge to 
new knowledge. Common knowledge is most concentrated in the first two sections ofthe 
briefing paper to introduce the topic and is used more sparingly in later sections to help 
create smooth transitions to new knowledge. 
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Institutional Knowledge 
Institutional knowledge is defined as data obtained from agencies and organizations such 
as the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the World Trade Organization, and industry 
organizations that are vested with institutional authority, generally recognized as reliable 
sources, and generally recognized as having specific expertise on beef hormone issue. This 
expertise covers all phases of producing untreated beef for export to the European Union. 
Because this type of information carries the authority of the data source, institutional 
knowledge is generally regarded as reliable and institutional data sources have high value as 
citable sources. 
Much of the common knowledge surrounding the hormone dispute is available from 
institutional sources such as universities and the U.S. government as published data, as data 
embedded within large datasets (e.g., trade databases), or as data embedded elsewhere within 
an organization (e.g., held by a single expert). In many cases outside the university, expertise 
is not measured formal education. Instead, it is bestowed on individuals within an 
institutional hierarchy who have been charged with obtaining, interpreting, and disseminating 
information in a specific topic area. Examples include individuals at trade associations and 
U.S. government agencies, many of whom do not hold Ph.D. degrees. Although participants 
in the beef industry are not charged with the tasks just mentioned, many would have unique 
institutional knowledge although many would be unlikely to have the academic credentials 
needed to be considered experts in a conventional academic sense. 
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Experience 
Data based on an individual's or group's direct involvement with any phase of producing, 
harvesting, processing, testing, marketing, or exporting untreated beef to the European Union 
is defined as experience. Most of the data from this category were based on subjective 
accounts related by individuals with expertise in one or more segments of that process. In 
these cases, expertise is defined as knowledge based on some form of experience in the 
production process (e.g., cattle producers and slaughter facility managers), with or without a 
high level of education or training. Important experience data included the amount of time 
spent maintaining program records required by the National Hormone-Treated Cattle 
program and whether the producers were able to sell their cattle for a premium compared to 
producers of cattle treated with growth-promoting hormones. 
The experience data were useful for evaluating the level of common knowledge and 
reliability of the group as an external data source. The experience data were also important 
in providing a great deal of knowledge not previously held within the research center or 
published elsewhere. Finally, the data could only be obtained by voluntary participation 
because most of these sources were not bound by any institutional imperative to provide 
information that might motivate a U.S. government agency, for example, to participate in the 
study. This concept was important in recognizing common and differing perceptions about 
the Non-Hormone Treated Cattle program. Participants operating outside direct institutional 
influence could offer information that differed from experience data offered by institutional 
sources. This effort to include experience data from participants that otherwise might not be 
considered experts in the conventional academic sense helps cross the boundary between 
experts and research subjects mentioned by theorists such as Geisler. 
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Belief 
The belief category refers to data revealing beliefs, opinions, or attitudes about some part 
of producing and exporting untreated beef. Data in the belief category almost exclusively 
reflected negative beliefs. Based on common knowledge of the beef industry, this negativity 
was not surprising, especially given the lengthy political dispute surrounding the hormone 
ban and the general sense of distrust of other segments of the beef industry among some 
industry participants. For example, producer mistrust of participants in other segments ofthe 
industry is relatively common and well-known in the industry (see, for example, Savell 
1993). This distrust stems, in part, from the perception that other segments ofthe industry 
make substantial profits while the producers receive low prices for their cattle. Examples of 
positive belief data are that producing non-hormone treated cattle is a more natural 
production method and that the cattle produce better beef in terms of taste and quality. 
In terms of content for the briefing paper, the predominantly negative nature of the data 
in this category made it valuable for identifying concerns among source groups, and a large 
number of negative comments about a single issue revealed potentially important issues that 
were not being resolved in the industry. In addition, negative comments may have been 
offered because some individuals in some of the source groups perceived participation in 
research conducted by a land-grant university as an opportunity to share information that 
might change the system in their favor. 
Hearsay 
Data categorized as hearsay was comprised of information from a data source that was 
attributed to another individual or group and for which no documentation or practical method 
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of independent verification existed. Data in this category included such phrasing as "I've 
heard" and "I was told." As with the belief category, much of this information contained a 
negative message, expressing perceived injury to the industry or misconduct on the part of 
others. As with data categorized as belief, this negative information was valuable in 
revealing common concerns among stakeholders. The difference, of course, is that the data 
source did not take direct credit for the information. 
An example of hearsay data used in the briefing paper involved an alleged instance of 
buyers purchasing non-hormone treated cattle for which documentation was prepared on-site 
after the sale. In other words, buyers wanted more non-treated cattle than were available and 
the seller(s) allegedly provided documentation for cattle that may not have been produced 
according to the standards for non-hormone treated animals. The value attached to this 
information was equal to that attached to belief data. Sources in both categories revealed 
concerns that were not found in data from institutional sources where participants were less 
likely to share information that would reveal problems in the system of verifying that cattle 
sold for consumption in the United States had not received growth-promoting hormones. It 
should be emphasized, however, that the data for this example were treated as allegation and 
not as actual practice. 
Misinformation 
Data that were found to be incorrect, either based on existing knowledge within the 
research center or when compared to new data from other external sources, were categorized 
as misinformation. Data in this category were especially useful in evaluating source 
reliability. In cases where data from different sources did not agree, the problem was 
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resolved by finding at least one independent source to confirm which source was correct. As 
discussed later in this chapter, the best example of misinformation was the cost of residue 
testing. This example is especially important because it violated the trust in a source group 
that would otherwise be considered to have high reliability in providing accurate data. 
Speculation 
Speculation was defined as information that provided a possible explanation for a 
problem or action but that was not offered as a definitive answer. Such data were often 
prefaced by the word "maybe" or "I think." No speculation data were included in the 
briefing paper, but these data were useful in offering alternative explanations for an event or 
outcome. These alternative explanations could then be checked to see if they were supported 
by other data or proven to be incorrect. An example of speculation came from a government 
source who attempted to explain a question about a data discrepancy. The speculation was 
later proven to be incorrect, but the data provided information that was used in the process of 
comparing data in an attempt to explain the discrepancy. 
Assigning Data Accuracy, Source Reliability, and Authority 
Based on the preceding descriptions of the data types and sources, Table 4.1 shows the 
types of data presented by each source group. Based on Table 4.1, the following sections 
describe how data accuracy was determined, how source reliability and data value were 
evaluated, the authority a source group would lend to the briefing paper, and the amount of 




















































































































































































































































































































The U.S. Government 
Given the authority ofthe U.S. government as an institution, all decisions about data 
accuracy began with the assumption that the data carried the authority and power of the 
government. This assumption exemplifies theories about relations of power forwarded by 
Smith and Foucault, whereby society has created the government as an institution that both 
manages society and participates in the process of selecting and excluding public knowledge. 
As both a funding agency for university research and creator of knowledge in its own 
right, the U.S. government could be considered another example (in addition to the 
university) of the type of institution described by Anderson that receives public support in 
return for service to the public good. As such, decisions about the accuracy of the data and 
the reliability of the government as an external source were different from those applied to 
any of the other data source groups. Content decisions concerning use of U.S. government 
data in the briefing paper were heavily influenced by institutionalized academic convention 
of "showing one's work" as a method of building credibility for the paper. In so doing, the 
use of statistical data served several purposes: to provide the basis for assertions made in the 
briefing paper, to confer the authority of government statistical data to the briefing paper, and 
to make the briefing paper appear more objectively scientific. Rhetorical decisions about 
using statistical data for these purposes exemplifies the technical writer's acknowledgment of 
conventional practices used in the academic and disciplinary discourses noted by theorists 
such as Pare and Kuriloff. 
Few would argue that U.S. government data do not represent an accurate measure of U.S. 
trade with other countries. This almost automatic acceptance of source reliability lends 
authority to the documents in which the data are used. Thus, using U.S. government data is, 
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in part, a politically expedient decision in developing the credibility of the briefing paper. In 
addition, accessibility of trade data on Internet sites and the free use of U.S. government data 
with appropriate attribution further encourage the use of government statistics. 
As noted in Table 4.1, the government statistical data provide both common and 
institutional knowledge. Because of the assumed authority and reliability ofthe u.s. 
government, both types of information normally are perceived as more objective forms of 
information than, for example, belief, hearsay, or speculation. Also, statistics are generally 
perceived as being individually objective pieces of data. However, the automatic assumption 
of reliability, authority, and objectivity implies a level of accuracy that the government data 
do not necessarily possess. Past research experience has shown that statistics published by 
the U.S. government can be highly inaccurate. Based on this experience, the statistical data 
used in the briefing paper were not automatically assigned a high level of accuracy. 
To conform to the process of ensuring the accuracy of data from all sources, the 
government statistics were evaluated to determine if the assumptions about data accuracy 
were justified for the dataset used for the briefing paper. The following discussion describes 
this process. This rather lengthy discussion provides an example of the combination of 
topical knowledge and research experience the technical writer applied in making this 
evaluation. 
One area of the briefing paper that required heavy use of U.S. government statistics was 
the value of trade between the European Union and the United States. The data were used to 
show differences in the value of trade before and after U.S. retaliation to the EU hormone 
ban to show how well the United States had achieved its goal of blocking $116.8 million in 
imports of targeted products from the European Union. Also, because trade of different 
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products from individual EU member-states was targeted at different levels, the data were 
used to show which EU countries were most affected by the duties. The statistical data were 
available from Internet sites of at least three government agencies. Although the data were 
arranged differently on the different sites, the same data could be extracted from each dataset. 
Determining the accuracy of the data required an understanding of how the data were 
collected and presented. Examination of the data sources revealed that the U.S. Department 
of Commerce (US DC) collects raw data from import documentation and enters the data into 
a computerized system based on harmonized system (HS) codes used to define products. 
The harmonized system assigns a code for every product traded between countries. When a 
shipment arrives at a U.S. port, the HS code, volume, and value of the product (along with 
approximately 200 other product descriptors) are entered into a USDC database. Selected 
portions of this database provide the trade data used by most government agencies. 
One issue concerning the data from the USDC system is that importers have one year to 
pay duties on shipments or to settle disputes about tariffs (e.g., an incorrect HS code was 
entered or an incorrect duty was charged). Also, errors made during the data entry process 
must be corrected by hand. Reductions in USDC staff due to budget cuts mean that data 
entry for late payments and corrections can be delayed by more than twelve months after a 
shipment arrives in the United States. 
A second issue with the data concerns the accuracy of the HS codes. HS classifications 
are reported based on 2-, 4-, 6-, 8-, and 10-digit codes, with 2-digit codes being very general 
and 10-digit codes representing the most specific product description. For example, HS 02 is 
"meat, edible offal," HS 2030 is "meat of swine," and HS 02032290 is "meat of swine, 
frozen, hams and shoulders and cuts thereof, bone in, processed." Research on meat trade 
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has found that HS codes can be considered accurate only to the 8-digit level in most 
international markets. Beyond eight digits, different countries often define products 
differently (U.S. Meat Export Federation 2002). 
A third issue is that import duties are applied to shipments on a cost and freight (c&f) 
basis, so the weight of packaging is included in the total shipped weight of the product. 
Thus, duties are applied against a value that includes packaging and freight, and not on the 
net weight of the actual product. 
A fourth data issue concerns how well data from the USDC datasets represent the true 
value of the products to which the U.S. retaliatory duties are assessed. Because the 
retaliatory duties are 100%, the retaliatory value of import duties should equal the import 
value of the products affected. However, data from the government expert source group 
revealed that actual values are considered confidential. This confidentiality suggests that the 
published data are not accurate in reporting the actual duties collected by the U.S. 
government and used for official government business, which raises the question about the 
accuracy of all the data. 
The question also arises about why the data are considered confidential. The answer may 
be based on both political and commercial reasons. Politically, revealing that EU imports 
had been blocked at a lower level than $119.8 million might cause dissatisfaction in the U.S. 
cattle industry, which has strongly supported the retaliatory duties against the European 
Union. From a commercial perspective, it is possible that revealing exact totals for HS codes 
would also reveal data that would allow competitors or others to calculate trade by individual 
companies in cases where a market is small or where only a few major companies dominate 
trade. 
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The four issues just discussed and the questions they raise were weighed against some 
very good reasons for accepting the government statistics as accurate. First, the U.S. system 
of collecting and reporting data is considered among the best in the world, and it would be 
impossible to obtain more reliable data in any other form. Second, given the large statistical 
values being analyzed, the relative impact of most errors from lags in data input or 
corrections would likely be relatively small. Finally, given that data from more than one year 
were available, comparison of the data for different years revealed reasonable trends. These 
factors contributed to the acceptance of USDC trade data as accurate, with acceptable levels 
of potential error. The statistical data were accurate enough to fulfill the purposes of the 
briefing paper, which were to show that the retaliatory tariffs had been effective in reducing 
trade by approximately the desired amount and to estimate the expected loss of beef exports 
to countries planning to join the European Union. 
The comparison also revealed an unexpected finding that provided potential new 
knowledge-that some EU countries appeared to benefit from the system used to implement 
the tariffs. An example of this effect occurred in Germany, which increased the value of its 
chocolate exports to the United States from $13,150,500 in 1998 before the 100% duties 
were imposed on France to $24,023,500 in 2001 when the duties were fully implemented. 
This finding appears to support the use of carousel retaliation, which would periodically 
change the range of products on which the retaliatory duties are assessed in order to 
disadvantage a greater number of EU producers. At the time carousel retaliation was created, 
it was thought that this broader impact might create enough political will among powerful 
EU agricultural constituencies to convince the EU government to repeal the hormone ban. 
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Carousel retaliation was written into the U.S. legislation to impose the 100 percent duties but 
was never implemented because it was unlikely the system would survive a WTO challenge. 
Given the general institutional acceptance of U.S. statistical data as accurate and the 
government as a reliable source, the large amount of data used, and the institutional authority 
behind these data, the U.S. government was a major external source of data used in the paper. 
The potential inaccuracies just discussed are acknowledged among researchers who work 
with the data but are likely not known among less expert readers. The purpose, audience, 
and genre of the briefing paper did not allow for explanation of the potential data problems. 
This gap in the knowledge of researchers and people who read research results provides an 
example of the public trust placed in the academic community to make appropriate decisions 
in selecting what data to present. At the same time, the institutional authority of the 
government and citation of government data sources in a university research paper reinforce 
the authority ofthe U.S. government to provide the raw data and of the university to interpret 
the data. This process is an example of Brown's discussion about the socially constructed 
environment within which academic research links science to politics and creates information 
networks among political and academic staff. 
U.S. Government Non-statistical Documents 
Determining the accuracy of non-statistical data from U.S. government sources involved 
a different process than that used for evaluating the accuracy ofthe statistical data. Non-
statistical data used for the briefing paper covered two areas: cattle production under the 
Non-Hormone Treated Cattle (NHTC) program and the U.S. position on the hormone ban. 
Examples of texts concerning NHTC production include a published list of the names and 
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contact information for NHTC producers, the date each producer was approved to produce 
certified untreated cattle, and regulations governing production of untreated cattle. There 
was no reason to believe these documents did not contain accurate information. The data 
were provided by the USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service, the agency that regulates the 
NHTC system, and could easily be verified by contacting each producer. The NHTC data 
were determined to be accurate without verification, and the government was accepted as a 
reliable source. 
The second area of non-statistical data was comprised of documents that presented the 
U.S. government's position on the hormone dispute and ban. Because the briefing paper 
conforms to the U.S. position in the hormone trade dispute, the paper implicitly accepts the 
government's authority to (1) determine that beef from cattle treated with growth-promoting 
hormones is safe for human consumption, (2) negotiate and implement rules established by 
the WTO trade agreement, and (3) support the U.S. beef industry in its aim to regain access 
for treated beef in EU beef markets or collect retaliatory duties if the ban is not lifted. Thus, 
the argument forwarded in the briefing paper is predicated on accepting the U.S. 
government's authority to provide information on political issues and regulations regarding 
the hormone dispute and the government's reliability as a source. 
These content decisions are political on two levels: the writer acknowledges the U.S. 
government position in making policy on the hormone dispute and as the funding source for 
the research center. The former consideration illustrates Schwartzman's contention that 
science seeks consensual agreement, whereas governments must form policy without full 
consensus. The latter consideration is not a dominant one, but it does inform the writing 
process in a way that would be considered one of the inner voices referred to by Flower. 
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Although the academic environment and the briefing paper genre do not discourage 
arguments that do not support U.S. policy positions, the technical writer's rhetorical 
decisions for the briefing paper accept and support the government's position. These 
decisions illustrate Winsor's (1996a) finding that writers with less power tend to be more 
responsive to the attitudes and politics of persons in power. 
The decisions also reflect the technical writer's understanding of the linkages between the 
political environment, the financial implications of the ban on U.S. producers, the role of 
science in determining whether the use of growth-promoting hormones poses a threat to 
human health. As noted by Brint, the more political an issue becomes, the less policymakers 
rely on science in forming decisions. As noted in the historical context in Chapter 3, the 
hormone issue has been a long-running political issue. 
U.S. Government Experts 
U.S. government data (other than statistical or published data) were provided by 
government staff. As shown in Table 4.1, the dataset from this source group contained all 
seven types of data. The variety of data was based on the large number of agencies and 
government staff who provided data. Decisions concerning data accuracy, source reliability, 
and the value of the data required evaluation of each source and each data type. 
The process for making these decisions for common knowledge was similar to that for 
evaluating the non-statistical government data in that such data are generally accepted as 
reliable by economics researchers and within the research center, with tacit 
acknowledgement that the data are based on the best available information. In addition, 
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questions about the accuracy of common knowledge could be resolved relatively easily by 
comparing data from other sources. 
Much experience data could not be confirmed by a second source. However, making 
decisions about the accuracy of experience data was relatively straightforward for two 
reasons. First, previous research experience has shown that government experts are cautious 
about the information they share. They understand the authority behind their positions as 
gatekeepers of information that could be used against the interests of the U.S. government 
and providers of data that will be closely examined by other experts. This caution applies to 
information that might be considered confidential, either commercially or politically, so the 
assumption was made that no confidential data were included in the dataset. 
Second, previous research experience has shown that government staff who do not 
consider themselves experts on a topic usually will provide contact information for a 
colleague with greater expertise. This willingness to identify more knowledgeable 
colleagues increases the perceived accuracy of experience data. In all cases, government 
experience data were considered accurate and the government was considered a reliable 
source of this type of data. 
The accuracy of belief data from U.S. government experts was determined to be high 
because the data were assumed to reflect the institutional beliefs ofthe U.S. government and 
not the personal beliefs of the experts. Previous research experience with government data 
has shown that government experts try to ensure the accuracy of government data, in part 
because they are often the authors of the data and base their own research on the same data. 
Although this situation does not automatically result in accurate data, acceptance of the 
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government's authority to provide knowledge about the hormone issue includes general 
acceptance of the beliefs concerning the issues. 
The only hearsay data from a government expert source was clearly stated as an estimate 
of the costs for hormone residue testing. Previous experience has shown that government 
expert sources are careful not to offer "unofficial" data, so it was not surprising that only one 
piece of data fit the hearsay category. The estimate was not accurate enough for use in the 
briefing paper, so the information was excluded from consideration, and accurate data was 
provided by another source. It should be noted, however, that if accurate data had not been 
provided by another source, the estimate might have been included in the briefing paper as 
the best available data and attributed to the government source as an estimate. 
Decisions about whether to use the remaining types of data obtained from government 
experts were more problematic. Previous experience with government data has shown that 
misinformation is not common, but it does occur. One problem with detecting 
misinformation from government experts is that assumptions about government data 
accuracy and source reliability can make it more difficult to recognize inaccurate data from 
government sources than from other sources. Only one instance of misinformation occurred 
when a government expert noted that the u.s. retaliatory tariffs could not legally target 
specific countries. Other data confirmed that misinformation had been provided, and all data 
from the source providing the misinformation were rechecked to ensure accuracy. 
As with hearsay, speculation is not a common type of information to receive from 
government experts. As noted, government experts usually refer researchers to government 
staff with more expertise instead of offering speCUlative data. Only one instance of 
speculation occurred in the data from government experts. As with hearsay, the fact that the 
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data were not being offered as first-hand knowledge was clearly stated by the expert and the 
data were not used in the briefing paper. 
Trade Associations 
Given their linkages with government and agricultural constituencies, trade associations 
answer to a variety of individuals and organizations and operate within a highly political 
environment. Because they represent commercial interests, trade associations are privy to 
both proprietary and public information. In additions, these associations often collaborate on 
or fund university research. A great deal of knowledge resides in trade associations, and 
differentiating confidential, proprietary, and public information is often a political decision 
within the organization. Experience has shown that organizations tend to act as gatekeepers 
of data. The value of these organizations is based in part on providing information that will 
be useful to their members and that other industry stakeholders do not have. 
As representatives of various agricultural sectors, trade associations are invested with 
high credibility for the data they provide and are often considered almost on par with the U.S. 
government in terms of expertise and authority. Most of the data these organizations provide 
is U.S. government data that has been extracted and interpreted for a specific audience. 
Trade associations and the university research center share the goal of adding value to 
government data and providing new knowledge. To use information from trade associations 
in the briefing paper was to acknowledge their missions of promoting a specific segment of 
the agricultural sector, the highly political environment within which they operate, and their 
ability to provide data not available from other sources. 
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The trade associations that provided data for the briefing paper have been involved in the 
hormone dispute throughout its history. These groups represent the interests of U.S. meat 
producers, processors, and exporters and have interacted closely with the U.S. government in 
defending these interests. Because trade associations are primarily a marketing arm of the 
industries they represent, they must rely on the U.S. government to negotiate trade 
agreements and on scientists to conduct research on technical issues such as the safety of 
using growth-promoting hormones to produce beef for human consumption and the 
economic implications of restricting exports of this beef. Thus, a mutual reliance on 
expertise and authority is created among trade associations, the U.S. government, and 
university researchers. 
For the briefing paper, trade association data represented every data category except 
hearsay. The data were evaluated with the understanding that this source group promotes 
specific commercial interests and political agendas, and there is little incentive to assist 
nonmembers, especially researchers who sometimes providing competing and conflicting 
knowledge to the U.S. meat industry. However, as with data from the U.S. government, 
information from this source group was initially assumed to be accurate and the source to be 
reliable. Given the caution of trade associations in releasing information, it was also 
assumed that the data would further U.S. industry interests without compromising 
confidentiality. The latter assumption held, but the former proved incorrect. 
The common knowledge and institutional knowledge from the trade association source 
group were easily verified, given that the government and researchers were the source of the 
majority of the data and that the data were publicly available on trade association Internet 
sites. All these data were determined to be accurate and the sources were determined to be 
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reliable. The small set of experience data was also easily determined to be accurate, given 
the number of other sources with which to verify these data. 
Belief data reflected the political and commercial interests of the trade associations, 
which generally conformed to the belief data provided by U.S. government experts. One 
example of belief data is that although not much beef was being shipping to the European 
Union, the market had long-term potential. It comes as no surprise that belief data from the 
trade organizations were more focused on the goals of the industries they represent compared 
with the more broad-based perspective of the U.S. government. A hypothetical example of 
this difference might be a trade association's belief that the U.S. government should 
negotiate for higher tariffs or greater access for U.S. beef in other countries. The 
government, on the other hand, must balance the interests of all U.S. commercial interests in 
determining which battles will achieve the greatest benefits or are the most winnable during 
trade negotiations. In such a situation, the government may believe the request from the 
trade association is justified, but other issues may be more politically or economically 
important and the government would have to compromise on the trade association's issue in 
exchange for achieving other goals. 
Misinformation, and speculation categories were the most problematic to evaluate for 
accuracy and as potential new knowledge. In terms of misinformation, one of the most 
prominent errors was the cost of testing for residual hormones in beef. These cost data were 
among the most difficult to obtain and among the most important in terms of presenting new 
knowledge in the briefing paper. As noted, one government expert provided an estimate of 
these costs. However, a representative of a trade association provided cost data as accurate 
information that were later proven to be inaccurate. The cost data were categorized as 
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misinformation, and the trade association group was determined to be a partially reliable 
external source. As a result, all the data from this source group were rechecked for accuracy 
and no data were allowed to stand alone as being the most accurate available data. 
Finally, as noted, speculation data could not be taken at face value and had to be 
compared against other data to determine whether the speculation could be proven correct or 
incorrect. Only the results of this process provided potential information for the paper, rather 
than the speculation information itself. In the case of the trade associations, speculation 
addressed whether the European Union would implement regulations prohibiting pet food 
ingredients from hormone-treated animals. The speculation itself was not included in the 
paper, but the topic was addressed using the most current publicly available information on 
the European Union's position. 
Industry Participants 
The industry participant source group provided common knowledge, institutional 
knowledge, experience, belief, and hearsay. The technical writer's determinations of data 
accuracy, source reliability, and the value of data as potential new knowledge from this group 
were more subjective than were decisions about data from the other source groups for several 
reasons. First, this source group did not carry the institutional authority that would confer the 
assumption of reliability given to the groups just discussed. Second, data provided by 
industry participants covered a broad range of topics, reflecting the variety of roles 
participants played in the production and export of non-treated beef and their different levels 
of experience and involvement. These differences required the technical writer to make 
decisions about the importance of the data. For example, a participant who was relatively 
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new to the industry such as a newly certified producer of non-hormone treated cattle might 
not have enough experience to discuss the impact of certification on the profitability of 
his/her operation. 
Third, this source group provided the highest proportion of conflicting information. On 
the other hand, as noted, none of the industry participant data was considered 
misinformation. This apparent discrepancy was resolved by assuming that conflicting 
information was the result of different experiences and different roles in the Non-Hormone 
Treated Cattle program. However, sorting through the conflicting data for information that 
could be used in the paper required the technical writer to make decisions about which data 
were most relevant and which were important enough to include. This process exemplifies a 
small part of the process Flower describes as negotiating a web of meaning using data 
characterized by the internalization of multiple and conflicting voices. 
Fourth, a large number of instances occurred where only one individual or representative 
provided a single item of information so that there was no way to compare the data for 
accuracy. As such, the data from this source group had to be carefully sifted for relevant data 
while at the same time taking care not to use data out of context. This process sometimes 
involved subjective decisions about the value of these data. For the most part, the technical 
writer chose to err on the side of caution and not to include data that did not seem clearly 
relevant or clearly important to the topic. 
Finally, a primary sensitivity of the university research center is to avoid publishing data 
that might reveal proprietary information or compromise the competitive positions of 
individuals or companies. The assumption could not be made that all the subjects in this 
source group were appropriately cautious about providing data that might damage their own 
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interests. This sensitivity meant that decisions about source attribution were more complex 
than for source groups such as the U.S. government, given that attribution might reveal 
proprietary information or confer unwanted authority or responsibility to an individual or 
group. As a result, much of the data provided by industry participants was aggregated so that 
information included in the paper could be presented without individual attribution. 
As noted, industry participants provided data in all categories except misinformation. 
Common knowledge represented the majority of the data provided by this group. Data 
classified as common knowledge focused more on local issues regarding beef production, 
processing, and testing than on the global issues addressed by the government and tr(ide 
association source groups. This focus reflects industry participants' direct involvement in 
producing and supplying beef. The differences in the focus of data also reflect what is 
valued as knowledge and what constitutes expertise among members ofthe different source 
groups. The accuracy of common knowledge data was easily verified through comparison 
with data from other sources inside or outside the group, and the industry participant source 
group was determined to be reliable for this data type. 
Industry participants provided a small amount of institutional data, most of which 
concerned regulations for producing untreated beef. The accuracy of these data was easily 
verified by government sources, such as the USDA Agricultural Marketing Service and the 
Food Safety and Inspection Service Internet sites that publish regulations, and by U.S. 
government experts. Thus, the industry participant source group was determined to be 
reliable for this type of data. 
Experience data accounted for the second largest amount of data from this source group, 
providing a valuable set of potential new knowledge. Because a main goal of the briefing 
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paper was to determine production costs and the actual supply of untreated beef, this group 
had good potential to provide the necessary data. Although this group is often not considered 
expert in a conventional sense, their hands-on experience with the Non-Hormone Treated 
Cattle (NHTC) system revealed an important "hidden" cost associated with untreated beef 
production-the labor involved in completing the required paperwork. Although none of the 
industry participants had recorded the time they spent completing the required documents 
and did not have an exact cost, all agreed that recordkeeping took a great deal of time and 
was one of the most difficult tasks in complying with U.S. government regulations for the 
NHTC program. This was an important finding for the research. The accuracy of experience 
data could only be confirmed by comparing input among members within this source group. 
This process determined that most of the experience data were accurate, and the source group 
was considered reliable in providing this category of data. 
Unlike belief data from most other sources, members of the industry participant source 
group were more likely to provide belief data that revealed problems in the industry than 
were other sources groups. An example of this type of information included discussions of 
problems producers encountered through their participation in the NHTC system. Another 
example is the belief that the NHTC program became necessary because some industry 
participants did not care about the regulations and were careless in sorting shipments 
destined for the European Union until the EU government discovered treated beef in 
shipments. These industry participants believe this disregard for regulations lost the market 
for the rest of the industry. No belief data of this type were included in the briefing paper. 
However, these data were valuable in identifying industry concerns, especially among 
producers and processors, which added to the overall knowledge held by the research center. 
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Examples of data used in the briefing paper included the belief that, although many of the 
producers were not receiving a premium for their cattle, they eventually would do so. 
Another example was the belief that individual animal identification would eventually 
become the norm and that the NHTC system gave producers a head start on other producers 
who had not yet implemented an identification system. Events that have occurred since the 
briefing paper was written, such as the discovery ofBSE in a U.S. cow imported from 
Canada, indicate that these producers were correct in their belief that animal identification 
would eventually be required in the U.S. industry. 
As noted in the section defining hearsay data, such data were not directly addressed in the 
briefing paper but provided a means of identifying issues of concern to the industry. In the 
case of hearsay data provided by industry participants, one issue emerged that was deemed 
important enough to include in the paper: the fact that treated beef could be labeled and sold 
as untreated beef relatively easily in the U.S. market. Part of the research center's 
institutional knowledge about agricultural issues is the awareness that U.S. agricultural 
sectors are sensitive about the publication of negative information that could be used against 
their industries. This sensitivity is based in part on the political power of agricultural 
producer groups and their ability to lobby the legislators responsible for creating funding 
opportunities for university research. In making the decision to include this mislabeling issue 
in the briefing paper, the technical writer weighed the importance of acknowledging this 
concern against the possibility of creating displeasure on the part of the beef industry and/or 
the U.S. government. As a result, the issue was addressed carefully and without direct 
attribution. The possibility of mislabeling treated beef as untreated beef was presented as a 
producer concern. This aggregate attribution protects individual sources and gives the 
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authors more responsibility for the statement. Implicitly, this decision also acknowledges a 
lower level of authority attributed to industry participants that may not have the formal 
academic credentials to be considered expert in the conventional academic sense and instead 
might be perceived as research subjects who are simply dissatisfied with the current system. 
None of the industry participant data were categorized as misinformation, but this does 
not mean this type of data was not provided. It is possible that misinformation occurred but 
was not recognized because so much ofthe industry participant data was new to the body of 
knowledge held by the center and, as such, could not be measured against existing data or 
because the misinformation was common enough to be verified within the industry 
participant source group. It is also possible that such data were not considered for inclusion 
in the briefing paper and so was not verified against other data. 
Non-government Documents 
Documents provided by sources other than the government were categorized as 
institutional knowledge. These documents included unpublished research papers and legal 
documents. Because some of the documents contained a great deal of proprietary 
information, they could not be verified using other data available to the technical writer. 
However, the genre of the legal documents provided a strong case for accepting these data as 
accurate. Determining source reliability also was not an issue because permission was 
obtained to cite the documents. The unpublished research papers were from a known and 
trusted source. Because only a small amount of information was used from these papers, 
only those data needed to be verified. 
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Other Experts 
The types of data provided by this source group included common knowledge, 
experience, and belief. Members of this group had first-hand experience with the non-
hormone treated beef industry in capacities other than those already listed. The data from 
this group were among the strongest in terms of expressing beliefs about industry operations, 
the history of the dispute, and why and how the Non-Hormone Treated Cattle program was 
implemented. Given the candid nature of these data, little could be used directly in the paper 
because they were considered too inflammatory. On the other hand, these data were valuable 
in confirming comparable data from other source groups, such as the industry participants. 
This agreement of the data increased the sense of accuracy in these data and in corresponding 
data from other source groups. The outspoken nature of data from this source group also lent 
greater credibility to the data in that the individuals were willing to make strong statements. 
The small size of this source group prevents providing examples that might reveal individual 
identities. 
The EU Government 
EU government data provided institutional knowledge in cases for which there was no 
other source. These data included publications providing the EU policy perspective on the 
hormone issue and resulting ban. Like the U.S. government, the EU government is assumed 
to be a highly reliable source of accurate data and as such could just as easily be privileged in 
an academic paper. As noted, the briefing paper accepts certain U.S. government decisions 
concerning policy and science. Given the differences in policy and political agendas between 
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the two sides in the dispute, data from the U.S. government was privileged over that from the 
EU government in cases where both could provide the same data. 
The decision to privilege the U.S. government as a data source provides an example of 
how the technical writer responded to the institutionalization of power and authority as 
theorized in several of the articles discussed in Chapter 2. One example is Bazerman's 
concept that language is empowered to convey meaning if it uses the systems experts have 
agreed can be used to create meaning. In the case of the briefing paper, the technical writer's 
language is empowered to convey meaning in a system where experts recognize the U.S. 
position as the correct position. A theory about this response is Winsor's finding that the 
writing of unempowered writers tends to be more heavily weighted toward organizational 
attitudes and politics. In this case, university attitudes and politics favor the U.S. position. 
The World Trade Organization 
As noted, the World Trade Organization (WTO) implements the Uruguay Round trade 
agreement and rules on trade disputes but does not have the authority to enforce their rulings. 
The WTO is perceived as a highly reliable source of institutional knowledge in that this is the 
organization that negotiates trade rules and arbitrates disputes. All the data provided by the 
WTO was obtained from the Internet and was categorized as institutional data. As with 
government data, published WTO data were assumed to be accurate and the WTO was 
assumed to be a reliable source. Accuracy of the WTO data was determined by comparison 
with U.S. government data. In cases where the WTO was the only source, data were allowed 
to stand alone as accurate data from a reliable source. 
103 
University Research 
University research accounted for one piece of information in the briefing paper. Source 
reliability and data accuracy were not verified for this research because the research had been 
written at the same university and in the same department that houses the research center and 
the research had been published in a peer review journal. 
One issue that emerged when using other university research in the briefing paper bears 
mentioning because it demonstrates the fluidity of knowledge. The briefing paper presents a 
table showing the values of U.S. beef exports before and after the ban was implemented. The 
historical values of beef and beef variety meat exports prior to the ban were taken from an 
earlier research paper that analyzed the potential economic loss to the U.S. beef industry as a 
result of the ban (Hayes 1989). In 1989, this research about economics losses was new 
knowledge and the fact that variety meats (e.g., tongues and livers) accounted for the 
majority of exports to the European Union (as opposed to beef cuts such as steaks or roasts) 
was common knowledge among government sources, industry participants, trade 
associations, and other experts with experience and institutional knowledge of the variety 
meat trade. 
At the time the briefing paper was written, the hormone ban had been in effect for 13 
years. In the briefing paper, the previous research about the value of trade was presented as 
part of the existing body of institutional knowledge. However, because so much time had 
elapsed, persons new to the topic might not realize that the major trade impact of the beef 
hormone ban was the decline in exports of variety meats for human consumption. This flow 
of knowledge is an ongoing process whereby some common knowledge may be "forgotten" 
as new stakeholders become involved and historical common knowledge is held by fewer 
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people. Understanding the potential fluidity of knowledge between categories is an example 
of the expertise required to decide whether the information should be included in the paper to 
help contextualize the hormone issue. This movement of knowledge provides an example of 
the shifting audiences mentioned by Schwartzman and of Herzberg's social view of 
communication where definitions of science and truth, and by extension what constitutes 
knowledge, change as a group's approach to determining knowledge changes. 
Silent External Sources 
Several external sources groups were excluded from the briefing paper, but they 
indirectly influenced the structure of the paper and affected content decisions. This 
influence, and perhaps the absence of the sources, would likely not be apparent to most 
readers. The two most important external sources that do not appear in the briefing paper 
influenced development of the paper in different ways. 
The most important external source group was comprised of companies that slaughter 
untreated cattle. This group was not represented because they chose not to provide data for 
the research. The meat industry is a highly competitive business with narrow profit margins, 
and slaughter companies are understandably reluctant to provide information of any kind to 
outside sources. At the time the briefing paper was being written, only one U.S. company 
was slaughtering non-hormone treated cattle and a second company was seeking EU 
approval to do so. As part of such a small source group, both companies likely perceived 
that participation in research might compromise their competitive positions. However, even 
if the source group had been larger, it is likely that few companies (and probably none) 
would have provided data. To compensate for the lack of data from this potential source 
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group, information about handling cattle and meat during the slaughter and post-slaughter 
processes was obtained from other sources. However, this information lacked the detail the 
slaughterers could have provided. 
The second silent source group was comprised ofNGOs that address issues such as 
animal welfare, environmental issues, and animal and human health issues. Many of these 
organizations have taken public positions on the use of hormones in beef production. 
Awareness of these groups and their political, economic, and social agendas influenced the 
writing process. An example ofthis influence involved the decision about whether to use the 
term "slaughter" instead of "harvest" for the act of killing cattle for meat. Whereas an 
industry member might readily accept the term slaughter to describe this process, NGOs have 
created political sensitivities to the term. Given the intended audience, the decision was 
made to use the term slaughter. However, the increasing importance ofNGOs in 
representing animal welfare issues and the common use of the term harvest might result in a 
different decision if the paper were being prepared today. 
Using the Data and Sources 
As noted, the technical writer prepared the first draft of the briefing paper. This process 
first involved making the decisions about source reliability and data accuracy as described in 
the previous sections. Next, the technical writer decided which data constituted which type 
of knowledge, evaluated the importance of each type of knowledge and the value of specific 
data, and determined what information would be included in the briefing paper. Many of 
these decisions were based on experience in writing within the academic environment and 
topical expertise on the hormone issue. Despite this experience and expertise, a great deal of 
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deliberation was involved in many of the decisions. As will be noted later in this chapter, 
almost every content decision remained intact in the published version. 
Further, the technical writer made rhetorical decisions regarding how to conform the 
paper's content and format to the conventions of an academic paper while positioning the 
argument within the economic and political contexts allowed by the briefing paper genre. 
These decisions included organizing the paper to inform readers about the topic and the 
argument being presented, providing evidence to support the argument, drawing conclusions, 
and providing full citations so the research could be replicated. Other decisions involved 
using authorial elements such as headings and transitions to help facilitate reading and 
comprehension of the text and formatting the paper to conform to specifications used by the 
research center's editorial staff. Many of these decisions were based on the theoretical and 
technical training provided by the writer's own discipline. However, the writer's primary 
goal was to create a credible, accurate, and "legitimate" text within a second discipline. This 
focus means the writer spent more time on content than on format, and many changes were 
made by the research center's editor before publication, whereas few content changes were 
made by the coauthor. The lack of content changes may be a reflection of the coauthor's 
trust in the technical writer's professional expertise in creating content as the primary 
researcher and writer. 
The following discussion provides an overview of more specific details about some of the 
writer's rhetorical decisions. This discussion is intended to provide a few examples of 
factors that influenced the writer's decisions rather than as a detailed description of each 
decision. As such, it is not meant to imply that the decision-making and writing processes 
proceeded in an orderly fashion from the beginning to the end of the briefing paper. The 
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actual writing process entailed moving back and forth within the paper as content decisions 
were made and writing, editing, and updating were performed. For example, the statistical 
tables presented in the appendices of the briefing paper needed to be developed before 
conclusions could be drawn about the data in these tables. With this nonlinear process in 
mind, Appendix A of this thesis provides a sentence-level analysis of the briefing paper and 
shows the data source(s), the data types, and authorial elements used in each sentence. For 
further reference, Appendix B presents a copy of the full briefing paper. 
In developing the opening section of the briefing paper, the technical writer attempted to 
provide readers with enough common knowledge to understand the topic of the paper and the 
argument being presented and to contextualize the paper within the history of the hormone 
dispute between the United States and the European Union presented in Chapter 3 of this 
thesis. The technical writer also attempted to inform readers that the paper is written from a 
U.s. perspective. This is done in part by addressing the effects of increased costs of to U.S. 
producers rather than, for example, providing reasons the United States should ban the use of 
growth-promoting hormones in cattle. At the same time, however, the technical writer 
attempted to use the objective voice most readers would expect from a paper published by a 
university. 
This contextualization of the paper within the historical context of the hormone dispute 
demonstrates the technical writer's knowledge that academic papers are part of an ongoing 
conversation about certain topics (as suggested by Collier and Toomey, among others) and 
that any new contributions to the discussion must be contextualized. The use of the objective 
voice and formal language and format also demonstrate the technical writer's understanding 
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of the type of prose often used in academia to legitimize the authors as technically competent 
to create new knowledge, as discussed by Longo. 
The technical writer also sets the stage for new knowledge in the introductory section by 
mentioning some of the conclusions (e.g., U.S. exports to the European Union are low 
because of cost, not lack of supply) in the introductory section. Overall, this section is 
intended to allow readers to decide whether or not they are interested enough in the content 
to continue reading. 
As shown in the table in Appendix A of this thesis, the technical writer generally begins 
each major section of the briefing paper with a few sentences of common knowledge to 
smooth the transition from the previous section and to contextualize the reader about the new 
section. The technical writer then presents other types of knowledge (e.g., institutional 
knowledge), followed by new knowledge. This rhetorical approach is loosely based around a 
format of moving from "what we all know" to "what some of us know" to "what the authors 
are presenting as new knowledge." Because the briefing paper targets an audience with a 
range of expertise, "what some of us know" likely will be new knowledge to some readers 
because this knowledge previously was not accessible to them. As a result, the technical 
writer chose to include more background data to level the playing field among readers than 
might be used in a technical academic paper where all readers are assumed to be experts. 
As noted, some of the paper's content helps establish credibility and authority for the 
paper, the authors, and the research center. In part, credibility and authority were inherent in 
the data because, as discussed, U.S. government data were the only or best existing data in 
many cases and the arguments presented in the paper could not be supported without the 
data. In other cases, however, the technical writer made rhetorical decisions specifically 
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intended to increase the credibility and authority of the paper. For example, the technical 
writer could have used historical government data to show U.S. exports before the EU 
hormone ban was implemented. Instead, the technical writer chose to use an earlier 
academic study from the same university where the research center is located. This decision 
lends credibility to the paper and to the authors' university as a continuing source of new 
knowledge. It also widens the base of acknowledged expertise by including the work of 
another academic expert early in the paper. 
Some rhetorical decisions were at least in part politically motivated. Again, for example, 
information about the end use of most of the U.S. beef being shipped to the European Union 
could have been obtained from U.S. government sources. However, a trade association 
contributed a relatively large amount of data, much of which was not applicable to the 
paper's purpose. The technical writer chose to cite the trade association for this end-use 
information, in part to help secure their indirect "buy-in" for the briefing paper. In other 
words, the citation ensures that readers know the authors acknowledge and value the 
expertise of the trade association and that the organization supported the research by 
contributing information. As discussed later in this thesis, this buy-in had unexpected 
consequences. It is important to note that such decisions did not change the content ofthe 
paper and that the same information would have been included if it had come from a different 
reliable source. This decision exemplifies Henry's point that writers need to develop 
organizational acuity as well as rhetorical and technological acuity. Henry was referring to 
the peer review system, but the concept is equally applicable to technical writers employed in 
professional workplaces. 
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As noted earlier, the technical writer's decision to use a large amount of institutional data 
lent credibility and authority to the paper. In addition, the institutional data support the 
objective voice mentioned in the discussion about the introductory section of the briefing 
paper. Whereas the briefing paper does not use the same level of professional language used 
in, for example, peer review articles, the paper's language still conveys a tone of expertise 
and authority. The objective voice of the briefing paper may not be as dispassionate as more 
formal academic writing, but it does conform to Checkoway's description of ways 
researchers use language to portray themselves as employing value-free research methods 
that assure reliability of their results. 
A simple sentence-level evaluation of the briefing paper illustrates the amount of the 
briefing paper's content that is based on data from the different external sources. The text 
was comprised of 178 sentences, including three informational endnotes. The sentence-level 
analysis excluded all headings, tables, and references. Each sentence was analyzed 
according to the data source and type used to develop the content of the sentence (see 
Appendix A). Because agreement among data was used to measure data accuracy and source 
reliability, many sentences are based on data from multiple sources and from more than one 
category. Multiple sources and data types are reflected in the percentages shown in Table 
4.2. 
As shown in Table 4.2, the U.S. government was used as the main data source in 44 
percent of the briefing paper text. Given the dominant use of U.S. government data in the 
briefing paper, it stands to reason that the most common type of data used in the briefing 
paper is institutional knowledge, which was the case. Based in part on the use of common 
knowledge to contextualize the paper in the ongoing academic conversation about the 
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hormone and on the author's expertise on the topic, authorial content provided 18 percent of 
the sentence-level content, or the second-highest percentage of the paper's content. 
However, if the statistical tables were included in this analysis, the percentage of information 
attributed to the U.S. government would be dramatically higher. These percentages were not 
calculated because the U.S. government provided the raw data used in the statistical tables, 
but the data were extracted, organized, and analyzed by the author. This process blended 
knowledge from both sources in the final tables. 
An additional factor in developing the briefing paper that requires discussion concerns 
the data that were not available to the technical writer as researcher. The silent external 
voices discussed earlier represent important potential sources of data who declined to provide 
data for the study-representatives of the cattle slaughter plants. Their lack of participation 
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is deemed important because they represent an industry sector with issues only they can 
address. The source group with the best secondary knowledge about the processing plants 
would be the U.S. government, which works with the slaughter plants and the EU 
government to obtain certification to export beef to the European Union and then monitors 
their adherence to regulations of the Non-Hormone Treated Cattle program. However, U.S. 
government sources would not provide data because of the confidentiality of working with 
private industry, and especially because there were only two plants involved at the time the 
paper was written. 
Members of other source groups also displayed reticence to provide data to varying 
degrees. This reticence became more pronounced the larger the companies or organizations 
were and the further removed they were from the producer level of the beef supply chain. 
Caution in providing data most often occurred for specific issues, such as the structure of the 
residue testing system. Although the data revealed that individuals within source groups 
shared belief and experience data with how the system had been developed, all but one 
individual source would not provide specifics. It is possible that some sources did not know 
the specific details, but the data indicated that several individual knew but were hesitant to 
provide the data. Instead, they suggested other contacts from which to obtain the data. 
The importance of the reticence just described is that it raises the question of how much 
other important data were unavailable to the research for this reason. From a researcher's 
perspective, this type of caution illustrates the importance of assigning legitimacy to 
knowledge held by research subjects, which Geisler contends is now denied by society's 
emphasis on formal knowledge. The data used for the briefing paper showed that the source 
groups held a great deal of information, only some of which was available to researchers. 
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This situation also illustrates that the chasm between experts and research subjects in the 
conventional academic sense, the "we" and "they" described by Cameron et aI., is 
attributable in part to "their" decision to withhold information. If one accepts Halal' s 
description of knowledge as an intangible asset, the academy as a public institution cannot 
provide adequate incentives for individuals to provide all the data researchers desire, 
especially if the information will be published. Much of the information held in the private 
sector has more power and thus more value if it is closely held by a small group of people 
than if it became public knowledge. 
A final issue that precluded obtaining some data was briefly mentioned earlier in this 
chapter. This issue is the movement of government employees among jobs over time. As 
noted, the hormone debate has spanned several years, and the turnover of people holding 
expertise has been considerable. This movement means that some staff members are new to 
their positions and have not yet developed the full range of expertise needed to provide data. 
Institutional memory is lost as employees move to other jobs. Budget cuts have exacerbated 
this problem by reducing the number of government employees so that employees are busier 
and less included to provide data or can no longer report data that had been collected in the 
past. 
The discussion in the previous sections about source types, data types, and the use of 
each illustrates the writer's multiple roles in writing the paper: providing expertise in the 
form of the research center's existing knowledge, evaluating the accuracy and value of data 
from other sources, creating a logical argument using data from multiple sources, and 
guiding the reader through the paper. It is only after the briefing paper has been written that 
the full role of the writer as a source of knowledge is revealed. The writer's knowledge 
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before, during, and after the writing process does not appear as a dataset in the same way that 
data from external sources are documented and exist as written artifacts. Instead, the writer's 
knowledge begins with internalized knowledge about the institutional process of writing an 
academic paper and some expertise about the hormone issue. As the research and writing 
occur, the technical writer gains additional knowledge by performing a literature review to 
determine what research has already been performed, evaluating the research data, 
determining what constitutes new knowledge, and internalizing additional knowledge not 
presented in the paper. The briefing paper is the artifact that documents the rhetorical 
decisions the technical writer has made to present this knowledge. 
Positioning the Briefing Paper as Knowledge 
Creating Institutional Authority 
The authority of the briefing paper as a university research paper was based on the 
authority of the authors as experts, the authority that resides within the research center as part 
of an academic institution, and authority transferred from other sources through citation. The 
authority of the authors as experts authorized to write a research paper is primarily conferred 
by the academic institution and the research center within which the paper was prepared. 
Given the conventions of preparing papers for the center, several implicit assumptions can be 
made about authorial credibility. 
First, the assumption is made that the university's institutionalized oversight process 
ensures that only individuals with the necessary expertise are allowed to produce research 
papers published by the university. Given this implied assurance, readers can assume that the 
knowledge presented has been accepted within the academic community as part of the 
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ongoing discussion about the hormone issue and can be used for the creation of future 
knowledge. 
In the case of the briefing paper, authority primarily was based on the status of the 
authors within the discourse community. The briefing paper was co-authored by a technical 
writer (the center's managing director) and full professor of economics (the center's 
director). The status of the professor as co-author provided institutional assurance ofthe 
authority to create and publish knowledge. Given his full membership in the economics 
discipline, the professor-coauthor holds the greatest authority, which has been conferred 
through the system of credentialing discussed by Brown, the adjudication of previous 
research as true and significant through peer review as discussed by Golden-Biddle and 
Locke, and a position within the hierarchy of power and authority that determines who is 
allowed to speak for a discipline as mentioned by Cayton. As such, the professor lends some 
of his power and authority to the technical writer by appearing as coauthor on the paper and 
provides assurance that the paper is worthy of publication by the university. 
As noted, institutional authority from the U.S. government is transferred to the briefing 
paper through the use of statistics and information with accompanying textual source notes 
and citations in the paper's reference list. Government authority is also transferred to the 
briefing paper by listing the USDA as the funding source for the paper on the title page. 
(The funding notation is a requirement of the USDA's contract with the university.) This 
transfer of authority often results in mutual recognition of institutional authority-the 
university research community recognizes the authority of the government to provide raw 
data and the government recognizes the authority of the university research community to 
manipulate and interpret the data. This mutual recognition can be viewed as one of the 
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ritualized procedures that Foucault claims have become universally accepted in producing 
SCIence. 
The briefing paper may also receive transferred authority from less obvious sources, 
given the broad audience for which the paper is prepared. For example, a cattle producer 
may grant authority to the paper based on the inclusion of data from other producers and on 
hislher agreement with the issues discussed and the conclusions drawn in the paper. Other 
readers may grant authority based on other nongovernment sources or content. 
Determining Acceptance as New Knowledge 
One problem for a technical writer working within another discipline is determining 
whether research has entered the body of accepted knowledge. In the case of the research 
center, briefing papers are usually not submitted for peer review. However, after the 
technical writer prepared the first draft of the briefing paper, the authors decided to submit it 
to an economics peer review journal. As noted in several of articles cited in the literature 
review, publication in a peer review journal would confer disciplinary acceptance (see, for 
example, Berkenkotter and Golden-Biddle and Locke). 
As co-author, the professor held the disciplinary expertise and professional language 
needed to add the theoretical underpinnings, economic analysis, and economic discourse 
needed to make the paper worthy of peer review. The professor made the decision that the 
briefing paper was a fact-finding paper that discovered facts known to specialists but to 
which no one else had easy access. As such, the paper's value was to document facts and 
serve as a reference piece. 
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For the hormone paper to provide the knowledge expected by reviewers and publishers of 
a peer review journal would require additional work, such as conducting a cause/effect 
analysis about the effects of the tariffs against EU products. The research center would 
receive only marginal benefit and such an analysis would not be worth the economist's 
marginal costs to perform. 
As a result, the briefing paper was published by the university research center as 
originally intended and permission was also given for publication on a trade association's 
Internet site. The draft initially prepared by the technical writer was proofed and corrected, 
edited by a professional editor, and published in hard copy and on the research center's 
Internet site. As such, the content of the draft paper developed by the technical writer was 
virtually the same content included in the final draft. 
Given that the paper was not submitted for peer review, acceptance ofthe research as 
new knowledge was more difficult to measure. However, less conventional methods do 
indicate acceptance of the paper into the existing body of knowledge, if not into the body of 
knowledge accepted by an academic discipline. 
External Reviews 
External reviews can be useful in determining the accuracy and value of the content of a 
research paper, and the draft of the briefing paper was distributed to three external reviewers. 
The review process used for the briefing paper was less formal and less objective than a blind 
review and created some unexpected results. 
The three reviewers were an industry participant, a representative of a trade association, 
and an individual from the "other expert" source group. Each of the reviewers had provided 
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data for the research and had agreed in advance to review the draft and provide comments. 
An electronic copy of the draft was distributed to the three reviewers. Only two of the 
reviewers responded, despite a follow-up phone call and email message to the third reviewer. 
Both reviews were positive. 
An unexpected situation occurred when one reviewer asked permission to post the draft 
on a restricted Internet site. The authors agreed to the request but specified that the reviewer 
wait for the final version of the paper to be posted on the research center's Internet site. The 
reviewer did not post the paper until a final version was provided, but he/she distributed the 
draft to others stakeholders to read before it was published, without the authors' knowledge. 
The trade association felt some urgency to distribute the paper before the European Union 
issued a forthcoming comment about the hormone issue. The authors were unaware that the 
comment was forthcoming or that the paper might be used by these stakeholders in preparing 
a U.S. response. 
A second result was that the technical writer was invited to participate in a working group 
created to advise government trade negotiators about the beef industry's position on the 
hormone ban. The invitation was extended based on the acknowledged expertise of the 
technical writer but the incorrect assumption that both authors were university professors. 
The misunderstanding about the technical writer's credentials was cleared up and the 
technical writer did not represent the university in the working group. 
A third result was that neither reviewer who provided a response identified any of the 
content errors that were ultimately found and corrected before publication. The informal 
review process meant the reviewers had no incentive to perform more than a brief reading of 
the text. The peer review system for academic journals ensures that reviewers have a vested 
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interest in ensuring that new knowledge is based on sound theory and method, whereas non-
academic reviewers have no reason to conduct such a careful reading. It is also possible that 
the reviewers' expertise was limited to the data they provided and they did not feel qualified 
to comment on other parts of the text. 
In the case of the reviewer who did not respond, one can only speculate on reasons for the 
lack of response. It is possible that the reviewer was unable to respond at the time the review 
was requested. It is possible that the reviewer did not agree with the paper's content but did 
not wish to submit negative comments. It also is possible that the reviewer did not feel 
qualified to comment on the text, although this seems the least likely reason, given hislher 
knowledge about the research and previous agreement to participate. 
Public Response 
A second method of determining a text's success in adding to accepted knowledge is 
public reaction to the research. In the case of the briefing paper, the university issued a press 
release announcing publication of the paper. Two radio interviews and at least one 
newspaper article resulted from the press release. These responses to the press release 
resulted in part from the public trust placed in the university to provide knowledge, with its 
implied acceptance of the researchers as authorities on the hormone issue. 
Recognition of the paper as an addition to institutional knowledge about the hormone ban 
was also granted by the trade association that published the paper on an Internet site 
restricted to use by its members. Even though the paper had already been published by the 
university, the trade association used the briefing paper to communicate current information 
to its membership, in part perhaps because the association is cited as a data source in the 
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briefing paper, but more likely because the paper used a u.s. perspective and could be used 
to support at least part of the association's stance on the hormone ban as a policy issue. 
Citation in Subsequent Research 
As noted by Golden-Biddle and Locke, an important indication that research has been 
accepted as knowledge is citation of the work by other researchers. The briefing paper was 
cited in subsequent papers by other researchers, including two peer review journals 
(Chatellier, Guyomard, Le Bris 2003 and Colyer 2004) and a discussion paper submitted for 
peer review (Alfnes and Rickertsen 2003). These citations indicate acceptance of the 
briefing paper in contributing knowledge to the discussion on the hormone ban by at least 
some researchers. It also acknowledges the authority ofthe authors, the research center, and 
the university to create this knowledge. 
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS 
The previous chapter presents a case study illustrating how one technical writer at an 
academic research center combined professional experience; knowledge about 
communication theory; topical expertise within another discipline; raw data from external 
sources; knowledge about the political, economic, and social relationships among the 
external sources and with the university as an institution; and knowledge about the 
institutionalized power relationships within a university as workplace to develop an academic 
research paper. This process also drew on the technical writer's knowledge about the 
university as an institution given the authority and power to create knowledge and how 
individuals with full membership in academic disciplines create knowledge. To conclude 
this thesis, I review the questions posed in Chapter 1 and discuss the answers found in the 
literature review, historical context, and case study chapters. 
4. How and why do institutional practices within universities control who is allowed to 
create knowledge within an academic discipline? 
5. To what extent does a writer's understanding ofthe academic institution as both a source 
of new knowledge and a workplace; external political, economic, and social factors and 
relationships; and the parameters that define an academic research paper affect rhetorical 
decisions about the content of a research paper? 
6. Can a technical writer create new knowledge from within another academic discipline? 
If so, how does one determine whether new knowledge has been created? 
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Answers to Question 1 are revealed in the discussion in the literature review in Chapter 2 
and illustrated by the case study presented in Chapter 4. As discussed in those chapters, 
defining, creating, and publishing new knowledge at universities is almost exclusively 
controlled by small groups of academic experts within individual disciplines. This control 
has arisen primarily from the institutionalization of the peer review system as a formal 
method of determining what constitutes knowledge, arriving at a consensus about who 
should be recognized as having expertise, and granting authority and power to individuals 
based on this recognized expertise. The peer review journal provides a genre in which to 
report knowledge, researchers are rewarded for publishing peer review articles, and full 
membership in an academic discipline requires peer review articles. The status of specific 
journals matters as well. As noted, theorists such as Golden-Biddle and Locke take peer 
review a step further in asserting that an article must be cited in other research before full 
recognition that an author has contributed knowledge in the field is achieved. 
Controlling who is allowed to create knowledge ensures that any knowledge developed 
within an academic discipline conforms to that discipline's accepted theories and 
methodologies, that the knowledge fits into the current ongoing conversations about specific 
topics, and that the knowledge is created by experts whose work has earned them the 
authority to create knowledge. How well a research paper conforms to these expectations is 
determined by other experts within the discipline. Theorists such as Berkenkotter view the 
peer review system as a social mechanism used to certify new knowledge and maintain 
quality control over a body of knowledge. As noted, however, others argue that the system 
marginalizes some individuals, stifles researchers' creativity, and allows only a small number 
of experts to hold, control, and create knowledge. Finally, the peer review system may 
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encourage research for the sake of creating knowledge, which does not necessarily coincide 
with research for the public good. 
The historical context presented in Chapter 3 and case study presented in Chapter 4 
demonstrate that each of the factors mentioned in Question 2 can have an enormous impact 
on the rhetorical decisions a technical writer makes in developing an academic research 
paper. First, the case study provides examples of how institutionalized power relationships 
can work both in favor of and against a technical writer's ability to create knowledge. An 
example of power relationships working in favor of the technical writer is the conferral of 
enough authority to the writer as researcher to allow him/her to conduct a research project 
with the potential to create new knowledge and to do so with very little oversight. 
On the other hand, academic disciplines value peer review articles as the measure of 
expertise and authority in research, but a technical writer working within another discipline 
would not have the level of knowledge and fluency in the professional language required to 
develop a peer review article in that discipline. In this context, the degree to which the 
knowledge presented in the briefing paper in the case study could be legitimated and 
accepted by the academic discipline hinged on the professor-as-coauthor's greater power to 
decide whether or not to contribute the content and professional language that would make 
the paper acceptable for peer review. The fact that the paper was not submitted for peer 
review is an example of institutional power relationships working against the technical 
writer. 
Turning to power relationships in external institutions, the case study demonstrates that 
what is commonly thought of as an implied contract between society and the research 
community for producing knowledge-creating new information based on objective research 
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using accurate data from public institutions entrusted to collect and supply these data--often 
does not exactly fit this implied contract. As shown in the case study, the accuracy of the 
raw data can be limited by factors such as available technology; collection and reporting 
methods; the incentive or lack of incentive for a data source to provide accurate data; and 
human error. An important factor noted in the case study is that the technical writer 
employed research experience, previous topical expertise, and new knowledge obtained 
while working with the dataset to determine that although some of the statistical data were 
not perfectly accurate, they were the best available, accurate enough for the purposes ofthe 
research project, and therefore could be used to create new knowledge. Somewhat ironically, 
a writer who did not have the same previous research likely would use the data without 
question, especially the U.S. government data, which carries the authority and power of the 
U.S. government, and would achieve the same results as those presented in the briefing 
paper. 
The second part of Question 2 addresses the political, economic, and social factors that 
affect the technical writer's rhetorical decisions. As demonstrated in Chapter 3, the United 
States and the European Union have spent many years disputing the safety of using growth-
promoting hormones in beef cattle. This dispute carries a long history of political, economic, 
and social issues and consequences resulting from the actions of each trading partner. Many 
of these issues were taken into account as the technical writer contextualized the briefing 
paper within the ongoing conversation about this topic. 
On another level, these factors were considered in terms of the goals of and relationships 
among the different source groups that provided data for the study. As shown in Chapter 4, 
some understanding of each source group's goals, underlying agendas, incentives, 
125 
institutionalized practices, and ability to provide data are beneficial in making appropriate 
decisions about data accuracy, source reliability, and the value of information as potential 
new knowledge. 
The case study demonstrates, for example, that many of the experts involved in this 
dispute disagree on what constitutes knowledge. Although the dispute originally may have 
been motivated almost exclusively by the EU government's political goals, the historical 
context shows the factors that caused its evolution into a science-based dispute about food 
safety and about which experts should be granted (or are able to claim) the power and 
authority to inform policy on the use of growth-promoting hormones in beef production. The 
political, economic, and social implications of the dispute are enormous, especially given the 
length of the dispute and the fact that resolution does not appear to be imminent. 
The third part of Question 2 concerns how the parameters that define a university 
research paper affect a technical writer's rhetorical decisions. An important conclusion that 
can be drawn from the case study is that the technical writer attempts to emulate some of the 
methods disciplinary experts use in writing peer review articles. Examples of this emulation 
include contextualizing the paper within the ongoing conversation on the topic, asking for 
external reviews of the paper before publication, adopting an objective voice for the text, and 
using statistical information to support the paper's argument. The technical writer has 
internalized many of the institutional practices used by disciplinary experts in creating and 
publishing new knowledge, even though some of these practices go against communication 
theory. An example of this conflict is the choice between an objective, passive voice or an 
active, interested voice in reporting research results. This finding indicates that the academic 
disciplinary experts in this workplace either reward the technical writer for emulating their 
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methods or bring their power and authority to bear to create this result. In the case study, the 
technical writer is responding to rewards that include the conferral of authority from experts 
higher in the institutional hierarch to conduct other research projects. 
The third question asks whether the technical writer was able to create knowledge for 
another discipline in an academic workplace. The argument could be made that all the 
information presented in the briefing paper already existed in some form and that the 
technical writer simply gathered the data together in one place. However, the case study 
presented in this thesis shows that the process of developing the briefing paper was much 
more complex and the technical writer developed a broad range of new knowledge, only part 
of which was included in the briefing paper. Thus, I believe the case study presented in this 
thesis answers the first part of question-whether new knowledge was created-with a 
qualified "yes." 
As noted, most technical writers would not have the level of education required to 
publish in a peer review journal in another discipline. In the most conventional academic 
sense, then, the briefing paper would not be seen to have created new knowledge in that 
discipline. As noted near the end of Chapter 4, the professor-eo-author of the briefing paper 
considered the research a fact-finding exercise that discovered facts known to specialists but 
to which no one else had easy access. I would argue that although the greatest value of the 
briefing paper ultimately may be as a reference piece, new knowledge was nonetheless 
created. 
As noted in the literature review, research writers need to develop organizational acuity 
as well as rhetorical and technological acuity. Part of developing this acuity is observing and 
learning how experts think about and communicate knowledge. Unfortunately, standards for 
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their own research are likely to be the ones by which experts judge all texts. Given that a 
technical writer is unqualified to prepare research for peer review journals, this conventional 
standard for creating and jUdging knowledge should not apply. Just as this thesis uses a less 
conventional definition of data, it will use a less conventional measure of whether new 
knowledge was created. 
On one level, the technical writer analyzed and interpreted information from a broad 
group of independent sources, each of which provided at least some potential new 
knowledge. As noted, most ofthe u.s. government data are publicly available on U.S. 
government Internet sites, which might seem to imply that no new knowledge could be 
created. However, the technical writer used topical expertise to select specific data from 
large trade databases, calculated and presented the data in a new form, and used the data to 
support specific arguments. For example, one finding was that some EU countries appeared 
to have benefited from country-specific tariffs against products from other EU countries. 
Despite this apparent benefit, the retaliatory tariffs were blocking approximately the correct 
total value of trade, so this finding likely would be of interest to a relatively small group of 
readers. Although carousel retaliation was never implemented because the United States did 
not want to test it at the WTO, this finding suggests that periodically changing the products 
affected might have greater retaliatory effect by preventing countries who might benefit from 
country-specific tariffs against other countries from being able to do so for long. This 
conclusion was reached independently by this study and was not found in any outside 
research. 
Another finding was that the amount of trade expected to be lost if Eastern and Southern 
European countries joined the European Union would be relatively small and that the 
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majority of the trade loss would be for variety meats, as had been the case for the European 
Union. This finding likely was intuitive for many readers, but the issue has economic 
implications for the U.S. beef industry and is political in terms of perceptions about the 
relative importance of these markets and whether to fight for retaliation to cover the 
additional losses of markets as the countries adopt EU standards. Whereas one of the trade 
associations that provided data for the briefing paper views this value as large when 
compared with the size of other developing markets, many trade analysts view the value as 
small compared with total beef trade or compared with the value of trade in other products 
deemed more important than untreated beef. Although the specific value that would be lost 
under normal circumstances might not be considered new knowledge by many people 
because they "knew" it, providing statistical data to show actual levels provided readers with 
a visual artifact that documents the value. Given the technical writer's knowledge about the 
political conflict over whether this value was high or low, that interpretation was left to the 
readers. 
The paper also presents knowledge previously held only by individual data sources. 
Perhaps the single most important example of this type of information was the cost of testing 
for residual hormones in beef. Only one data source provided specific and accurate data 
about these costs. At least one other data source claimed to have the costs but considered the 
data proprietary and would not disclose them. These data were extremely important to the 
briefing paper because anecdotal evidence had suggested the costs were very high and as 
such had a large impact on the ability of U.S. exporters to sell untreated beef to the European 
Union. This evidence was supported by the data. Given that so few individuals appeared to 
hold the correct data and given the importance of the data in documenting the additional 
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costs of producing non-hormone treated beef-a task that had not previously been 
performed-this data also is defined as new knowledge. One challenge of considering data 
held by one or a few individuals as new knowledge is the subjective judgment involved in 
determining how many people can hold the data before it can no longer be considered new 
knowledge. This may have to be determined on a case-by-case basis. In this instance, the 
difficulty of procuring the accurate data and the importance of the data to the paper's 
argument are considered good reasons to consider the data as new knowledge. 
Finally, as mentioned, the paper presented information about the amount of time cattle 
producers must spend on recordkeeping to comply with regulations of the Non-Hormone 
Treated Cattle (NHTC) program. No cost could be assigned to this labor because none of the 
producers who mentioned it actually knew how many hours of labor they were spending on 
the recordkeeping.. However, the technical writer determined that, if producers were to place 
a value on this time, including the value of labor used for recordkeeping in the production 
costs would result in much higher costs than the current data indicate. Again, this is 
information that the producers held and that would be an important consideration for an 
outside producer considering using the NHTC program. The data used in the study revealed 
that several groups have developed business plans for producing NHTC beef and quickly 
abandoned these plans when they discovered the extra costs. Given that the information 
about high labor costs was not available anywhere else, even though the exact level is not 
known, this information is also considered new knowledge. 
In the case study, the assumption was made that no individual source or source group 
held all the information presented in the paper, in part because the knowledge was not 
previously available in a single source and in part because each source group provided only a 
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portion of the data determined to have value as potential new knowledge. Thus, even 
industry participants with high levels of expertise would likely gain at least some new 
knowledge from the briefing paper. The value of this knowledge would depend on the 
individual concerns of readers and their level of participation in and expertise about the 
industry. 
On another level, new knowledge created during the process of writing the briefing paper 
became part of the body of knowledge held within the research center. Only a small amount 
of the total data provided for the research was actually used in the briefing paper, but the 
remainder of the data and the comprehensive analysis will continue to reside within the 
research center. Much of this knowledge is proprietary and will never be shared outside the 
research center, but it enhances the topical expertise held by individuals within the research 
center. Given that the technical writer developed the research paper, most of this knowledge 
will be held by the technical writer, thereby increasing hislher expertise. 
The overall conclusion that can be drawn from the case study and the preceding 
discussion is that although technical writers working in an academic workplace are well-
positioned to create new knowledge, institutionalized practice can limit opportunities if 
conventional academic standards are used to measure and reward the technical writer's 
efforts. The workplace described in the case study makes it possible for a technical writer to 
create new knowledge by providing an alternative genre with which to report research results 
and the conferral of at least some authority to conduct the research. 
Even under a less conventional definition of what constitutes new knowledge, this thesis 
employs some of the conventions used by experts, such as external reviews and citation in 
peer review articles to determine whether new knowledge has been created. Given that 
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external review was not conducted through an academic peer review process, the most 
important conventional measure is citation. As shown, the briefing paper was cited in two 
peer review articles and one paper that had been submitted for peer review. It is interesting 
to note that two of these articles were published in journals outside the United States, 
indicating that the paper has been received into the international body of knowledge about 
the topic. 
On the other hand, several limitations on the conclusions that can be drawn from this 
study should be mentioned. First, the study is highly subjective. The case study is based on 
an analysis of the process used by one technical writer (also the author of this thesis) for one 
briefing paper. However, the technical writer has written several briefing papers and has 
extensive previous experience in preparing research papers similar to this one and using 
similar data sources. These circumstances may not reduce the subjectivity inherent in self-
study, but they do provide insights that are not likely to be available from a technical writer 
preparing his/her first academic research paper. 
Second, most of the conclusions drawn from the case study cannot be extended to other 
workplace settings. For example, for the reasons stated in Chapter 4, the technical writer in 
an academic workplace is likely to have greater access to external institutional sources such 
as U.S. government experts, who are interested in ensuring that government and academic 
research are complementary, than does a technical writer in many other workplace settings. 
This enhanced access makes it easier for the technical writer at the university to obtain data, 
get information that might not be available elsewhere, and seek a clearer explanation from a 
government expert than that available in a document or on an Internet site. Technical writers 
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who need to create new knowledge in other workplaces might be at a disadvantage in this 
respect. 
The academic workplace also carries expectations that differ from those in many 
nonacademic workplaces. One example is that accuracy is important to maintaining the 
credibility not only of the technical writer in relation to workplace power hierarchies but of 
the institution in relation to external constituencies and other institutions. Although any 
technical writer aspires to produce accurate text, the public nature of academic research, 
especially because most of it is published on the Internet, means the audience is almost 
unlimited and errors are almost impossible to correct once the research has been released. 
Research conducted in other workplaces is likely to have a more limited and identifiable 
audience and errors are more easily corrected. 
Finally, the research environment in which the briefing paper was prepared might be 
considered unique. The most important factor in allowing the technical writer to create 
knowledge for the briefing paper was an academic workplace with a political environment 
and a source of funding that allowed the writer to gain the hierarchical authority to invest the 
time necessary to stay current on the body of knowledge about a topic; interpret data; and 
write and publish papers that do not meet the criteria of the peer review process. 
The information presented in this case study would be more useful if future research 
included similar case studies in both academic and nonacademic environments. Additional 
research would allow us to compare how experienced technical writers with topical expertise 
write research and the factors that have the greatest impact on advancing or limiting their 
ability to create new knowledge. Such studies would have pedagogical implications for 
university communications programs that develop theory and prepare coursework for 
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technical writers who will enter the workplace. Such research would also have practical 
implications in terms of teaching management how to develop workplaces that encourage 
and value research by technical writers and reward them for their efforts. 
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APPENDIX A. SENTENCE-LEVEL ANALYSIS OF BRIEFING PAPER CONTENT 
Appendix Table A.I. Sentence-level analysis of data used for briefing paper, "Why Can't 
U.S. Beef Compete in the European Union?" 
Data Data Author Sentence 
Source" Typeb Element No. Sentence 
USGS CK 1 Since the European Union banned imports of beef treated with growth-
promoting hormones in 1989, the United States has been unable to fill the 





















In 1999, U.S. exports to the European Union were temporarily suspended, 
and even less beef has been shipped since exports resumed. 
As discussed in this paper, the stringent guidelines for producing, 
harvesting, and shipping certified non-hormone treated beef for the 
European Union create additional costs that greatly reduce the 
competitiveness of U.S. beef. 
4 What was once a niche market for producers and processors has all but 
vanished, yet some producers continue to obtain U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) certification for their non-hormone treated beef. 
5 In this paper, a short overview of current U.S. trade flows with the 
European Union is presented, followed by an estimate of the additional 
costs of producing beef for that market. 
6 Then, given that exports to the European Union are so low and the costs of 
producing, processing, and shipping are so high, the paper discusses where 
producers are marketing their non-treated cattle and beef and whether they 
are receiving an adequate premium to cover their additional costs. 
7 Results from these informal discussions follow the cost estimates. 
8 As an international trade issue, the beef hormone ban (and U.S. retaliation) 
continues to playa role in policy decisions and trade negotiations. 
9 As more countries negotiate accession to the European Union, for example, 
the United States stands to lose additional trade potential. 
10 The final sections of this paper discuss U.S. retaliation against the E.U. 
hormone ban and some implications ofE.U. enlargement. 
Current Trade Flows 
11 After the 1989 ban on beef from hormone-treated cattle, the United States 
exported a small but relatively constant volume of beef to the European 
Union. 
12 In July 1999, the European Union reported finding traces of growth-
promoting hormones in shipments of U.S. beef, and the USOA voluntarily 
suspended exports and implemented a more rigorous system of regulation 
and controls. 
13 Exports resumed in September 1999. 
14 Maintaining a consistent E.U. market for U.S. non-treated beef has been an 
ongoing challenge, but the E. U. market for U.S. beef all but disappeared 
after the temporary market closure. 
15 From January through June 2002, only 510 metric tons of 
fresh/chilled/frozen U.S. beef were shipped to the European Union. 
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Appendix Table A.I. (continlled) 
Data Data Author Sentence 
Source" Typeb Element No. Sentence 
CO NK 16 According to the U.S. Meat Export Federation (USMEF 2002), most of this 
beef appears to have been destined for U.S. military bases, embassies, or 


























Table I compares USDA data for beef and beef variety meat exports to the 
European Union for 1995 through 2001 and for the first six months of2002. 
These data do not differentiate beef purchased for sale in the E.U. market 
from beef shipped to the destinations just mentioned. 
Also, beef from E.U.-approved plants in other countries can be imported 
into the United States, processed at E.U.-approved u.S. plants, and re-
exported to the European Union. 
The data in Table I also do not differentiate non-treated variety meats for 
human consumption from variety meats used in the pet food industry. 
Before implementation of the hormone ban, the European Union was a 
major import market for U.S. variety meats. 
In 1987, the European Union imported 73,372 metric tons ofbeefliver, 
tongues, and other variety meats from the United States, primarily for 
human consumption (Hayes 1989). 
Since the ban, only non-treated variety meats can be used for human 
consumption, but some variety meat and by-product imports for the pet 
food industry are allowed from non-treated animals. 
During the January through June 2002 period, just over 2,500 metric tons of 
variety meats were exported, all for use in pet foods. 
The European Commission has stated that [indent quote] The European pet 
food industry relies on third countr[y] sources for the supply of raw material 
for pet food production. In order to allow this trade to continue, th[is] 
proposal establishes that the import of pet food and raw material for pet 
food production, derived from animals which have been treated with certain 
substances prohibited in accordance with Directive 96/221EC, shall be 
permitted under specific conditions to be laid down by the Commission. 
(Commission of the European Communities 2000) 
26 It appears that this market segment will remain open to U.S. exporters, but 
the importation of variety meats from treated cattle continues to cause 
discomfort in the European Union, and this trade may be subject to 
additional controls. 
27 Recently, the European Union proposed that imports of U.S. variety meats 
for the E.U. pet food industry be treated with visible "markers" to 
distinguish them from non-treated products intended for human 
consumption (Pet Food Institute 2002). 
The Additional Costs of Producing Non-Hormone Treated Beef 
28 As shown, very little trade is occurring between the United States and the 
European Union. 
29 The additional costs of producing, slaughtering, and shipping are the 
primary deterrent to this trade. 
30 The following sections break down the additional costs associated with 
producing certified non-hormone treated beef and discuss the alternative 
markets producers are finding for their non-hormone treated beef. 
Non-Hormone Treated Cattle Program Certification 
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To become eligible to export non-treated beef, producers must obtain 
certification for their cattle through the USDA's Non-Hormone Treated 
Cattle (NHTC) program. 
Under this program, the USDA certifies that cattle "have never been fed or 
treated with hormonal growth promotants" (USDA 200lc). 
33 The USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) administers the NHTC 
program from an animal's birth through delivery to the packing plant door. 
34 As of June 2002, sixteen farms, ranches, or feedlots were registered under 
the NHTC program. 
35 The NHTC program is operated on a user-fee basis, and producers pay an 
hourly rate (as published in the Federal Register) for USDA staff time and 
expenses needed to certify the production facility. 
36 Producers are required to prepare a detailed program manual that includes 
"clear, sequential, written operating policies and procedures or work 
instructions, specific to the farm or ranch seeking approval, that address all 
program requirements ... " (USDA 200 I b). 
37 The producer pays the AMS staff time required to ensure that the program 
manuals and other documentation comply with the NHTC program 
requirements. 
38 The AMS also conducts audits that include document reviews, on-site 
compliance audits, and follow-up or surveillance audits. 
39 As part of the on-site audits, the AMS auditor inspects the NHTC herd, 
examines the producer's documentation, meets with the herd's 
veterinarians, visits feed providers, and examines feed labels. 
40 Producers are charged for travel expenses, inspector time, and the per diem 
costs required for on-site audit procedures. 
41 An estimated $3,000 is required for the initial certification process, 
including program manual and documentation reviews and the on-site audit. 
42 Once a producer is certified, annual compliance audits are conducted. 
43 (In cases where a problem is discovered, follow-up audits are sometimes 
needed.) 
44 USDA auditors attempt to combine audit trips to producers located within a 
reasonable proximity to each other and to prorate the travel costs among 
these producers. 
45 As a result, on-site audit costs can vary widely among producers. 
46 NHTC producers estimated the fees paid to USDA for their annual audits at 
between $500 and $2,000 annually. 
47 These estimated audit costs do not include the cost of the producer's labor 
to develop a program manual and to prepare the extensive documentation 
involved in obtaining and maintaining certification. 
48 None of the producers contacted for this study provided an estimate of his 
or her own labor costs for the paperwork, but all agreed that documentation 
requires a large number of hours. 
49 The labor-intensiveness of the documentation was the most common 
comment from producers about the NHTC program. 
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Appendix Table A.I. (continued) 
Data Data Author Sentence 
Source· Typeb Element No. 
IP B 50 
IP E 51 
IP E 52 
USGD CK 53 
USGD IK 54 
USGD IK 55 






























Given the extensive documentation requirements for certifying cattle, some 
producers expressed the opinion that NHTC production is best suited for 
relatively small calving-through-finishing operations and that cattle 
transfers would be almost impossible to do. 
On the other hand, spreading these fixed costs over fewer animals makes it 
necessary to earn an even higher premium for their non-treated cattle than 
that needed for larger herds. 
Producers with relatively large herds have shown themselves able to meet 
the NHTC documentation requirements, so the program is workable for a 
broad range of herd sizes. 
Production Costs 
The advantages of using growth-promoting hormones include improving 
feed efficiencies, speeding weight gain, and producing a leaner beef product 
preferred by health-conscious consumers. 
According to Hanrahan (2000), hormones are used on approximately 63 
percent of all cattle and about 90 percent of the cattle on feedlots in the 
United States. 
In large commercial feedlots, usage approaches 100 percent. 
The additional cost of raising cattle without growth-promoting hormones 
varies but generally is estimated at between $15 and $40 per animal (USDA 
2000). 
This cost will be incurred by any producer who does not use growth-
promoting hormones, so it is not unique to the NHTC program. 
However, non-hormone treated beef is required by the European Union and 
represents an additional cost relative to beef raised for the U.S. commodity 
market. 
Packing Plant Certification 
The USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) oversight comes 
into force as the animal enters the packing plant. 
Non-treated animals can be slaughtered at any U.S. plant, but beef destined 
for the European Union must be harvested in a plant approved for export to 
the European Union. 
Although the European Union now recognizes USDA plant inspection, final 
E.U. approval may require some plant modifications. 
Modification costs vary from plant to plant, so no estimate ofthis cost is 
provided. 
In addition to any modification costs, packing plants pay a fee to 
USDAIFSIS for inspection services. 
Unlike the NHTC program, only the inspector's time and travel costs are 
included; no per diem fees are charged. 
FSIS also does not charge for office time spent on paperwork and 
documentation. 
An inspection trip for plant certficiation costs approximately $500. 
Once a plant has achieved certification, annual review is not required but is 
recommended. 
As of August 2002, only one U.S. plant was certified to slaughter U.S. beef 
for export to the European Union. 
Another had been approved by FSIS and was awaiting final E.U. approval, 
which usually takes between 21 and 60 days. 
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Appendix Table A.I. (continued) 
Data Data Author Sentence 
Source" Typeb Element No. 












































The entire plant certification process takes approximately six months from 
the time a plant states its intention to become certified through final E.U. 
approval. 
Additional Residue Testing 
In addition to plant approval fees, the Additional Residue Testing Program 
adds substantial costs to beef destined for the European Union. 
There are two layers of costs for the testing process. 
First, only one laboratory in North America-Maxxam Analytics, Inc., in 
Mississauga, Ontario, Canada-is approved to test the urine and animal 
tissue samples for meats produced for human consumption in the European 
Union. 
After the European Union announced that hormone-treated meat had been 
discovered and the USDA closed exports in 1999, the European Union 
would not approve any of the North American labs that had been 
performing tests for U.S. and Canadian meat. 
Maxxam Analytics agreed to bring their lab into compliance with E.U. and 
USDAiFSIS testing requirements. 
Gaining this validation required that Maxxam make a sizeable investment, 
and a small group of meat companies committed funds to Maxxam to pay 
down expenses and other non-recoverable costs involved in meeting all the 
requirements (Argosy Enterprises, LLC 2002). 
In exchange for their contributions in meeting the validation costs, the meat 
companies entered into a five-year agreement with Maxxam that any U.S. 
company requiring meat testing must join the group for a fee of $30,000. 
The original members of the group would receive this fee pro rata so they 
could recoup some of their initial contribution.2 
The agreement became effective September I, 2000. 
Thus, after August 31, 2005, non-member meat plants will no longer have 
to join the group or pay this fee. 
The second layer of costs is the actual testing cost. 
In its agreement with the meat companies, Maxxam agreed to keep testing 
costs constant for the first two years. 
The cost for the full schedule of tests required by the European Union was 
$1,950 for steers and heifers (16 compounds) and $1,600 for cows and other 
bovine animals (14 compounds).3 
These fees were effective through August 3 1,2002; a current schedule was 
not available. 
If a banned substance were to be detected, Maxxam would run a second 
(confirmation) analysis and submit the samples, results of the first analysis, 
and results from the confirination analysis to the USDAiFSIS. 
An additional fee would be charged for confirmation analyses. 
After U.S. shipments resumed in 1999, the European Union required 100 
percent testing of exported lots. 
In September 2000, the European Union reduced the testing requirement to 
a 20 percent test-and-release system that allowed shipments to be released 
pending receipt of final test results. 
In February 2002, the European Union approved random testing. 
The number of randomly tested samples is determined by a risk assessment 
based on the number of animals slaughtered (USDA 2002a). 
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The small size of the E.U. market means that exporters cannot consolidate 
their product into large shipments. 
Some beef is being flown into the European Union, making shipping costs 
extremely high. 
Once the beef arrives, the 20 percent tariff on in-quota beef is based on the 
CIF (cost, insurance, and freight) value, so high freight costs can 
substantially increase the tariffs that are charged against the product. 
One producer noted that a system that levies tariffs only on the value of the 
product would have a large, positive impact on U.S. competitiveness. 
Marketing the Entire Animal 
Finally, as is the case in most international markets, E.U. importers want 
only specific cuts and not the entire carcass. 
As a result, the remainder of the carcass must be sold into alternative 
markets at a price that, combined with the price for the cuts purchased by 
the E.U. importer, provides a reasonable profit. 
Table 2 summarizes the additional costs discussed in this section. 
If Not the European Union, Where Are the Markets? 
Given the higher costs of production, harvesting, and residue testing and 
given that so little volume is being shipped to the European Union, an 
obvious question is where the non-treated beef is being sold. 
Several certified NHTC producers were contacted to understand why they 
maintain certification and where they are marketing their cattle. 
Informal conversations with producers revealed that several of them had 
obtained certification based on perceived market potential and they remain 
optimistic that exports to the European Union will eventually increase. 
For the most part, producers are selling their cattle into domestic niche 
markets, but not all of these markets provide high enough returns to 
compensate producers for the additional production and certification costs. 
The producers contacted for this study mentioned a range of markets. 
These included direct sales of beef at farmers markets and on the Internet, 
marketing live cattle under other USDA certified beef programs, selling live 
cattle into the commodity beef market at no additional premium, selling 
cattle to processors of natural beef, and providing very high-quality beef to 
specialty retail and hotel, restaurant, and institutional (HRI) markets. 
Based on producer responses, the largest market for NHTC program beef is 
the U.S. natural beef market. 
The USDA states that beef labeled as natural "cannot contain any artificial 
flavor or flavoring, coloring ingredient, chemical preservative, or any other 
artificial or synthetic ingredient; and the product and its ingredients are not 
more than minimally processed (ground, for example)." 
Thus, "all fresh meat qualifies as natural" (USDA 2002a). 
However, many natural beef processors implement additional standards, 
such as hormone-free (and/or antibiotic-free), and can make the appropriate 
claims about their products. 
Beef sold as non-hormone treated in the United States requires only an 
affidavit declaring that growth-promoting hormones have not been used 
when producing the cattle. 
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Although USDA NHTC certification has opened additional markets for 
some beef, the additional costs ofNHTC certification generally reduce 
producers' competitiveness in the U.S. market. 
However, a frequent comment from producers is that they believe the 
NHTC program has given them a head start on full traceability, which many 
believe will be required eventually in many markets. 
Some NHTC producers noted that consumer education and energetic 
marketing could help increase niche market opportunities. 
They also noted that it would be important to protect these niche markets 
and any resulting premiums by ensuring the beef is non-hormone treated. 
They believe NHTC certification is the best guarantee that treated beef is 
not inadvertently labeled as hormone free, potentially causing a loss of 
consumer confidence in the domestic and export markets. 
U.S. Retaliation Against the E.U. Hormone Ban 
USGD CK 1I5 On July 29, 1999, the United States retaliated against the E.U. ban by 
placing 100 percent ad valorem tariffs on selected agricultural products, 
based on country of origin. 
USGD CK 116 The objective of the duties was to block $116.8 million in trade of selected 






X 117 Appendix Table A.I lists the products and countries of origin for which the 
100 percent duties have been applied. 
118 
119 
The inclusion of beef and beef offal on the list was largely symbolic 
because so little E.U. beef was being exported to the United States. 
The United Kingdom consistently voted against implementing the hormone 
ban on imported beef and it is not the country of origin for any products 
subject to retaliatory duties. 
X 120 Because the duties were implemented in July 1999, the first full year of 
trade under the duties was 2000. 
X 121 This paper compares 1998 data (pre-retaliation data) with trade data for 
2000 and 200 I. 
x 122 Appendix Table A.2 presents the value of U.S. imports of the agricultural 
products subject to retaliation and Table A.3 shows the same data by 
country. 
123 As shown, imports of the products dutiable under retaliation were down 
$114.0 million in 2000 and $113.3 million in 2001 compared with the value 
of trade in 1998. 
124 Products from Italy, France, Germany, and Denmark have been most 
affected by the tariffs. 
125 Although these totals do not isolate the effects of the retaliatory duties from 
other factors such as changes in currency exchange rates, changes in supply 
and demand, or historical trade flows, the data show that retaliation appears 
to have effectively blocked trade at approximately the intended level. 
126 According to the U.S. Customs Service, trade has been blocked by 
approximately 80 to 90 percent; a 100 percent block in retaliatory cases 
such as this is not expected because some commodities cannot be supplied 
domestically or by other countries of origin. 
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USGD IK 135 
USGE IK 136 
X 137 
USGS AA 138 
USGS AA 139 
USGS AA 140 
USGS AA 141 
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Intuitively, the level of duties collected on the products to which the tariffs 
apply would be 100 percent of the import values reported in this paper. 
However, the current U.S. data collection system and potential reporting 
errors and updates do not support such a direct estimation of the actual 
duties collected on the imports (U.S. Customs Service 2002). 
One criticism that has been leveled at the current system concerns the 
"carousel" provision enacted during the Clinton administration, which 
allows for scheduled changes in the dutiable product mix. 
This provision has never been implemented, and this is a common 
complaint among industry members and organizations against the current 
system. 
During the World Trade Organization (WTO) arbitration process, the 
European Union objected to carousel retaliation. 
In response to questions from the WTO arbitrators, the United States 
indicated that "[a]lthough nothing in the DSU [Dispute Settlement 
Understanding] prevents future changes to the list [of products subject to 
suspension] ... the United States has no current intent to make such change" 
(WTO 1999). 
The arbitrators then declined to consider the objection. 
Another issue regarding the retaliation system is that some E.U. member 
states have increased exports of some of the country-targeted products. 
As noted, not all countries are targeted for all the listed products. 
Because customs data are collected based on country of origin, 
transshipments of targeted products would not affect the import data. 
Table AA shows the value of imports from E.U. member states of products 
for which the 100 percent ad valorem tariff applies only to other countries 
of origin. 
As shown, some countries have greatly increased the value of some 
products compared with the 1998 values. 
Although the total value of these imports declined by almost $5.7 million, 
some countries were able to offset some ofthe trade value lost because of 
the retaliation duties by increasing exports of items that targeted other 
countries of origin. 
Comparing 1998 with 2001, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, and Portugal all showed an increase in exports of products for 
which duties were applied only to other countries of origin. 
Thus, the U.S. government has successfully blocked trade at about the 
appropriate level of retaliation, but it appears that some E.U. countries may 
have benefited, at least in part, from the country-specific duties. 
Larger Retaliation for a Larger European Union? 
Recently, some industry groups and legislators have proposed that the U.S. 
government seek to increase the total level of retaliation based on the loss of 
market access resulting from E.U. enlargement. 
As shown in Table 3, U.S. beef exports to the thirteen countries that applied 
for accession to the European Union totaled only 226 metric tons in 2001, 
down from a ten-year high of 5,404 metric tons in 2000. 
The total value of U.S. beef exports to applicant countries was nearly $6 
million in 2000 but decreased to $966,000 in 2001. 
The current level of U.S. beef exports to these countries is very low and 
most will never become major markets, but U.S. exporters have been laying 
the groundwork to build these markets as economic conditions improve. 
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Sentence 
With E.U. enlargement, the United States stands to lose both current and 
potential trade opportunities. 
Preferential tariffs for free trade area partners (including the European 
Union) and implementation of sanitary and phytosanitary standards in 
preparation for E.U. accession have already blocked some U.S. trade in 
these countries, especially of pork and beef (USDA 2001a). 
Although Romania is less advanced in negotiations than are most of the 
other candidate countries, the Romanian government already has adopted a 
ban on hormone-treated beef. 
Poland plans to join the European Union in 2004 and will need to introduce 
all the veterinary and sanitary regulations used by the European Union no 
later than six to twelve months before accession. 
Imported U.S. beef and beef offal (mostly tripe) may need to be certified 
and slaughtered at E.U.-approved facilities sometime in 2003. 
As shown in Table 4, the cumulative average value of U.S. beef and beef 
variety meat exports to the applicant countries has consistently been much 
lower than the average value of exports to the European Union. 
In 200 I, the average value of U.S. beef exports to applicant countries was 
$4,276 per metric ton, compared with $6,320 per metric ton for U.S. beef 
exported to the European Union. 
Thus, the additional costs of providing non-hormone treated beef would 
close markets to U.S. exports and likely would reduce variety meat trade, as 
happened in the European Union. 
As noted, the United States will lose market potential as the economies of 
applicant countries improve and beef demand increases. 
According to a European Commission report released earlier this year, 
"[R]ecent projections for the main commodities show that the candidate 
countries would be expected to somewhat increase their surplus production 
of cereals, oilseeds, and pigmeat until 2006 (in a status quo scenario without 
accession). 
Milk and beef production would be expected to decline, with many 
countries becoming net importers as consumer income and demand grows" 
(Commission of the European Communities 2002, p. 3). 
(The report refers to ten of the thirteen applicant countries and excludes 
Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey.) 
The report further states that, in joining the European Union's Common 
Agricultural Policy, "[T]he main effects of the application ofE.U. price 
policy in the candidate countries will be to encourage cereal production and 
discourage feed consumption. 
The effects on beef and dairy production are slightly positive, but not 
enough to cause a significant increase compared to current production 
levels. 
The major impact of direct payments on production would be a further shift 
towards coarse grains and a faster development of specialized beef 
production, subject to the suckler cow premium ceiling" (p. 3). 
As stated, the countries joining the European Union represent very small 
markets for U.S. beef imports. 
These markets are highly responsive to price and exchange rate fluctuations, 
and transportation costs make the United States less competitive than the 
European Union and other countries supplying these markets. 
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Of perhaps greater concern than losing these markets is that other countries 
will follow the E.U. lead against non-treated beef. 
For example, although China has not banned imports of hormone-treated 
beef, the Chinese government recently banned the use of growth-promoting 
hormones in the domestic industry. 
The USMEF reports that current and potential bans on hormone- treated 
beef represent 40 percent of the world's beef-eating population (Seng 
2002). 
Not all of the countries noted by the USMEF are major markets for u.s. 
beef, but the threat of other countries following the European Union's lead 
in opposition to the WTO ruling could have a significant impact on U.S. 
commodity beef exports. 
167 Further, unless NHTC beef can be provided more competitively, these 
markets will not become niche markets for non-treated beef. 
Conclusion 
168 The additional costs of producing and exporting non-hormone treated beef 
to the E.U. market prohibit all but a very small volume of trade. Prior trade 
relationships, willing E.U. buyers, and demand still exist, but the cost of 
U.s. beef has been too high to justify trade. 
169 Thus, complying with E.U. non-hormone treated regulations effectively 
blocks U.s. access to the 11,500 metric ton quota, and, as applicant 
countries adopt E.U. sanitary measures, E.U. expansion will increase the 
level of lost trade. 
170 Because the E. U. market is so small, producers of certified non-treated beef 
have been forced to find other markets for their beef. Some producers are 
selling their cattle into U.S. natural beef markets at the standard premium, 
and some have obtained larger premiums from direct sales. 
171 However, the costs of the NHTC program require that producers obtain a 
larger premium for their non-hormone treated beef than do non-certified 
producers, all else being equal. 
172 Niche markets paying an additional premium for certified non-treated beef 
are relatively small and limited in number. 
173 However, growth in demand for natural beef (which many companies 
require to be non-hormone treated) indicates that more consumers are 
purchasing from this niche market. 
174 Given the cost of exporting non-hormone treated beef and the relatively low 
value of current exports to countries attempting to join the European Union, 
E.U. expansion would close most of these markets to U.S. beef. 
175 These markets are relatively small, but the possibility of even more 
countries following the E. U. lead on banning treated beef could have 
significant implications for U.S. beef exports. 
Endnotes 
176 a. The duty for beef imported into the European Union under this quota is 
20 percent. 
177 b. Companies related to the original members can join for a $10,000 fee. 
178 c. The list of compounds for which testing is required (and other 
requirements for shipping meat to the European Union) is available at 
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OFO/exportieuroreqs.htm. 
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Executive Summary 
The stringent guidelines for producing, harvesting, and shipping certified non-hormone 
treated beef for the European Union create additional costs that greatly reduce the 
competitiveness of U.S. beef. What had once been a large market for beef variety meats and 
then a niche market for non-treated beef has all but vanished because the E.U. hormone ban 
and regulations for producing and certifying non-treated beef have made U.S. product too 
expensive to export. Some producers continue to obtain U.S. Department of Agriculture 
certification for their non-hormone treated beef, but most are selling their fully traceable, 
certified cattle into the domestic natural beef market at no additional premium compared with 
cattle verified as non-treated via a producer-signed affidavit. As an international trade issue, 
the beef hormone ban (and U.S. retaliation) continues to playa role in policy decisions and 
trade negotiations. As more countries negotiate accession to the European Union, for 
example, the United States stands to lose additional trade potential. In addition, although 
retaliation appears to be blocking trade at about the appropriate level, some E.U. countries 
may actually be benefiting from the retaliatory duties applied to some agricultural products 
based on country of origin. 
Keywords: beef hormone ban, E. U. enlargement, natural beef, NHTC program, non-
hormone treated beef, retaliatory tariffs, traceability. 
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WHY CAN'T U.S. BEEF COMPETE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION? 
Introduction 
Since the European Union banned imports of beef treated with growth-promoting 
hormones in 1989, the United States has been unable to fill the 11,500 metric ton quota 
allowed for high-quality, non-hormone treated beef.} In 1999, U.S. exports to the European 
Union were temporarily suspended, and even less beef has been shipped since exports 
resumed. As discussed in this paper, the stringent guidelines for producing, harvesting, and 
shipping certified non-hormone treated beef for the European Union create additional costs 
that greatly reduce the competitiveness of U.S . beef. What was once a niche market for 
producers and processors has all but vanished, yet some producers continue to obtain U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) certification for their non-hormone treated beef. In this 
paper, a short overview of current U.S. trade flows with the European Union is presented, 
followed by an estimate of the additional costs of producing beef for that market. Then, given 
that exports to the European Union are so low and the costs of producing, processing, and 
shipping are so high, the paper discusses where producers are marketing their non-treated 
cattle and beef and whether they are receiving an adequate premium to cover their additional 
costs. Results from these informal discussions follow the cost estimates. 
As an international trade issue, the beef hormone ban (and U.S. retaliation) continues to 
playa role in policy decisions and trade negotiations. As more countries negotiate accession 
to the European Union, for example, the United States stands to lose additional trade 
potential. The final sections of this paper discuss U.S. retaliation against the E.U. hormone 
ban and some implications ofE.U. enlargement. 
Current Trade Flows 
After the 1989 ban on beef from hormone-treated cattle, the United States exported a 
small but relatively constant volume of beef to the European Union. In July 1999, the 
European Union reported finding traces of growth-promoting hormones in shipments of U.S. 
beef, and the USDA voluntarily suspended exports and implemented a more rigorous system 
of regulation and controls. Exports resumed in September 1999. 
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Maintaining a consistent E.U. market for U.S. non-treated beef has been an ongoing 
challenge, but the E.U. market for U.S. beef all but disappeared after the temporary market 
closure. From January through June 2002, only 510 metric tons offreshlchilled/frozen U.S. 
beefwere shipped to the European Union. According to the U.S. Meat Export Federation 
(USMEF) (2002), most of this beef appears to have been destined for U.S. military bases, 
embassies, or cruise ships; only a very small amount was actually sold into the E.U. market. 
Table 1 compares USDA data for beef and beef variety meat exports to the European 
Union for 1995 through 2001 and for the first six months of 2002. These data do not 
differentiate beef purchased for sale in the E. U. market from beef shipped to the destinations 
just mentioned. Also, beef from E.U.-approved plants in other countries can be imported into 
the United States, processed at E.U.-approved U.S. plants, and re-exported to the European 
Union. 
The data in Table 1 also do not differentiate non-treated variety meats for human 
consumption from variety meats used in the pet food industry. Before implementation of the 
hormone ban, the European Union was a major import market for U.S. variety meats. In 
1987, the European Union imported 73,372 metric tons ofbeefliver, tongues, and other 
variety meats from the United States, primarily for human consumption (Hayes 1989). Since 
the ban, only non-treated variety meats can be used for human consumption, but some variety 
meat and by-product imports for the pet food industry are allowed from non-treated animals. 
During the January through June 2002 period, just over 2,500 metric tons of variety meats 
were exported, all for use in pet foods. 
TABLE 1. U.S. beef and beef variety meat exports to the European Union (in metric 
tons) 
Calendar Year Jan.-June 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Beef, fresh/chilled/frozen 4,506 3,982 4,819 6,265 6,106 4,847 1,866 510 
Beef, prepared/preserved 309 458 255 409 192 132 174 6 
Beef variety meats 9,053 8,681 12,741 34,247 16,966 23,576 12,063 2,524 
Source: U.S. International Trade Commission 2002. 
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The European Commission has stated that 
The European pet food industry relies on third countr[y] sources for the 
supply of raw material for pet food production. In order to allow this trade 
to continue, th[is] proposal establishes that the import of pet food and raw 
material for pet food production, derived from animals which have been 
treated with certain substances prohibited in accordance with Directive 
96/22/EC, shall be permitted under specific conditions to be laid down by 
the Commission. (Commission of the European Communities 2000) 
It appears that this market segment will remain open to U.S. exporters, but the 
importation of variety meats from treated cattle continues to cause discomfort in the 
European Union, and this trade may be subject to additional controls. Recently, the European 
Union proposed that imports of U.S. variety meats for the E.U. pet food industry be treated 
with visible "markers" to distinguish them from non-treated products intended for human 
consumption (Pet Food Institute 2002). 
The Additional Costs of Producing Non-Hormone Treated Beef 
As shown, very little trade is occurring between the United States and the European 
Union. The additional costs of producing, slaughtering, and shipping are the primary 
deterrent to this trade. The following sections break down the additional costs associated with 
producing certified non-hormone treated beef and discuss the alternative markets producers 
are finding for their non-hormone treated beef. 
Non-Hormone Treated Cattle Program Certification 
To become eligible to export non-treated beef, producers must obtain certification for 
their cattle through the USDA's Non-Hormone Treated Cattle (NHTC) program. Under this 
program, the USDA certifies that cattle "have never been fed or treated with hormonal 
growth promotants" (USDA 200Ic). The USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) 
administers the NHTC program from an animal's birth through delivery to the packing plant 
door. As of June 2002, sixteen farms, ranches, or feedlots were registered under the NHTC 
program. 
The NHTC program is operated on a user-fee basis, and producers pay an hourly rate (as 
published in the Federal Register) for USDA staff time and expenses needed to certify the 
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production facility. Producers are required to prepare a detailed program manual that 
includes "clear, sequential, written operating policies and procedures or work instructions, 
specific to the farm or ranch seeking approval, that address all program requirements ... " 
(USDA 2001 b). The producer pays the AMS staff time required to ensure that the program 
manuals and other documentation comply with the NHTC program requirements. 
The AMS also conducts audits that include document reviews, on-site compliance 
audits, and follow-up or surveillance audits. As part of the on-site audits, the AMS auditor 
inspects the NHTC herd, examines the producer's documentation, meets with the herd's 
veterinarians, visits feed providers, and examines feed labels. Producers are charged for 
travel expenses, inspector time, and the per diem costs required for on-site audit procedures. 
An estimated $3,000 is required for the initial certification process, including program 
manual and documentation reviews and the on-site audit. Once a producer is certified, annual 
compliance audits are conducted. (In cases where a problem is discovered, follow-up audits 
are sometimes needed.) USDA auditors attempt to combine audit trips to producers located 
within a reasonable proximity to each other and to prorate the travel costs among these 
producers. As a result, on-site audit costs can vary widely among producers. NHTC 
producers estimated the fees paid to USDA for their annual audits at between $500 and 
$2,000 annually. 
These estimated audit costs do not include the cost of the producer's labor to develop a 
program manual and to prepare the extensive documentation involved in obtaining and 
maintaining certification. None of the producers contacted for this study provided an estimate 
of his or her own labor costs for the paperwork, but all agreed that documentation requires a 
large number of hours. The labor-intensiveness of the documentation was the most common 
comment from producers about the NHTC program. 
Given the extensive documentation requirements for certifying cattle, some producers 
expressed the opinion that NHTC production is best suited for relatively small calving-through-
finishing operations and that cattle transfers would be almost impossible to do. On the other 
hand, spreading these fixed costs over fewer animals makes it necessary to earn an even higher 
premium for their non-treated cattle than that needed for larger herds. Producers with relatively 
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large herds have shown themselves able to meet the NHTC documentation requirements, so the 
program is workable for a broad range of herd sizes. 
Production Costs 
The advantages of using growth-promoting hormones include improving feed 
efficiencies, speeding weight gain, and producing a leaner beef product preferred by health-
conscious consumers. According to Hanrahan (2000), hormones are used on approximately 
63 percent of all cattle and about 90 percent ofthe cattle on feedlots in the United States. In 
large commercial feedlots, usage approaches 100 percent. The additional cost of raising cattle 
without growth-promoting hormones varies but generally is estimated at between $15 and 
$40 per animal (USDA 2000). 
This cost will be incurred by any producer who does not use growth-promoting 
hormones, so it is not unique to the NHTC program. However, non-hormone treated beef is 
required by the European Union and represents an additional cost relative to beef raised for 
the U.S. commodity market. 
Packing Plant Certification 
The USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) oversight comes into force as the 
animal enters the packing plant. Non-treated animals can be slaughtered at any U.S. plant, but 
beef destined for the European Union must be harvested in a plant approved for export to the 
European Union. Although the European Union now recognizes USDA plant inspection, final 
E.U. approval may require some plant modifications. Modification costs vary from plant to 
plant, so no estimate of this cost is provided. 
In addition to any modification costs, packing plants pay a fee to USDAIFSIS for 
inspection services. Unlike the NHTC program, only the inspector's time and travel costs are 
included; no per diem fees are charged. FSIS also does not charge for office time spent on 
paperwork and documentation. An inspection trip for plant certficiation costs approximately 
$500. Once a plant has achieved certification, annual review is not required but is 
recommended. As of August 2002, only one U.S. plant was certified to slaughter U.S. beef for 
export to the European Union. Another had been approved by FSIS and was awaiting final 
E.U. approval, which usually takes between 21 and 60 days. The entire plant certification 
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process takes approximately six months from the time a plant states its intention to become 
certified through final E.U. approval. 
Additional Residue Testing 
In addition to plant approval fees, the Additional Residue Testing Program adds 
substantial costs to beef destined for the European Union. There are two layers of costs for 
the testing process. 
First, only one laboratory in North America-Maxxam Analytics, Inc., in Mississauga, 
Ontario, Canada-is approved to test the urine and animal tissue samples for meats produced 
for human consumption in the European Union. After the European Union announced that 
hormone-treated meat had been discovered and the USDA closed exports in 1999, the 
European Union would not approve any of the North American labs that had been performing 
tests for U.S. and Canadian meat. Maxxam Analytics agreed to bring their lab into compliance 
with E.U. and USDAIFSIS testing requirements. Gaining this validation required that Maxxam 
make a sizeable investment, and a small group of meat companies committed funds to Maxxam 
to pay down expenses and other non-recoverable costs involved in meeting all the requirements 
(Argosy Enterprises, LLC 2002). 
In exchange for their contributions in meeting the validation costs, the meat companies 
entered into a five-year agreement with Maxxam that any U.S. company requiring meat 
testing must join the group for a fee of $30,000. The original members of the group would 
receive this fee pro rata so they could recoup some of their initial contribution? The 
agreement became effective September 1,2000. Thus, after August 31, 2005, non-member 
meat plants will no longer have to join the group or pay this fee. 
The second layer of costs is the actual testing cost. In its agreement with the meat 
companies, Maxxam agreed to keep testing costs constant for the first two years. The cost 
for the full schedule of tests required by the European Union was $1,950 for steers and 
heifers (16 compounds) and $1,600 for cows and other bovine animals (14 compounds).3 
These fees were effective through August 31, 2002; a current schedule was not available. If 
a banned substance were to be detected, Maxxam would run a second (confirmation) 
analysis and submit the samples, results of the first analysis, and results from the 
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confirmation analysis to the USDAIFSIS. An additional fee would be charged for 
confirmation analyses. 
After U.S. shipments resumed in 1999, the European Union required 100 percent testing 
of exported lots. In September 2000, the European Union reduced the testing requirement to 
a 20 percent test-and-release system that allowed shipments to be released pending receipt of 
final test results. In February 2002, the European Union approved random testing. The 
number of randomly tested samples is determined by a risk assessment based on the number 
of animals slaughtered (USDA 2002a). 
Shipping Costs 
The small size of the E.U. market means that exporters cannot consolidate their product 
into large shipments. Some beef is being flown into the European Union, making shipping 
costs extremely high. Once the beef arrives, the 20 percent tariff on in-quota beef is based on 
the CIF (cost, insurance, and freight) value, so high freight costs can substantially increase 
the tariffs that are charged against the product. One producer noted that a system that levies 
tariffs only on the value of the product would have a large, positive impact on U.S. 
competitiveness. 
Marketing the Entire Animal 
Finally, as is the case in most international markets, E.U. importers want only specific 
cuts and not the entire carcass. As a result, the remainder of the carcass must be sold into 
alternative markets at a price that, combined with the price for the cuts purchased by the E.U. 
importer, provides a reasonable profit. Table 2 summarizes the additional costs discussed in 
this section. 
If Not the European Union, Where Are the Markets? 
Given the higher costs of production, harvesting, and residue testing and given that so 
little volume is being shipped to the European Union, an obvious question is where the non-
treated beef is being sold. Several certified NHTC producers were contacted to understand 
why they maintain certification and where they are marketing their cattle. Informal 
conversations with producers revealed that several of them had obtained certification based 
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on perceived market potential and they remain optimistic that exports to the European Union 
will eventually increase. For the most part, producers are selling their cattle into domestic 
niche markets, but not all of these markets provide high enough returns to compensate 
producers for the additional production and certification costs. The producers contacted for 
this study mentioned a range of markets. These included direct sales of beef at farmers 
markets and on the Internet, marketing live cattle under other USDA certified beef programs, 
selling live cattle into the commodity beef market at no additional premium, selling cattle to 
processors of natural beef, and providing very high-quality beef to specialty retail and hotel, 
restaurant, and institutional (HRI) markets. 
TABLE 2. Additional costs of producing non-hormone treated beef for the European 
Union 
Producer Costs 
Higher production costs for not using hormones 
Initial NHTC Program documentation processing and audit by USDA! AMS 
Annual NHTC Program audit by USDAI AMS 
Labor for maintaining NHTC Program paperwork and documentation 
Slaughter Plant Costs 
Initial plant certification inspection by USDA/FSIS 
Annual plant inspection (not required, but recommended) 
Plant modifications to meet EU requirements 
$15 to $40 per head 
up to $3,000 
$500 to $2,000 
Not estimated 
One-time validation fee for using Maxxam Analytics (effective until August 31, 2005) 







Shipping small volumes and using air freight 
Marketing the remainder of the carcass 
Not estimated 
Not estimated 
"This fee is $10,000 for companies associated with the original export group who invested in the validation costs for 
Maxxam Analytics. 
bTests are conducted randomly based on total slaughter volume. The reported cost is based on the price schedule effective 
through August 31, 2002. 
Based on producer responses, the largest market for NHTC program beef is the U.S. 
natural beef market. The USDA states that beef labeled as natural "cannot contain any 
artificial flavor or flavoring, coloring ingredient, chemical preservative, or any other artificial 
or synthetic ingredient; and the product and its ingredients are not more than minimally 
processed (ground, for example)." Thus, "all fresh meat qualifies as natural" (USDA 2002a). 
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However, many natural beef processors implement additional standards, such as hormone-
free (and/or antibiotic-free), and can make the appropriate claims about their products. 
Beef sold as non-hormone treated in the United States requires only an affidavit 
declaring that growth-promoting hormones have not been used when producing the cattle. 
Normally, certified NHTC producers do not receive any greater premium for their beef in the 
natural market, so certification costs give NHTC producers a higher break-even point than 
that for other producers of non-treated beef. 
Although USDA NHTC certification has opened additional markets for some beef, the 
additional costs ofNHTC certification generally reduce producers' competitiveness in the 
U.S. market. However, a frequent comment from producers is that they believe the NHTC 
program has given them a head start on full traceability, which many believe will be required 
eventually in many markets. Some NHTC producers noted that consumer education and 
energetic marketing could help increase niche market opportunities. They also noted that it 
would be important to protect these niche markets and any resulting premiums by ensuring 
the beef is non-hormone treated. They believe NHTC certification is the best guarantee that 
treated beef is not inadvertently labeled as hormone free, potentially causing a loss of 
consumer confidence in the domestic and export markets. 
u.s. Retaliation Against the E.U. Hormone Ban 
On July 29, 1999, the United States retaliated against the E.U. ban by placing 100 
percent ad valorem tariffs on selected agricultural products, based on country of origin. The 
objective of the duties was to block $116.8 million in trade of selected agricultural products 
from the European Union. Appendix Table A.l lists the products and countries of origin for 
which the 100 percent duties have been applied. The inclusion of beef and beef offal on the 
list was largely symbolic because so little E.U. beef was being exported to the United States. 
The United Kingdom consistently voted against implementing the hormone ban on imported 
beef and it is not the country of origin for any products subject to retaliatory duties. 
Because the duties were implemented in July 1999, the first full year of trade under the 
duties was 2000. This paper compares 1998 data (pre-retaliation data) with trade data for 
2000 and 2001. Appendix Table A.2 presents the value of U.S. imports of the agricultural 
155 
products subject to retaliation and Table A.3 shows the same data by country. As shown, 
imports of the products dutiable under retaliation were down $114.0 million in 2000 and 
$113.3 million in 2001 compared with the value of trade in 1998. Products from Italy, 
France, Germany, and Denmark have been most affected by the tariffs. Although these totals 
do not isolate the effects of the retaliatory duties from other factors such as changes in 
currency exchange rates, changes in supply and demand, or historical trade flows, the data 
show that retaliation appears to have effectively blocked trade at approximately the intended 
level. 
According to the u.s. Customs Service, trade has been blocked by approximately 80 to 
90 percent; a 100 percent block in retaliatory cases such as this is not expected because some 
commodities cannot be supplied domestically or by other countries of origin. Intuitively, the 
level of duties collected on the products to which the tariffs apply would be 100 percent of 
the import values reported in this paper. However, the current u.S. data collection system 
and potential reporting errors and updates do not support such a direct estimation of the 
actual duties collected on the imports (U.S. Customs Service 2002). 
One criticism that has been leveled at the current system concerns the "carousel" 
provision enacted during the Clinton administration, which allows for scheduled changes in 
the dutiable product mix. This provision has never been implemented, and this is a common 
complaint among industry members and organizations against the current system. During the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) arbitration process, the European Union objected to 
carousel retaliation. In response to questions from the WTO arbitrators, the United States 
indicated that "[a]lthough nothing in the DSU [Dispute Settlement Understanding] prevents 
future changes to the list [of products subject to suspension] ... the United States has no 
current intent to make such change" (WTO 1999). The arbitrators then declined to consider 
the objection. 
Another issue regarding the retaliation system is that some E.U. member states have 
increased exports of some of the country-targeted products. As noted, not all countries are 
targeted for all the listed products. Because customs data are collected based on country of 
origin, transshipments of targeted products would not affect the import data. Table A.4 shows 
the value of imports from E.U. member states of products for which the 100 percent ad 
156 
valorem tariff applies only to other countries of origin. As shown, some countries have 
greatly increased the value of some products compared with the 1998 values. Although the 
total value of these imports declined by almost $5.7 million, some countries were able to 
offset some of the trade value lost because of the retaliation duties by increasing exports of 
items that targeted other countries of origin. 
Comparing 1998 with 2001, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, and 
Portugal all showed an increase in exports of products for which duties were applied only to 
other countries of origin. Thus, the U.S. government has successfully blocked trade at about 
the appropriate level of retaliation, but it appears that some E.U. countries may have 
benefited, at least in part, from the country-specific duties. 
Larger Retaliation for a Larger European Union? 
Recently, some industry groups and legislators have proposed that the U.S. 
government seek to increase the total level of retaliation based on the loss of market 
access resulting from E.U. enlargement. As shown in Table 3, U.S. beef exports to the 
thirteen countries that applied for accession to the European Union totaled only 226 metric 
tons in 2001, down from a ten-year high of 5,404 metric tons in 2000. The total value of 
U.S. beef exports to applicant countries was nearly $6 million in 2000 but decreased to 
$966,000 in 2001. The current level of U.S. beef exports to these countries is very low and 
most will never become major markets, but U.S. exporters have been laying the 
groundwork to build these markets as economic conditions improve. With E.U. 
enlargement, the United States stands to lose both current and potential trade 
opportunities. 
Preferential tariffs for free trade area partners (including the European Union) and 
implementation of sanitary and phytosanitary standards in preparation for E.U. accession 
have already blocked some U.S. trade in these countries, especially of pork and beef 
(USDA 2001a). Although Romania is less advanced in negotiations than are most of the 
other candidate countries, the Romanian government already has adopted a ban on 
hormone-treated beef. Poland plans to join the European Union in 2004 and will need to 
introduce all the veterinary and sanitary regulations used by the European Union no later 
157 
than six to twelve months before accession. Imported U.S. beef and beef offal (mostly 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































As shown in Table 4, the cumulative average value of U.S. beef and beef variety meat 
exports to the applicant countries has consistently been much lower than the average value of 
exports to the European Union. In 2001, the average value of U.S. beef exports to applicant 
countries was $4,276 per metric ton, compared with $6,320 per metric ton for U.s. beef exported 
to the European Union. Thus, the additional costs of providing non-hormone treated beef would 
close markets to U.S. exports and likely would reduce variety meat trade, as happened in the 
European Union. 
As noted, the United States will lose market potential as the economies of applicant 
countries improve and beef demand increases. According to a European Commission report 
released earlier this year, "[R]ecent projections for the main commodities show that the 
candidate countries would be expected to somewhat increase their surplus production of cereals, 
oilseeds, and pigmeat until 2006 (in a status quo scenario without accession). Milk and beef 
production would be expected to decline, with many countries becoming net importers as 
consumer income and demand grows" (Commission of the European Communities 2002, p. 3). 
(The report refers to ten of the thirteen applicant countries and excludes Bulgaria, Romania, and 
Turkey.) 
The report further states that, in joining the European Union's Common Agricultural Policy, 
"[T]he main effects of the application ofE.V. price policy in the candidate countries will be to 
encourage cereal production and discourage feed consumption. The effects on beef and dairy 
production are slightly positive, but not enough to cause a significant increase compared to current 
production levels ... The major impact of direct payments on production would be a further shift 
towards coarse grains and a faster development of specialized beef production, subject to the suckler 
cow premium ceiling" (p. 3). 
As stated, the countries joining the European Union represent very small markets for U.S. 
beef imports. These markets are highly responsive to price and exchange rate fluctuations, and 
transportation costs make the United States less competitive than the European Union and other 
countries supplying these markets. Of perhaps greater concern than losing these markets is that 
other countries will follow the E.U. lead against non-treated beef. For example, although China 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































use of growth-promoting hormones in the domestic industry. The USMEF reports that current 
and potential bans on hormone-treated beef represent 40 percent of the world's beef-eating 
population (Seng 2002). Not all of the countries noted by the USMEF are major markets for U.S. 
beef, but the threat of other countries following the European Union's lead in opposition to the 
WTO ruling could have a significant impact on U.S. commodity beef exports. Further, unless 
NHTC beef can be provided more competitively, these markets will not become niche markets 
for non-treated beef. 
Conclusion 
The additional costs of producing and exporting non-hormone treated beef to the E.U. 
market prohibit all but a very small volume of trade. Prior trade relationships, willing E.U. 
buyers, and demand still exist, but the cost of U.S. beefhas been too high to justify trade. Thus, 
complying with E.U. non-hormone treated regulations effectively blocks U.S. access to the 
11,500 metric ton quota, and, as applicant countries adopt E.U. sanitary measures, E.U. 
expansion will increase the level of lost trade. 
Because the E.U. market is so small, producers of certified non-treated beef have been 
forced to find other markets for their beef. Some producers are selling their cattle into U.S. 
natural beef markets at the standard premium, and some have obtained larger premiums from 
direct sales. However, the costs ofthe NHTC program require that producers obtain a larger 
premium for their non-hormone treated beef than do non-certified producers, all else being equal. 
Niche markets paying an additional premium for certified non-treated beef are relatively small 
and limited in number. However, growth in demand for natural beef (which many companies 
require to be non-hormone treated) indicates that more consumers are purchasing from this niche 
market. 
Given the cost of exporting non-hormone treated beef and the relatively low value of current 
exports to countries attempting to join the European Union, E.U. expansion would close most of 
these markets to U.S. beef. These markets are relatively small, but the possibility of even more 
countries following the E.U. lead on banning treated beef could have significant implications for 
U.S. beef exports. 
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Endnotes 
1. The duty for beef imported into the European Union under this quota is 20 percent. 
2. Companies related to the original members can join for a $10,000 fee. 
3. The list of compounds for which testing is required (and other requirements for shipping 




Data Tables for U.S. Retaliation to the E.U. Hormone Ban 
TABLE A.1. Products for which 100 percent ad valorem duties are applied. 
HTS Description 
Country o/Origin: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic o/Germany, Greece, 


























Meat of bovine animals, fresh or chilled 
Meat of bovine animals, frozen 
Meat of swine (pork), fresh or chilled, carcasses and half-carcasses 
Meat of swine (pork), fresh or chilled, hams and shoulders and cuts thereof, bone in, processed 
Meat of swine (pork), fresh or chilled, hams and shoulders and cuts thereof, bone in, other 
Meat of swine (pork), fresh or chilled, other, processed 
Meat of swine (pork), fresh or chilled, other 
Meat of swine (pork), frozen, carcasses and half-carcasses 
Meat of swine (pork), frozen, hams and shoulders and cuts thereof, bone in, processed 
Meat of swine (pork), frozen, hams and shoulders and cuts thereof, bone in, other 
Edible offal of bovine animals, fresh or chilled 
Edible offal of bovine animals, frozen, tongues 
Edible offal of bovine animals, frozen, livers 
Edible offal of bovine animals, frozen, other 
Roquefort cheese, in original loaves, not grated or powdered, not processed 
Roquefort cheese, other than in original loaves, not grated or powdered, not processed 
Onions, other than onion sets or pearl onions not over 16 mm in diameter, and shallots, fresh or 
chilled 
Truffles, fresh or chilled 
Dried carrots, whole, cut, sliced, broken or in powder, but not further prepared 
Prepared or preserved liver of goose 
Prepared or preserved liver of any animal other than of goose 
Rusks, toasted bread, and similar toasted products 
Juice of any other single fruit (including cherries and berries), concentrated or not concentrated 
Roasted chicory and other roasted coffee substitutes and extracts, essences and concentrates 
thereof 
Prepared mustard 
Country o/Origin: France, the Federal Republic o/Germany, or Italy 
20021000 Tomatoes, whole or in pieces, prepared or preserved otherwise than by vinegar or acetic acid 
Country o/Origin: France or the Federal Republic a/Germany 
05040000 Guts, bladders and stomachs of animals (other than fish), whole and pieces thereof 
21041000 Soups and broths and preparations thereof 
55101100 Yam (other than sewing thread) containing 85% or more by weight of artificial staple fibers, 
singles, not put up for retail sale 
Country o/Origin: France 
15059000 Fatty substances derived from wool grease (including lanolin) 
18063100 Chocolate and other cocoa preparations, in blocks, slabs or bars, filled, not in bulk 
20079905 Lingonberry and raspberry jams 
02101100 Hams, shoulders and cuts thereof with bone in, salted, in brine, dried or smoked 
35061050 Products suitable for use as glues or adhesives, NESOI,' not exceeding 1 kg, put up for retail 
sale 
Source: Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. 
'Not elsewhere specified or indicated. 
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TABLE A.2. Customs value of E.U. products for which 100 percent ad valorem tariffs 
apply, by Harmonization Tariff Schedule code, 1998-2001 (U.S. dollarst 
HTS Number Country 1995b 1999 2000 2001 
0201 C -Meat of bovine animals, fresh or chilled 
(02013006) Spain 0 0 5,286 0 
Total 0 0 5,286 0 
0202C-Meat of bovine animals, frozen 
(02023050) Austria 0 0 116,924 0 
(02023050) Netherlands 0 0 0 186,822 
Total 0 0 116,924 186,822 
02031100-Meat of swine (pork), fresh or chilled, carcasses and half-carcasses 
Total 0 0 0 0 
02031210-Meat of swine (pork), fresh or chilled, hams and shoulders and cuts thereof, bone in, processed 
Denmark 2,039 14,491 2,046 0 
Italy 0 0 33,420 17,655 
Total 2,039 14,491 35,466 17,655 
02031290-Meat of swine (pork), fresh or chilled, hams and shoulders and cuts thereof, bone in, other 
Total 0 0 0 0 
02031920-Meat of swine (pork), fresh or chilled, other, processed 
Italy 0 0 
Finland 0 0 
Denmark 15,360 0 
Total 15,360 0 









02032100-Meat of swine (pork), frozen, carcasses and half-carcasses 










02032210-Meat of swine (pork), frozen, hams and shoulders and cuts thereof, bone in, processed 
Denmark 1,094,801 330,834 0 
Total 1,094,801 330,834 0 
02032290-Meat of swine (pork), frozen, hams and shoulders and cuts thereof, bone in, other 
Finland 166,084 0 0 
Ireland 101,762 109,503 0 
Denmark 16,928,642 5,737,128 38,153 
Total 17,196,488 5,846,631 38,153 
02061000-Edible offal of bovine animals, fresh or chilled 
Total 0 0 0 
02062100-Edible offal of bovine animals, frozen, tongues 
Total 0 
02062200-Edible offal of bovine animals, frozen, livers 
Total 0 
































TABLE A.2. Continued. 
HTS Number Country 1999 2000 
0210 II OO-Hams, shoulders and cuts thereof with bone in, salted, in brine, dried or smoked 
France 805,134 1,531,081 0 
Total 805,134 1,531,081 0 
04064020-Roquefort cheese, in original loaves, not grated or powdered, not processed 
Denmark 0 0 0 
France 3,804,643 3,669,293 1,753,295 
Total 3,804,643 3,669,293 1,753,295 
04064040-Roquefort cheese, other than original loaves, not grated or powdered, not processed 
Italy 0 0 0 
France 613,513 382,034 303,315 
Total 613,513 382,034 303,315 
05040000-Guts, bladders, and stomachs of animals (other than fish), whole and pieces thereof 
France 1,527,824 847,399 0 
Germany 6,955,169 3,664,472 554,561 













07031040-0nions, other than onion sets or pearl onions not over 16 mm in diameter, and shallots, fresh or 
chilled 
Spain 164,634 180,646 0 
Italy 167,688 144,275 39,789 
Belgium 63,363 174,314 3,513 
France 5,837,538 6,657,030 1,036,734 
Netherlands 2,090,950 752,685 359,642 
Total 8,324,173 7,908,950 1,439,678 
07095200-Truffles, fresh or chilled 
Spain 19,028 20,246 0 
France 1,068,293 959,388 103,446 
Italy 3,419,676 1,142,909 92,421 
Total 4,506,997 2,122,543 195,867 
0712901O-Dried carrots, whole, cut, sliced, broken, or in powder, but not further prepared 
Austria 92,306 29,600 0 
Ireland 172,438 0 0 
Netherlands 1,659,010 1,135,715 14,980 
Germany 663,064 470,265 72,095 
France 2,331,097 1,125,579 412,803 
Total 4,917,915 2,761,159 499,878 
15059000-Farty substances derived from wool grease (including lanolin) 
France 205,962 359,116 
Total 205,962 359,116 










16022040-Prepared or preserved liver of any animal other than goose 
Belgium 68,591 2,217 
Germany 2,190 23,472 
Denmark 0 33,036 




































TABLE A.2. Continued. 
HTSNumber Country 1999 2000 2001 
Total 387,060 1,264,678 207,710 155,075 
18063100-Chocolate and other cocoa preparations, in blocks, slabs, or bars, filled, not in bulk 
France 1,467,125 1,135,727 127,872 722,418 
Total 1,467,125 1,135,727 127,872 722,418 













































20021000-Tomatoes, whole or in pieces, prepared and preserved otherwise than by vinegar or acetic acid 
France 59,268 0 0 0 
Italy 21,244,550 11,954,239 283,072 133,347 
Total 21,303,818 11,954,239 283,072 133,347 









20098060-Juice of any other single fruit (including cherries and berries), concentrated or not concentrated 
Denmark 504,313 120,000 0 0 
Greece 49,280 9,448 0 0 
Finland 169,690 0 0 0 
Sweden 109,800 54,900 0 0 
Portugal 0 3,305 0 15,394 
Spain 200,879 275,133 0 23,634 
Italy 1,717,665 813,297 243,715 85,363 
Germany 9,235,493 9,836,936 61,132 97,145 
Netherlands 1,293,219 2,613,537 26,422 127,160 
Belgium 2,612,248 1,811,055 2,098 138,614 
Austria 9,184,373 6,216,894 218,385 170,879 
France 315,440 163,847 125,831 178,844 
Total 25,392,400 21,918,352 677,583 837,033 
210 13000-Roasted chicory and other roasted coffee substitutes and extracts, essences, and concentrates 
thereof 
Italy 84,120 139,273 6,488 0 
Netherlands 39,292 8,251 7,813 0 
Belgium 344,022 39,401 37,781 2,676 
Portugal 51,772 34,403 30,748 22,919 
Germany 1,448,133 947,526 54,423 26,802 
France 1,783,433 1,398,221 943,648 891,279 
Total 3,750,772 2,567,075 1,080,901 94~,676 
21 033040-Prepared mustard 
Austria 7,301 0 0 0 
Ireland 9,212 33,380 2,687 2,169 
Netherlands 44,383 32,347 7,953 4,003 
Italy 6,948 0 0 4,587 
Sweden 14,878 3,483 5,250 4,766 
Belgium 8,869 0 25,956 58,509 
Denmark 72,622 102,730 62,400 69,276 



































35061050-Products suitable for use as glues or adhesives, NESOI,d not exceeding 1 kg, put up for retail sale 
France 2,449,280 1,422,100 353,058 241,831 
Total 2,449,280 1,422, I 00 353,058 241,831 
55101100-Yarn (other than sewing thread) containing 85 percent ore more by weight of artificial staple fibers, 













Change from Calendar Year 1998 to Calendar Year 2000: $113,968,828 
Change from Calendar Year 1998 to Calendar Year 2001: $113,278,439 
Source: U.S. International Trade Commission. 
'U.S. imports for consumption. 









cProducts classified in any eight-digit subheadings under this four-digit heading are subject to 100 percent duties. 
dNot elsewhere specified or indicated. 
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TABLE A.3. Customs value of E.U. products by county of origin for which 100 percent 
ad valorem tariffs apply, 1998-2001 (U.S. doIIars)3 
Country HTS Number 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Austria 02023050 0 0 116,924 0 
02062900 0 0 0 39,917 
07129010 92,306 29,600 0 0 
20098060 9,184,373 6,216,894 218,385 170,879 
21033040 7,301 0 0 0 
Austria Total 9,283,980 6,246,494 335,309 210,796 
Belgium 02031940 55,038 0 0 0 
07031040 63,363 174,314 3,513 24,689 
16022040 68,591 2,217 0 0 
19054000 4,986 16,161 0 9,249 
20098060 2,612,248 1,811,055 2,098 138,614 
21033040 8,869 0 25,956 58,509 
Belgium Total 3,157,117 2,043,148 69,348 233,737 
Denmark 02031210 2,039 14,491 2,046 0 
02031920 15,360 0 6,489 530,545 
02031940 0 194,859 81,343 0 
02032210 1,094,801 330,834 0 0 
02032290 16,928,642 5,737,128 38,153 561,280 
04064020 0 0 0 8,791 
16022040 0 33,036 0 0 
20098060 504,313 120,000 0 0 
21033040 72,622 102,730 62,400 69,276 
Denmark Total 18,617,777 6,533,078 190,431 1,169,892 
Finland 02031920 0 0 0 32,316 
02032290 166,084 0 0 0 
19054000 128,550 0 0 0 
20098060 169,690 0 0 0 
Finland Total 464,324 0 0 32,316 
France 02101100 805,134 1,531,081 0 0 
04064020 3,804,643 3,669,293 1,753,295 1,465,955 
04064040 613,513 382,034 303,315 236,291 
05040000 1,527,824 847,399 0 7,824 
07031040 5,837,538 6,657,030 1,036,734 644,238 
07095200 1,068,293 959,388 103,446 38,774 
07129010 2,331,097 1,125,579 412,803 459,869 
15059000 205,962 359,116 0 0 
16022020 1,336,984 1,477,994 560,367 526,878 
16022040 316,279 1,205,953 207,710 155,075 
18063100 1,467,125 1,135,727 127,872 722,418 
19054000 882,166 766,477 442,338 284,880 
20021000 59,268 0 0 0 
20079905 680,181 744,763 58,459 46,392 
20098060 315,440 163,847 125,831 178,844 
21013000 1,783,433 1,398,221 943,648 891,279 
21033040 4,840,740 5,358,979 3,340,757 3,241,466 
21041000 587,009 687,525 289,812 370,130 
35061050 2,449,280 1,422,100 353,058 241,831 
55101100 1,798,519 979,358 22,806 46,095 
France Total 32,710,428 30,871,564 10,081,531 9,558,239 
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TABLE A.3. Continued. 
Country HTS Number 1998 1999 2000 2001 
21013000 344,022 39,401 37,781 2,676 
Germany 05040000 6,955,169 3,664,472 554,561 84,696 
07129010 663,064 470,265 72,095 153,966 
16022020 0 0 3,163 0 
16022040 2,190 23,472 0 0 
19054000 1,322,346 349,767 303,565 142,728 
20098060 9,235,493 9,836,936 61,132 97,145 
21013000 1,448,133 947,526 54,423 26,802 
21033040 267,877 122,389 66,040 116,819 
21041000 4,639,150 2,796,586 1,051,654 1,032,714 
55101100 2,498,238 1,078,947 145,403 6,889 
Germany Total 27,031,660 19,290,360 2,312,036 1,661,759 
Greece 19054000 987,841 334,622 27,291 433,549 
20098060 49,280 9,448 0 0 
Greece Total 1,037,121 344,070 27,291 433,549 
Ireland 02032290 101,762 109,503 0 0 
07129010 172,438 0 0 0 
21033040 9,212 33,380 2,687 2,169 
Ireland Total 283,412 142,883 2,687 2,169 
Italy 02031210 0 0 33,420 17,655 
02031920 0 0 0 23,483 
02031940 0 0 24,974 0 
04064040 0 0 0 3,557 
07031040 167,688 144,275 39,789 2,700 
07095200 3,419,676 1,142,909 92,421 160,272 
19054000 2,920,597 1,912,861 382,613 242,734 
20021000 21,244,550 11,954,239 283,072 133,347 
20098060 1,717,665 813,297 243,715 85,363 
21013000 84,120 139,273 6,488 0 
21033040 6,948 0 0 4,587 
Italy Total 29,561,244 16,106,854 1,106,492 673,698 
Netherlands 02023050 0 0 0 186,822 
07031040 2,090,950 752,685 359,642 873,019 
07129010 1,659,010 1,135,715 14,980 0 
19054000 450,199 573,930 496,751 362,311 
20098060 1,293,219 2,613,537 26,422 127,160 
21013000 39,292 8,251 7,813 0 
21033040 44,383 32,347 7,953 4,003 
Netherlands Total 5,572,378 5,113,770 913,561 1,553,315 
Portugal 19054000 10,117 13,887 0 0 
20098060 0 3,305 0 15,394 
21013000 51,772 34,403 30,748 22,919 
Portugal Total 61,889 51,595 30,748 38,313 
Spain 02013006 0 0 5,286 0 
07031040 164,634 180,646 0 0 
07095200 19,028 20,246 0 19,945 
19054000 640,073 578,281 372,345 576,648 
20098060 200,879 275,133 0 23,634 
Spain Total 1,024,614 1,054,306 377,631 620,227 
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Sweden 19054000 560,939 32,448 70,418 20,346 
20098060 109,800 54,900 0 0 
21033040 14,878 3,483 5,250 4,766 
Sweden Total 685,617 90,831 75,668 25,112 
Grand Total 129,491,561 87,888,953 15,522,733 16,213,122 
Source: u.s. International Trade Commission. 
'U.S. imports for consumption. 
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TABLE A.4. Customs value of products by E.U. country of origin for which 100 ad 
valorem tariffs apply only to other countries of origin, 1998-2001 (U.S. dollars)a 
Country HTSNumber 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Austria 02101100 0 0 0 2,415 
18063100 161,180 272,119 196,230 2,156,521 
20079905 207,167 217,465 202,946 158,864 
35061050 0 8,143 0 2,476 
55101100 12,465,147 9,049,780 7,452,356 2,887,136 
Austria Total 12,833,494 9,547,507 7,851,532 5,207,412 
Belgium 05040000 0 21,647 83,283 0 
15059000 373,110 701,892 1,519,748 1,424,963 
18063100 2,328,511 2,471,273 1,768,286 1,337,393 
20079905 55,216 156,684 640,903 662,976 
21041000 155,293 0 4,103 7,466 
35061050 76,094 62,948 123,564 157,609 
55101100 1,177,341 99,374 241,228 498,033 
Belgium Total 4,165,565 3,513,818 4,381,115 4,088,440 
Denmark 05040000 10,947,759 11,497,736 12,978,740 11,747,035 
18063100 83,784 150,815 300,784 72,904 
20079905 665,020 1,020,305 432,985 487,299 
21041000 0 9,358 0 79,488 
35061050 1,295 0 475,517 482,056 
Denmark Total 11,697,858 12,678,214 14,188,026 12,868,782 
Finland 05040000 228,689 9,798 34,285 0 
18063100 109,612 108,598 384,355 238,488 
20079905 31,137 31,489 26,212 26,807 
55101100 175,598 0 0 0 
Finland Total 545,036 149,885 444,852 265,295 
Germany 15059000 1,525,206 1,246,765 884,898 1,478,521 
18063100 13,150,555 11,533,757 16,052,627 24,023,515 
20079905 292,846 164,975 180,252 218,867 
35061050 14,556,930 7,767,136 6,881,763 5,647,222 
Germany Total 29,525,537 20,712,633 23,999,540 31,368,125 
Greece 05040000 36,143 0 0 0 
18063100 0 6,094 2,007 76,682 
20021000 0 0 4,709 12,506 
20079905 0 33,879 24,754 96,235 
21041000 0 0 29,713 0 
55101100 8,653 0 0 0 
Greece Total 44,796 39,973 61,183 185,423 
Ireland 02101100 27,457 0 0 0 
05040000 0 0 169,479 0 
18063100 110,005 92,599 73,930 35,235 
20079905 10,114 14,165 2,640 5,208 
21041000 121,072 104,379 124,949 69,083 
35061050 4,656,943 6,084,905 6,800,422 6,263,943 
Ireland Total 4,925,591 6,296,048 7,171,420 6,373,469 
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TABLE A.4. Continued. 
Country HTSNumber 1998 199.9 2000 2001 
Italy 02101100 547,930 1,329,108 557,978 288,437 
05040000 0 149,425 137,524 91,948 
15059000 159,566 359,028 193,510 155,971 
18063100 1,583,649 571,208 771,751 1,059,310 
20079905 11,469 17,917 70,249 48,009 
21041000 529,901 258,984 139,535 88,006 
35061050 47,395 1,384,188 761,333 296,700 
55101100 930,481 1,684,460 1,005,580 354,899 
Italy Total 3,810,391 5,754,318 3,637,460 2,383,280 
Netherlands 05040000 1,800,941 707,759 1,951,816 2,194,555 
15059000 95,329 198,316 139,082 74,634 
18063100 57,655 414,366 715,843 458,960 
20079905 0 6,878 45,653 39,483 
21041000 136,011 78,467 223,582 66,345 
35061050 614,826 97,291 222,625 410,686 
55101100 0 0 0 55,000 
Netherlands Total 2,704,762 1,503,074 3,298,601 3,299,663 
Portugal 05040000 1,217,054 933,674 1,203,474 981,258 
18063100 26,928 18,437 27,224 14,520 
20021000 0 0 0 6,560 
21041000 173,444 139,675 175,405 171,322 
35061050 21,633 0 2,400 0 
55101100 17,852 785,211 757,494 670,936 
Portugal Total 1,456,911 1,876,997 2,165,997 1,844,596 
Spain 02101100 155,010 1,024,786 2,201,858 379,493 
05040000 0 0 2,714 381,785 
18063100 80,718 112,445 191,360 259,479 
20021000 3,423,000 1,403,067 271,775 585,964 
20079905 0 46,138 5,452 21,023 
21041000 64,427 454,909 423,785 465,097 
35061050 18,212 181,415 427,184 143,676 
55101100 469,588 3,095,999 2,980,423 1,735,141 
Spain Total 4,210,955 6,318,759 6,504,551 3,971,658 
Sweden 05040000 1,735,784 791,057 391,085 0 
18063100 24,900 30,571 66,988 219,072 
20079905 455,115 666,085 566,920 443,834 
21041000 11,750 31,270 20,848 12,575 
35061050 173,281 69,794 166,507 34,746 
55101100 0 35,512 48,881 68,510 
Sweden Total 2,400,830 1,624,289 1,261,229 778,737 
Total, All Countries 78,321,826 70,015,515 74,965,506 72,634,880 
Source: u.s. International Trade Commission. 
'U.S. imports for consumption. 
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